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THE LOGIC

OF

INTROSPECTION;

OR,

METHOD IN MENTAL SCIENCE.

BY

REV. J. B. WENTWORTH, D.D.

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TO THE MEMORY OF MY VENERATED FATHER,

RICHARD WENTWORTH, ESQ.,

WHO, AS THE COMPANION AND INTELLECTUAL GUIDE OF MY YOUTH, BY HIS DISPLAY OF SUBTLE LOGICAL POWER, KEEN METAPHYSICAL ANALYSIS, AND DEEP PENETRATION INTO THE WORKINGS OF CONSCIOUSNESS, FIRST GAVE MY MIND ITS BIAS TOWARD SPECULATIVE STUDY, AND TAUGHT ME TO PRACTICE THE INTROSPECTIVE ART,

THIS WORK IS

Most Affectionately Dedicated

BY THE AUTHOR,

JOHN BRODHEAD WENTWORTH.

BUFFALO, N. Y., *April* 20, 1886.

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INTRODUCTORY.

ON METHOD.

PSYCHOLOGIC METHOD is the theme to which this work invites the reader's attention. Nor could we be called to consider a subject more deeply fraught with interest because of the nature of its contents, or more fruitful by reason of the number and magnitude of its conclusions.

SEC. 1. *What is Intellectual Method?*

Method relates chiefly to the direction of men's thoughts, the systematic course of their intellectual faculties, when engaged in the pursuit and discovery of truth. From its very nature, therefore, the question of Method is the prime question of all science. Its determination is the first thing to call for the attention and efforts of the philosopher; and its correct elucidation is the prime condition of all true intellectual culture, and of all genuine reflective knowledge.

The discovery and settlement of the various questions pertaining to Method is, in propriety, the business of LOGIC: for the aim of Logic is to de-

termine the principles and rules which are to govern the human mind in its pursuit of truth. In the order of nature and of thought, therefore, Logic, as thus defined, is the Fundamental Science; from the fact that it is only on condition of a science of Logic, that any science whatever is possible. Such is the view of the province and prerogatives of Logic, as entertained by that most judicious of English logicians, Archbishop Whately; for he defines Logic to be the science, as well as the art, of Reasoning: "Meaning," as says John Stuart Mill, who concurs in the correctness of this definition, "by the former term, the analysis of the mental process which takes place whenever we reason, and by the latter, the rules, grounded upon that analysis, for conducting the process correctly." For he adds, "A right understanding of the mental process itself, of the conditions it depends upon, and the steps of which it consists, is the only basis on which a system of rules fitted for the direction of the process can possibly be founded."

In this light, also, did Bacon regard this subject; and he characterized his "Novum Organum" as "a species of Logic," in that it consists of rules and helps for the Understanding in the inquisition of nature.

It being, then, the sole aim of Logic to prescribe and delineate the procedure of the intellectual faculties in their search after truth, it can in no other

way, perhaps, be more tersely and correctly defined than as the Science of Method. Hence the question of Method, which I propose here briefly to discuss, resolves itself into one of Logic.

By thus settling at the outset the particular field of thought, the precise department of science, to which our theme belongs, we secure these advantages, namely: that we know our whereabouts, and will be less likely to be enticed away and become confused in the consideration of matters not relevant to the subject in hand; while, at the same time, we are furnished with appropriate rules and implements of thought by which to prosecute our investigations.

SEC. 2. *Importance of a Right Method.*

From what we have already said, the great importance of a correct Method can readily be inferred. Indeed, in science every thing depends upon it. The fate of every system of philosophy is wrapped up in the Method of its prosecution and development. As the issue of a voyage is determined by the points of the compass by which the ship is steered, so the result of every speculative and scientific undertaking is contained in the direction of thought, the line of reasoning, which shall therein be adopted and pursued. The true and desired haven, in either case, can only be reached by taking and continuing in the right course.

This truth is clearly and accurately expressed by

Cousin: "Method," says he, "is the genius of a system; and a system is little else than a method in action, a method applied. One can always, a system being given, re-ascend to the method which could lead thither; or, a method being given, one can predict the system which will spring from its rigorous application. Put a method into the world, and you put a system into the world which the future will take care to develop. Between a system and its Method, there is nearly the relation of effect to cause: this cause, then, must be reached, in order to master any system."

In the following definition of Sir William Hamilton, one cannot fail to see the vital importance of a right method: "All method is a rational progress, a progress toward an end; and the method of philosophy is the procedure conducive to the end which philosophy proposes."

Under this view of Method, or the logical procedure of the rational faculties in their search after truth, we cannot be mistaken in regarding it as a matter of prime consequence with the philosopher and man of science. The theories which we here adopt will both shape the outlines and conditionate the conclusions of all subsequent theories. The thoughts of every philosopher and man of science should, then, first and longest, be directed to the subject of Method; for all the success of his after labors is conditional hereupon. A mis-

take here will prove inevitably fatal, and render vain and fruitless all forth-issuing speculations. I did not, then, overstate or misstate the fact at the outset, when I said that Logic is, in the natural as well as the chronological order, the first of all the sciences; that the department of philosophy, which elucidates and settles the method of procedure of the intellectual faculties in their pursuit of truth, is the Prime Philosophy.

SEC. 3. *How to settle the question of Right Method.*

And now, next in order, the question occurs, How shall this question of Method be determined? In what way shall we discover the rules to be adopted for the guidance of the Understanding in its investigations in any given province of philosophic inquiry? I answer, the right Method to be pursued in the prosecution of any branch of science or philosophy is to be settled in two ways, namely: First, by considering the nature of the mental faculties which will therein be brought into use and action; and, secondly, by considering the nature of the facts, ideas, and principles which are therein contained. For Logical Method is no more than a process of mediation between the intellectual faculties, and the objects of those faculties. It seeks to draw out and fix, not simply the laws of the reasoning powers, but the modes of action of those powers when employed upon their correla-

tive objects. A true Method, relating to any subject, then, must take into account both the powers of the intellect brought into requisition, and the objects by them to be investigated.

SEC. 4. *In the last analysis, the true Method, in whatever department of Science, is to be discovered by a study of the spontaneous action of the Rational powers.*

This classification, this dual division of the subject of Method just indicated, is, I am aware, rather formal than real, rather speculative than practical. For, though the nature of a subject toward which the mind is directed may affect the mode of procedure in its investigation, this fact is made known only by the actual operations of the mind while employed thereupon; and, in the last analysis, is, therefore, to be referred to some law of thought, some essential law of mental action. In other words, it is the nature of the intellectual powers to be regulated and controlled in their action, more or less, by the quality of the objects upon which they are brought to bear: so that the ultimate grounds and original principles of all forms and processes of reasoning are found in the structure and constitution of the mind.

And from this fact we deduce a very important truth—one worthy of careful consideration, and which philosophers, in adopting their methods of inquiry, have been wont to ignore, to the great

detriment of sound learning, namely: that the course to be pursued—the way of rational procedure in the discovery of truth in whichever of the realms of being — cannot be made known through any process of *a priori* reasoning, but alone by examining the actual operations of the intellect, as developed in the Consciousness. Neglect of this obvious fact has corrupted Science, and introduced into philosophic literature a mass of vague and fanciful speculations: and by this neglect, false Methods have been applied in every region of human inquiry — in the study of God, the world, and the mind; and nothing but falsehood can result from the application of a false Method.

The attempt to lay out and establish rules for the guidance of the Intellect in any department of truth, without first reflecting upon the actual spontaneous modes and processes of the Intellect when employed in that department, cannot be otherwise than imaginary and abortive. A system of *a priori* Logic must necessarily be a fiction: for the Intellect cannot anticipate its own reasoning processes. Its modes of operating in the study of being and its attributes, and in comparing, combining, and separating its own ideas, cannot by itself be foreseen. They must first be actually disclosed in the Consciousness, and then be seized and apprehended by Reflection.

SEC. 5. *Bearing of the distinction between the Spontaneous and the Reflective action of the Intellectual Powers upon the subject in hand.*

And here we are brought face to face with that most fundamental and fruitful distinction in Mental Science, which was insisted upon with so much emphasis and iteration by the great Eclectic Philosopher, Cousin—the distinction, namely, between the spontaneous and the reflective action of the Intellect. In fact, every faculty of the mind has its native appetencies, its inherent instincts, having their source in the essential constitution and nature of each faculty. And thus every attribute of the soul, under proper conditions, puts forth its power and performs its functions spontaneously; and in this way does it disclose its nature and laws in the Consciousness, precisely as they are, without modification or interruption from personal volition.

And these spontaneous disclosures are the mental phenomena, the facts of consciousness, which constitute the proper objects of reflection, and the ground and condition of a true Psychology.

The Reason and Understanding have their innate functions and appetencies, no less than the Sensibilities; and, when their correlative objects are presented, and the proper conditions are supplied, they develop themselves in spontaneous action—in which they make known their essential laws, and actually exemplify in consciousness the various

modes and processes of thinking and reasoning of which the human intellect is capable.

In this spontaneity of the Reason and Understanding are found all the materials for Rational Science and Logic; and, by reflection upon their spontaneous processes and modes of action, and only thus, do we discover the laws of human thought, and are enabled to construct a science of Method, which shall furnish rules for the future guidance of the rational powers in all voluntary and intentional efforts, for the increase or systemization of our reflective knowledge.

SEC. 6. *The seeming paradox involved in the above proposition.*

To this point having at length been brought, we find ourselves involved in this most singular paradox: We have said—and the assertion is true in reason and true in fact—that the science of Method is the condition of, and must antedate, all other science; for it is plain that we can reflectively construct no system of knowledge until we are taught how to use our knowing faculties. But we have just seen that we can only discover the right use of our knowing faculties, by attending to their modes and processes of action and development as spontaneously disclosed in consciousness; that is, the science of Method, which logically and chronologically antedates all science, is itself conditioned upon and antedated by Psychology.

We can only explain and escape this paradox, by taking into account the fact that Psychology itself, as a science, has its Method upon which it is conditioned; and that, from its very nature, it necessarily includes both its own and all other forms of Method. In other words, Logic, as the science of Method, is contained in and constitutes a part of Psychology, and, in so far, is identical with it.

THE LOGIC OF INTROSPECTION.

BOOK I.

STATUS OF PSYCHOLOGIC METHOD REVIEWED.

CHAPTER I.

INDUCTION THE ACCREDITED METHOD.

SEC. 1. *The question of Psychologic Method very generally ignored by Philosophers.*

Within the period of modern speculation, I know not that this question of Method has been made a special and definite subject of scientific solution.

By this, I do not recklessly and ignorantly assert, that this question has been entirely ignored by modern philosophers. It has been, indeed, by many of them; and, with all of them, the inquiries which have given direction to their labors and meditations have related chiefly to the origin of our ideas, and the grounds and sources of human knowledge. A discussion of the laws of Reason, and of the relation of thought to substantial existence —that is, Rational Criticism and Ontology—have

absorbed the attention of the cultivators of modern Metaphysical Science. But it is one thing to criticise the Reason, and quite another to inquire how this criticism ought to be conducted. It is one thing to examine the process by which the mind apprehends substantial existence, and another to determine the Method by which the mind may know itself and the modes of its own operation.

And while multitudes of our modern philosophers have given their whole time and attention to the former of these subjects, but few seem to have had the latter even suggested to their thoughts, with any degree of distinctness; and of these few, not one has attempted an elaborate and logical exposition of the procedure of the mental faculties, in investigating the phenomena of Consciousness. Not one has proposed to himself, in any published writings, the scientific construction of a Psychologic Method.

SEC. 2. *Incidental allusions by certain Philosophers to the question of Psychologic Method.*

The necessity of such a Method to the success of Mental Philosophy some have felt and confessed. Of these, none so fully and emphatically as Cousin. Nor do I know of any Psychologist of modern times who, by being endowed with the true psychologic insight, was so well qualified as he to supply this *desideratum*.

Indeed, Cousin has, here and there in his writ-

ings, stated what seemed to him the grounds and outlines of such a Method, in his remarks upon consciousness, spontaneity and reflection, and analysis and synthesis; but only incidentally and in a fragmentary style—only in general terms, and not with any degree of scientific precision and accuracy. And the same may be said, also, of Sir William Hamilton. Both these Philosophers assert a critical analysis of the spontaneous states of consciousness to be the beginning of a true process of psychologic research, and that it finds its completion in reflective reconstruction and synthesis. But neither of them expounds to us the doctrine of Analysis and Synthesis, as applied to the mental phenomena. They do not define the extent, nor explain the nature, of their analytic process; and hence do not, of course, refer the various steps and stages of this process to the correlative laws and functions of the Reason. And, therefore, they do not explain to our understanding either their Analysis or their Synthesis. In fine, they both, by failing to distinguish between analysis and synthesis as applied to the mind, and analysis and synthesis as applied to the phenomena of nature (though they practically adopt a method of mental research unique and their own), do yet theoretically fall in with the common herd of Mental Philosophers, since the Baconian era, by accepting and glorifying Induction as the proper Method of procedure in Psychology.

They, therefore, constitute no exception to the declaration which I now make, namely: that there is not one Mental Philosopher of modern times who has made Method a subject of notice and remark, that has called in question the Baconian theory of Induction; not one of this class of Philosophers that has not assented and subscribed to this theory, either tacitly or in express terms, as a mode of investigation applicable to the mind and its processes. A number make no formal reference thereto in their writings; some give merely a passing eulogium, in incidental allusions, to this species of research as a means of interpreting the laws and ongoings of the mind; while others, in extended remarks and systematic courses of reasoning, attempt to show its precise adaptation to mental as well as physical investigation, and profess to make a practical application of it in their expositions of the phenomena of thought, feeling, and will. And thus, by silent consent or by open and public profession, the theory of Induction, as expounded by Lord Bacon, has become universally received as the true and appropriate Method for conducting the search after the truth in Psychology, among the Philosophers of the present day.

SEC. 3. *Induction every-where regarded as the true Method of Psychologic Investigation.*

The above statement of fact, no well-informed person will, perhaps, feel disposed to deny. And

yet it may be more satisfactory to some, and certainly it will give a greater formal completeness to my argument, to back it up by reference and quotation.

We will pause, therefore, to give a few specimens in proof from the writings of some of the most approved and authoritative among our modern Psychologists.

1. And let us begin with McCosh, as being among the most recent metaphysical writers of eminence, and because he is prëeminent for his Baconian zeal, and furthermore because nowhere else than in him is the disparity between pretension and performance, in the application of this his pet Method, more conspicuous. This writer has produced a work, not without great merit, upon "The Intuitions of the Mind;" a department of mental science the highest and most difficult, and containing questions the most abstruse and transcendental, of any in the whole domain of psychologic thought. And it is in this work, upon a class of principles and ideas, as far removed from the ordinary world of observation and experiment as heaven from earth, that McCosh professes his adhesion to the Baconian Method, and pretends to employ Induction as his only guide: not, indeed, as though he were introducing an innovation or a novelty—as he really is not—but simply in the way of establishing his logical orthodoxy, and preparing the minds of all

careful, prudent, and judicious thinkers, for a favorable reception of his doctrines.

Thus he declares, "In inquiring into the evidence of the existence of native and necessary principles, into the place which they hold in the constitution of the mind, into the laws by which they are guided and the way in which they manifest themselves, I am to proceed throughout in the Method of Induction. I propose to prosecute the investigation in the way of the observation of facts, with an accompanying analysis and coördination, but still of facts which have been carefully collected. It has often been shown," he adds, "that the Method of Induction admits, *mutatis mutandis*, of an application to the study of the human mind as well as to that of the material universe." *

That he does not mean by Induction simply Observation, but an exact and rigid adherence to those rules which Bacon laid down for the interpretation of physical nature, is evident enough from the following passage: "Just as the law of gravitation is not written on the face of the sky, so that the eye can see it, so neither is the law of causation printed on the soul, so that Consciousness can read off the inscription. The one law, like the other, is to be ascertained by an investigation of its individual acts, and this in a state of things in which the action of one property is closely interblended with

* "Intuitions of the Mind," p. 2.

that of other properties, necessitating not only an observation of facts, but a very patient and discerning Induction, so that we may catch the rule of the different agencies." *

There can, therefore, be no misunderstanding of the purpose with which this writer set out: that he failed in its fulfillment—or rather, that he abandoned it almost entirely when he came to the body of his work — must be equally manifest to every careful reader; and it is much to his credit, as well as to the cause of philosophic truth, that he did.

2. As another example, take Dr. Thomas Brown. In his "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," after an explanation of the theory of Induction as applied to material existences and phenomena, he says: "Such, then, is Physical Inquiry, both as to its object and its mode of procedure, particularly as it regards the universe without; and the laws which regulate our inquiry in the internal world of thought are, in every respect, similar. The same great objects are to be had in view, and no other—the analysis of what is complex, and the observation and arrangement of the sequences of phenomena, as respectively antecedent and consequent."† And in consistency with his idea of the mode of procedure in the study of mentality, he proceeds to assert: "In this respect, also, the

* "Intuitions of the Mind," p. 71.

† "Philosophy of the Human Mind," vol. i, p. 89.

philosophy of matter and the philosophy of mind completely agree; that in both equally our knowledge is confined to the phenomena which they exhibit."* Indeed, most of the grave errors into which Brown fell can be traced directly to his mistaken notion of the use of the Inductive principle in the explication of the facts of Consciousness.

3. As another example of the credit which is awarded to the Baconian system—the authority almost universally ascribed to it, in the domain of Mental Science, by modern Philosophers, I refer you to William Archer Butler.

In his "History of Ancient Philosophy," he argues at length that Psychology is an Inductive Science. "We have seen, thus," says he, "that an Inductive Science of the Mind—the immediate subject of our present consideration—is possible from the very existence of science of any kind."† Thus placing the study of mind and matter upon the same basis, and declaring their phenomena to be subject to the same rules of interpretation. And afterward he again affirms, that "the present improved state of Psychology is indirectly his (Bacon's) creation," in that, "it is due to the irresistible influence of the vast triumphs achieved by Inductive observation in the external world."‡ We shall not here question the truth of this assertion, nor inquire, at present, into the influence really exerted by the

* "Phil. of the Human Mind," i, p. 89. † P. 113. ‡ P. 130.

theory of Bacon upon modern metaphysical speculation, but shall defer this for subsequent consideration.

4. We cite Dugald Stewart, as another witness to the almost universal deference accorded to the Inductive Method, by the modern cultivators of Mental Philosophy.

In the second chapter of his "Philosophical Essays," Stewart replies, with spirit and success, to a critic in the "Edinburg Review," who had attacked the favorite study of that Philosopher, on the ground of its *inutility*. And among other things urged in his own defense, he claims to be, in his own peculiar sphere of intellectual exertion, a disciple of the great founder of the Inductive Philosophy. Not a mere speculatist, but a diligent and laborious plodder among facts of observation and experiment. He apologetically says: "That Bacon's Philosophy was constantly present to my thoughts when I have dwelt, in any of my publications, on the importance of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, must be evident to all who have read them with attention. The sanguine and extravagant expectations which I am accused to have formed with respect to the advantages likely to result from its future improvement, will be found to resolve chiefly into a conviction (founded on the astonishing success with which the followers of Bacon have been attended), that much may yet be

done to direct and accelerate the progress of the mind, by completing that undertaking to which he gave a beginning." As though, if he could convince the public that he employed the orthodox and accredited Method of Induction in his researches into the arcana of the soul, his labors would require no further justification.

5. Let us close our citation of psychologic authors, in proof of their unanimous concurrence in the opinion that Induction is the method of search, as applicable in the domain of Mind as of Matter, with the following from President Porter, found in his work on "The Human Intellect." He is there endeavoring to substantiate the proposition that Psychology is a Science; and, by way of conclusion, asserts: "While, then, Psychology is an Inductive Science, with a peculiar subject-matter to which it points us continually, and to the source from which it is derived, as exempting it from the associations and prepossessions with which physical philosophy would invest it, it is not merely an Inductive Science, but is, in a certain sense, the Science of Induction itself."*

These quotations will serve to indicate the general sentiment entertained upon this subject by modern Psychologists: and it is only for this purpose that I have introduced them. Were it necessary, they could be multiplied to any extent.

* Introduction, sec. iv.

CHAPTER II.

Why Induction has been thus Generally Accepted as the True Method of Psychologic Research.

That the Inductive mode of demonstration should be in such high and universal favor with the Psychologists of the present day, may be regarded by most persons, perhaps, as evidence that it is the true and proper course to be adopted in the discovery and investigation of mental laws and causes. And, therefore, it seems necessary that I should here attempt to meet and refute any such opinion or prejudice, and thus clear the way for the introduction and favorable reception of the direct argument, which I propose to bring to bear against the Baconian theory, as a rule for prosecuting the Science of the Mind.

Sec. 1. *Influence of Caprice, Custom, and Authority.*

The saying of Pope, that "whatever is, is right," no more holds good in Philosophy, than in Morals. The influence of caprice, authority, custom, and opinion, is as powerful in the world of letters as in social life. The talismanic sway of a great mind is as strongly felt in literature, as in politics. A powerful genius will stamp the impress of his opinions upon a whole period of philosophic

progress, put the seal of universal orthodoxy upon false or baseless theories, compel all the *literati* of the age to do him homage by becoming his servitors and laboring for the development and perfection of his system, and cause the method and technical terms of his own science to be taken up, adopted, and repeated, in every department of literature, as the scholastic rage and fashion of the times. Sometimes the scholars of an age are, by caprice or accident, or by the peculiar circumstances of the times, determined to the special cultivation of a particular branch of learning; and the success which attends their labors here gives an undue prominence and influence to that special science, removes it from its legitimate sphere and relations, and causes the ideas and logical forms and modes of reasoning peculiar to it to be made use of in the treatment of other subjects and sciences, to which they have no just application.

Thus in the history of English literature, when Mathematics became the rage among scholars, writers upon Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics must needs divide their works into axioms, demonstrations, scholia and corollaries, and, upon all subjects of a probable nature, undertake to imitate the logical processes of the Geometrician.

SEC. 2. *Necessities of Science.*

But to adduce a more conspicuous instance, and one far more pertinent to our theme: Out of what

necessity of science, I ask, sprang Bacon's theory for the interpretation of physical nature? All will answer, The barren and unproductive state of Natural Philosophy in his time, and during all former ages. This is the account which he himself renders of his work, as he surveys the learning of his own and of former times. To remedy this defect was the great object of his literary labors. But why this dearth of physical knowledge? Bacon well and truly answers, Because of the application and employment of a false Method—one having no logical relation to the nature of the subject.

What was that Method? The Metaphysical and Deductive; and it became the accredited mode of intellectual procedure, not only upon all subjects which depend upon the ideas of the human mind—upon speculation and opinion—but also in the department of natural existences and physics, where it is entirely out of place, and can achieve no worthy and reliable results, on this wise: The ancient civilized nations were destitute of the knowledge of Revelation.

SEC. 3. *Influence of Religious Thought.*

But the subjects and questions which Religion includes are of most vital interest to men, and do, naturally and ever, engage the attention of the inquisitive and discursive Reason. In their treatment and resolution, therefore, the sages and philosophers of old, being supplied with no foreign data

or helps, were compelled to rely upon their own unaided powers of intellect. They grappled with the questions relating to the being and attributes of God, the origin of the universe, the origin of evil, and the nature and destiny of the human soul, with the help only of such instruments and data as Reason supplied. They betook themselves to meditation, examined the workings of their own minds, began with the most abstract and general ideas as a basis, and built up their theories into consistent and symmetrical unity, in conformity with the regulative laws of the formal Understanding.

They were shut up here to the metaphysical and deductive method of research, as a necessity of their intellectual condition; and hence this became the prevailing method of philosophizing among the ancients. In the sphere of Religion and Morals and Abstract Ideas, where it had its origin, it was and is legitimate, and capable of glorious achievements. But when made use of in the inquisition of Nature, it became productive of nothing but vagaries and falsehood, since the actual laws and processes of Nature bear no relation or resemblance to the logical ongoings and conclusions of the human Understanding.

That the thinkers and sages of the olden time should, however, have sought to extend the Method which had given birth and form and contents to their Philosophy beyond its proper sphere,

into and over the realm of Physics, was natural and, indeed, inevitable. They had become familiar with its forms; their minds had contracted habits of thinking induced by its customary use; and their imaginations were dazzled by the brilliancy of its achievements in its native field of speculation. While, then, we have here a striking illustration of the abortive and pernicious consequences flowing from the employment of a false Method of logical procedure in a given department of science, we have also, and specially, a notable and standing proof of the influence which authority, custom, and partial success may exert, in extending the application of a particular Method of philosophic research beyond the limits of its legitimate province, into all the fields of human knowledge.

SEC. 4. *Reaction from the Deductive and Metaphysical Method that guided the Ancient Speculations.*

The universal popularity and imagined universal applicability of the Inductive System is but the modern reaction against the old, and once universal, Deductive and Metaphysical process of scientific research. The science of the supersensible was the Philosophy of the old world; Physics is now in the ascendant. The ancients sought to draw Philosophy down from heaven to earth; we draw our Philosophy from the earth; and, it must be confessed, it does not tend much heavenward. The

thought of our age has taken a materialistic direction. It delves in matter, and is busy with the discovery of the dark and devious ways by which Nature accomplishes her wonderful works.

This is chiefly owing to the impulse given to natural studies by the writings of Lord Bacon. The rules he laid down, for the inquisition of physical laws and causes, have revolutionized the sciences, and reversed the ancient order and relation of the different branches of knowledge.

The potent wand of the Inductive Philosophy, placed by him in the hand of modern learning, has been reached out to and has touched every part of the material universe, causing it every-where to reveal its inmost secrets, and to yield up its treasures and surrender its powers for the comfort and dignity of the human race. And the astonishing increase and development which this system has given to natural and mechanical knowledge, within the last two hundred years, is the great reason which has induced Psychologists of the present age to give to it their tacit or avowed theoretic adoption, in their province of Philosophic inquiry.

If the Baconian Logic has done so much toward clearing away the mists of dreamy and speculative error which floated over the field of Natural Science —if it has so far unlocked the secrets of Nature and disclosed her hidden operations—why may it not also, it has been argued, accomplish the same desira-

ble and beneficent results in the domain of Mental Philosophy? And so, under the inspiration of this hope, our Psychologists have awarded it their assent and indorsement, without any thorough investigation of its rules and requirements. What else, indeed, could we expect from such general and intense devotion to physical studies as characterizes the learning and scholarship of the present day, than a transference of the ideas, rules, habits of thought, and modes of reasoning contracted in the pursuit of such studies, to that department of learning which treats of the phenomena and laws of the human mind? As it was unavoidable that the ancients should apply the modes of reasoning peculiar to the ethical and metaphysical studies chiefly cultivated by them, to the investigation of Nature, so it was hardly to be avoided that the modes of inquisition and research employed in Physical Philosophy, which is now in the ascendant, should be applied in examining the constitution and ways of acting of the human soul.

BOOK II.

THE INDUCTIVE METHOD: ITS PROPER DOMAIN AND ITS LIMITATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

STATEMENT AND EXPOSITION OF THE BACONIAN THEORY OF INDUCTION.

HAVING above indicated some of the reasons which have induced the general acquiescence in the Baconian system, by the scholars of the present day, as being the true guide of the Reason in its pursuit of truth relating to the mind, it would seem to accord with the demands of a logical arrangement, that I should next proceed to a careful and minute exposition of that system. But before we come directly to that, I wish to allude to and correct some vague notions and misapprehensions, that have been and are entertained respecting the theory of Induction.

SEC. 1. *Induction not simply a gathering of Facts and Observation of them.*

By some, Induction is understood to signify simply a collecting of facts relating to a given subject. This, however, is not Induction; it is only the first preparative thereto.

In common parlance, Induction is often used as synonymous with Observation. And even Philosophers, who are supposed to use terms of science with the utmost precision, have been betrayed into this loose way of speaking, and thence into great confusion of ideas upon this subject. Thus McCosh, in speaking of Metaphysics, says: "Like every other science which has to do with facts, it must be conducted in the Inductive Method, in which Observation is the first process and the last process, and the main process throughout."* He here practices a wrong mode of defining, as applied to any subject or idea. The attempt to define any term by the use of one more general is absurd, and gives us no knowledge of the thing defined. Induction is a specific process; Observation is general in its nature; and to predicate the latter of the former is not true definition.

Besides, Observation is no more than the effort of the mind in seeing what is, or occurs; it is only the Intellect in the attitude of attending to what is transpiring in the inner or outer world. But Induction is a process of reasoning. It is not simply the action of the mind while looking at facts; it is that effort of thought which endeavors to look through facts, and, by looking through them, to discover their laws and causes. And, be it understood, in Inductive reasoning simple observation of

* "Intuitions," p. 283.

facts is not even the principal prerequisite; it is not even that which renders the chief and most important assistance, for that is Experiment: for Experiment goes deeper into the heart of things, and furnishes to the understanding more reliable data upon which to base its reasonings, than mere Observation.

SEC. 2. *Induction not accurately defined as Analysis and Synthesis.*

Other Philosophers there are, who define Induction to be the Method of Analysis and Synthesis. Even the critical Cousin, and the marvelously acute and learned Sir William Hamilton, have so spoken and treated upon it.

But both these writers also declare Analysis and Synthesis to be the *only* method possible in philosophizing. Thus Hamilton says: "There is but one possible Method of Philosophy—a combination of Analysis and Synthesis. The aberrations of Philosophy have been all so many violations of the laws of this one Method."* And Cousin: "The history of Method, that is, of Philosophy, is the history itself of Analysis, followed step by step by Synthesis."†

The same objection can be urged against the above definition that William Archer Butler brings against the Cartesian rule of Philosophy, namely:

* "Lectures on Metaphysics," p. 76.

† "History of Modern Philosophy," vol. i, p. 326.

that, though "correct in a general sense, yet, as presented to ordinary thinkers, it contains nothing very novel in theory or very useful in practice." Moreover, if Analysis and Synthesis is the only Method possible in Philosophy, then it only includes Induction, as it includes all other specific Methods; and therefore we gain herefrom a no more correct idea of the Method of Induction, than of the Method of Aristotle and the Schoolmen, against which Bacon leveled his anathemas.

Indeed, Hamilton, to prove his proposition that Analysis and Synthesis is the only Method possible in the acquisition of philosophic knowledge, reviews all the theoretical systems that have arisen and flourished from the earliest times, and shows that each and all were the outgrowth of this one Method variously applied. We learn nothing, then, and can learn nothing herefrom, concerning the specific character of the Baconian theory. A definition, which applies equally to all methods ever used in philosophy, cannot give us an understanding of that one expounded in the "Novum Organum."

SEC. 3. *The Baconian Method Precise and Unique.*

True definition consists in enumeration, and not in the use of vague and general terms. The theory of Bacon is precise, definite, specific. He reduced his Method to the precise and orderly form of a Science. Every step in the process which he recommended in the study of Nature is by him plainly

set down, from beginning to conclusion. Nothing is left to guess-work. Every thing here is as fixed, and arranged with as much logical precision, as is the course of procedure in Mathematical demonstration. And nothing short of this would come up to our ideal of a scientific Method. And such a one it was, that Bacon essayed and accomplished. Such a one is Induction.

To learn what this is, and to obtain that true and precise definition after which we are seeking, we must repair to the writings which compose "The Great Instauration." The authority of Bacon, in settling the precise nature of the theory which bears his name, will not be called in question by any one. He is the great father of the Inductive Philosophy; and any thing short of, or aside from, the Method which he propounded, and whose rules he laid down, must be confessed not to be Induction.

SEC. 4. *Bacon's own Definition of his Method.*

We will, then, at once repair to Bacon, and question him for an explanation of that method which, as says McCosh, all Philosophers of the modern era have at least theoretically accepted as the correct Method of Psychologic investigation—unless it may be Schelling and Hegel. And in drawing out this exposition from Bacon, I shall employ, as far as I can without being tedious, his own language, so that my readers may be satisfied that I do not mis-

represent his theory, or give to it a false coloring by passing it through the laboratory of my own mind.

1. The following, then, are the various and successive steps in the process of Induction as wrought out by him: First, a subject for examination being given, "we must prepare, as a foundation for the whole, a complete natural and experimental History. We must not," he adds, by way of caution, "imagine or invent, but discover the acts and operations of Nature."

2. But then, secondly, "natural and experimental History is so varied and diffuse that it confounds and distracts the understanding, unless it be fixed and exhibited in due order. We must, therefore," says he, "form tables and coördinations of instances, upon such a plan and in such order, that the understanding may be able to act upon them." Hence these "tables of instances," relating to the given nature whose form or cause is to be discovered or determined, must be divided into three parts, or under three heads, for the assistance and direction of the intellect; first, of *agreeing* instances, or instances in which the given nature manifestly appears; second, of *disagreeing* instances, or those which, being similar to the others in their general outlines and qualities, do not, however, contain the given nature; and, third, of *mediate* instances, that is, such as seem to lie between the other two, and

do not exhibit or contain the given nature, only in a latent degree and in initiatory forms.

3. But, thirdly, "when this is done, the understanding, left to itself and its own operations, is incompetent and unfit to construct its axioms without direction and support."

And, therefore, the first step in this third part of the process, and which is, in truth, the beginning of legitimate Induction—that going before being only preparatory hereto — is *rejection* or *exclusion* of such qualities in individual natures as are not found in the instance containing the given nature, or (exclusion) of such qualities as are found in any instance, from which the given nature is absent.

Then, as says Bacon, "an affirmative form will remain as the residuum, solid, true, and well-defined, while all volatile opinions go off in smoke."

4. And here, fourthly, there comes in a consideration of this affirmative kind of instances—which he further arranges under twenty-seven heads, and denominates *prerogative* instances—by a patient and careful study of which the mind is led into the discovery of the real form or cause of any given nature, quality, or action, with almost infallible certainty; since by this process of "exclusion," kept up to the last, nothing at length will remain but the given nature, quality, or action, and that upon which it depends for its continuation or production.*

* Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 363, and on.

Such, in brief, is the theory of Induction as expounded by its author; and thus by it, as says Morell, "our knowledge must rise from the bare facts as they are presented to the senses, upward through the different degrees of generalization, till the most general form thereof is ascertained, and the top-stone of the pyramid laid upon it."*

The whole process is mechanical, as Bacon himself confesses. It admits of no anticipations; permits of no excursive, and scarce any deductive, thought; denies the power of the Reason to know or discover more than is contained in the facts themselves of observation and experiment under contemplation; and utterly repudiates the idea of any Intuitive knowledge of the form or the cause concerning which inquiry is made.

* "History of Modern Philosophy," p. 66.

CHAPTER II.

INDUCTION INAPPLICABLE IN THE INQUISITION OF MENTAL FACTS, LAWS, OR CAUSES.

IT now devolves upon us to consider, whether this Baconian theory of Method is the one to be followed in the search after Psychologic truth—in the study of the powers, laws, and functions of the human mind.

That I shall take the position that it is not, has been already more than intimated.

For me to take this side of the question, might seem an exhibition of boldness bordering on presumption, were it not for the fact that the other side has been, almost without exception, *assumed* to be true—taken for granted without hesitation and without examination, or attempt at proof. Had the multitude of learned and able Mental Philosophers, who have tacitly and avowedly accepted the rules of the "Novum Organum" as a proper guide to the Intellect in the prosecution of their science, first sat down to a careful and critical discussion and analysis of these rules, and from such examination been led to the adoption of them, it might manifest a degree of presumption in any one man to question their validity. But as it is, the case is

different, and only requires a little independence of thought.

To succeed, however, in our attempt, requires more than speculative independence. To doubt a long-cherished and almost universally received opinion is one thing; to vindicate and establish the doubt is quite another. But, nevertheless, I propose to hazard the undertaking: even failure herein will not be dishonorable.

First, I shall offer a few indirect arguments, though not wholly wanting in positive force and conclusiveness, in support of my thesis.

SEC. 1. *Bacon originally intended his Theory of Method to be used only in the examination of Physical Facts.*

And the first of these indirect arguments is, that the great expounder of the Inductive Method did not himself, originally and directly, intend it for any thing else than a mode of procedure in the pursuit of Physical knowledge. Originally and directly, I say; for I am not unaware of the fact, nor do I desire to ignore or conceal the fact, that in one or two passages of his great work he intimates incidentally, and in one passage he distinctly asserts, the applicability of his system to Mental and Metaphysical subjects, and his intention that it shall be thus applied.

But it can easily be shown, that this was with Bacon an after-thought. He was led to assert this

additional and unwarrantable extension of his theory, in order to meet an anticipated objection to it, as well as from a very natural and pardonable disposition, manifested by all originators and discoverers, to magnify the greatness and utility of his own invention.

It is certain, too, that among the scores of illustrations of the use of his Method which he has given us in his writings, not one genuine instance can be found of its application by him to any subject coming within the range of Psychology or Metaphysics. Let this suffice upon this point for the present; I shall meet and consider it again in another and more appropriate place.

SEC. 2. *Some assert that Bacon expounded his Theory of Induction with special reference to its being employed as a Method of Psychologic Investigation.*

In the above statement of the purport and intent of the Baconian Logic, I am again brought in contact with high authority; but, fortunately for me, in this collision I am backed up and sustained by other equally high authority.

1. Very strangely and exceptionally, as judged in the light of his usual candor and fairness, Dugald Stewart declares, that "the improvement of the Philosophy of the Mind is manifestly the great object of Bacon, from the beginning to the end of his work." * And his remarks hereupon are quoted,

* "Philosophical Essays," p. 48.

with approval, by the equally learned and more acute, if not so judicious, Archer Butler. Whereas, Bacon himself affirms, again and again, that his special aim is, to furnish a Method which shall aid man in the interpretation of Nature, enable us to acquire a deeper and juster knowledge of things, and thus extend our power and dominion in the material world. And, notwithstanding Stewart's strenuous defense of the Baconian system from the charge of exclusive Naturalism, he was himself forced reluctantly to confess, that "the effects which Bacon's writings have hitherto produced have, indeed, been far more conspicuous in Physics than in the Science of Mind." *

2. Archer Butler, also, in connection with his defense of Bacon as a Psychologist, is driven to acknowledge, that "it would not be easy to establish that the speculative side of the Philosophy of man was equally revealed to him [Bacon] with the experimental;" and suggests, in excuse herefor, "that circumstances urged him to concentrate his energies where they were most demanded; and if his principal object was that of combining facts into theory, and if he did not fully appreciate the importance of vindicating the divinity of Reason, of Morality, of Love, we cannot, perhaps, censure him more than for not anticipating the 'Principia.'" †

* "Philosophical Essays," p. 52.

† "Ancient Philosophy," vol. i, p. 131.

SEC. 3. *Other students of Philosophy confess Bacon's Theory to have been wrought out wholly or chiefly in the interest of Physical Science.*

But equally weighty authority with the above can be adduced to prove that the author of the "Novum Organum" conceived and executed it, solely or chiefly, in the interest of Natural Philosophy.

1. Thus Morell, in his "History of Modern Philosophy," says: "Bacon, who gave his attention chiefly to the direction and improvement of Physical Science, taught to analyze Nature; while Descartes, who aimed rather at grounding all human knowledge upon its ultimate principles, instructed how to analyze thought." *

2. Cousin, also, says: "Bacon was particularly occupied with Physical Science; he starts by analysis; but rested analysis on the exterior observation of the phenomena of Nature." † And, again, he emphatically declares, "It is established and acknowledged that it is the sensualistic tendency that governs in Bacon." ‡

3. Schwegler, in his "History of Philosophy," magisterially and truly affirms: "The historical significance of the founder of the Baconian Philosophy is, in general, this, that he directed the attention and reflection of his contemporaries again upon the given actuality, upon Nature; that he affirmed the

* "History of Modern Philosophy," p. 63.

† "History of Mod. Phil.," vol. ii, p. 80. ‡ Ibid., vol. ii, p. 83.

necessity of experience, which had been formerly only a matter of accident, and made it, as in and for itself, an object of thought. His merit consists, in having brought up the principle of scientific empiricism, and only in this." *

4. And Whewell, as though it were on all hands conceded that the Baconian system of Logic was adapted alone to Physics, names his great works upon Natural Science, respectively, "History of the Inductive Sciences," and "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences."

SEC. 4. *What Bacon himself declares of the Intent and Purpose of his "Novum Organum."*

But this is a question which ought not to be, and in this instance shall not be, decided wholly upon authority. We will refer to Bacon himself, for its final and conclusive settlement.

1. And, first, let him answer what led him to conceive that a new Organ of Science was demanded: "I thought, also," says he, "that among these difficulties of the sciences"—that is, those he had just been enumerating—"the case of Natural Philosophy has been the hardest of all: inasmuch as it has had but a trifling share of men's labor, has been readily deserted, and never cultivated and matured in any high degree." † Again, more fully and quite as explicitly upon this point, he says: "In the first place, the defective and falla-

* "History of Philosophy," p. 167. † Bacon's Works, vol. i, p. 424.

cious evidence of our senses—a system of observation slothful and unsteady, as though acting from chance—a tradition vain, and depending upon common report—a course of practice intent upon effects, and servile, blind, dull, vague, and abrupt experiments—and lastly, our careless and meager natural history—have collected together for the use of the Understanding, the most defective materials as regards Philosophy and the Sciences. In the next place, a preposterous refinement, and as it were ventilation of argument, is attempted as a late remedy for a matter become clearly desperate, and neither makes any improvement nor removes errors. There remains no hope, therefore, of greater advancement and progress, unless by some restoration of the sciences." *

In these passages is clearly disclosed the fact, that Bacon conceived a new Instauration of the Sciences necessary, because of the dearth of knowledge, and the prevalence of a false system of inquisition, in Natural Philosophy. To meet this necessity, then, is the object of his "Great Instauration."

2. But what does he allege to be the special and exclusive aim of his Method? for it is with that we are now specially concerned. "The object of the second part," that is, the "Novum Organum," he says, "is the doctrine touching a better and more perfect use of reasoning in the investigation of

* Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 340.

things, and the true helps of the Understanding, that it may by this means be raised, so far as our human and mortal nature will admit, and be enlarged in its powers, so as to master the arduous and obscure secrets of Nature." *

And to the same purport, he says, in another place: "We are founding a real model of the world in the Understanding, such as it is found to be, not such as men's reason has distorted." † Does he not here confine his aim, and the aim of his theory, solely to Physical research? For, what he means by *nature* and the *world*, is sufficiently indicated in the following passage: "All who become practically versed in Nature, are the mechanic, the mathematician, the physician, the alchymist, and the magician." ‡

That is, only those who practice and pursue the physical arts and professions.

Of course, then, he means by *Nature* the external, physical world.

3. Hear, now, upon this point, the general definition which he gives of Induction: "Although," says he, "we would leave to the syllogism, and such celebrated and applauded demonstrations, their jurisdiction over popular and speculative arts (for we here make no alteration), yet, in every thing relating to the nature of things, we make use of Induction, both for our major and minor proposi-

* Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 338. † Ibid., p. 368. ‡ Ibid., p. 345.

tions. For we consider Induction to be that form of demonstration which assists the senses, closes in upon Nature, and presses on, and, as it were, mixes itself with action." * Can language more explicit be employed to inform us of his intention to confine his Method solely to the prosecution and improvement of Natural Philosophy?

4. So, also, his correction of the Understanding, and purging it of those "idols" with which it may be pre-occupied, has no other or higher object, than preparing it to receive the images and representations of objects of sense, without distortion. For, he says: "The mind is pre-occupied with idols, either adventitious or innate;" so that, "when affected by things through the senses, it does not act in the most trustworthy manner, but inserts and mixes her own nature with that of things." To remedy this defect, therefore, he lays down his doctrine of "the purifying of the Understanding." And when this purification shall have been accomplished, and "it has at last been clearly seen what results are to be expected from the nature of things and the nature of mind, we consider," he exultantly adds, "that we shall have prepared and adorned a nuptial couch for the Mind and the Universe." †

It is evident, therefore, that his whole Organ contemplated no more than an acquisition of sensuous knowledge. And the end to which he would have

* Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 339. † Ibid., p. 340.

this knowledge applied was, but the more-extended dominion of man over Nature, and the increased physical comfort and dignity of the human race. And to this point Bacon testifies thus: "Our determination is, that of trying whether we can lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity;" * and in another place he affirms, "To generate and superinduce a new nature, or new natures, upon a given body is, the labor and aim of human power." †

These extracts, which I have here introduced, are taken from the body of the "Great Instauration." They are the honest and candid utterances of its great author, while his mind was laboring upon the development and exposition of his theory. And, therefore, the force and significance of them are not to be set aside by any casual remark he may chance to have made, when engaged in answering objections and attempting the defense of his Method.

And I submit, whether the above quotations do not fully prove the proposition with which I set out, namely: that the theory of Induction, as originated by Bacon, was never intended by him to be used with any other purpose, than as a guide in the prosecution of the Physical Sciences?

5. And, in the practical employment of this Method, he was at least consistent with himself. In the numberless instances of its application found

* Bacon's Works, vol. i, p. 431. † Ibid., vol. iii, p. 371.

in his writings, we find but one which seems to depart, in the least, from this originally intended use; and this is rather in seeming, than in reality. It is a table of "instances" upon Memory. But even here, true to his maxim that all knowledge must be referred to use and practice, his object is not to discover or unfold the laws of Memory, in the genuine Psychologic sense, but only to determine the rules of art by which the Memory may be improved; in other words, to suggest a plan for constructing a system of Mnemonics, which bears about the same relation to any end or purpose of Mental Science, as the feats of a rope-dancer to a system of Dynamical Philosophy.

SEC. 5. *Bacon's System of Philosophy was Sensualistic.*

Undoubtedly Bacon had elaborated, in his own thoughts, an Intellectual System, in the proper and extended signification of that phrase; though we are left to determine what it was, only by hints and side remarks. A mind of the structure and grasp of his, would rest satisfied with nothing short of a clearly defined intellectual theory. And there is as little ground for doubting, from the materials furnished us in his writings for forming an opinion on this question, that it was a system of Absolute Naturalism, or what, in our most modern philosophic nomenclature is called, not very significantly, *Positivism.*

In his Psychology, Bacon evidently belonged to the Sensational School, and conceived that nothing was the subject of scientific knowledge, but Nature and her laws. He lays down and repeats, in various ways and divers places, the precise postulates of Sensationalism; nor could it be possible for a mind so logically constituted as his, not to have drawn herefrom all the conclusions of that species of Philosophy.

Thus, in the opening sentence of the "Novum Organum," he declares: "Man, as the minister and interpreter of Nature, does and understands as much as his observation on the order of Nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more."

He begins, then, by denying and rejecting all original sources of knowledge found in the Reason—all ideas, cognitions, and primary truths, having their rise in the Mind itself independent of experience; and by asserting substantially the prime maxim of the Sensational School, that all our knowledge is derived from experience.

But, this fundamental dogma of Sensationalism, he lays down still more emphatically in another place. He says: "It is a rotten and pernicious idea or estimation that the majesty of man's mind suffers diminution, if it be long and deeply conversant with experiences and particulars, subject to sense, and bound in matter . . .; and this opinion or

state of mind received much strength from another wild and unfounded opinion, which held that truth is innate in the mind of man, and not introduced from without, and that the senses rather excite than inform the Understanding."* This passage clearly convicts him, of not only repudiating the original ideas, cognitions, and convictions of the Reason, but of holding the degrading doctrine of the Sensualistic School, that all our knowledge is conveyed to the mind through the senses.

It is only on the ground of his having embraced these tenets, that we can account for his perpetual glorification of the Natural Sciences, his frequent characterization of them as the root and fountain of all genuine Philosophy. No Ideal-Realist could have taken such a view of the relative importance of the Natural, as compared with the Intellectual, Sciences.

Our Idealistic conceptions constrain us to award the first place to those branches of learning which treat of the Mind—its convictions, its faculties, and modes of acting. For we see, that from hence are derived all those principles of knowledge which underlie all Science, and give validity and strength to all systems of Philosophy.

But, true to his fundamental ideas, quoted above, Bacon speaks of Natural Philosophy as "the venerable mother of the Sciences," and declares that no

* Bacon's Works, vol. i, p. 426.

one need expect any progress in sound learning, "unless Natural Philosophy be applied to particular Sciences, and particular Sciences referred back again to Natural Philosophy." *

SEC. 6. *He can in no way be defended from the charge of Sensationalism.*

But it may be queried, by those who would defend Bacon from the charge of Naturalism and Sensationalism: Did he not acknowledge the necessity, and define the nature, of a First Philosophy, which should, in a sense, include all human knowledge, and furnish maxims which should be equally applicable to all the Sciences? In other words, did he not advocate the construction of a system of Metaphysics? I answer, Yes. How, then, it will be replied, can he be convicted of ignoring the original ideas and principles of Reason? How can he be justly charged with Sensationalism and Materialism? For, judged by the postulates of this species of Philosophy, Metaphysics are moonshine and falsehood; are, indeed, an impossibility.

We at once escape this dilemma, when we question the character, and apprehend the real import and quality, of his "Prima Philosophia"—his Universal Maxims, and his Metaphysics. His First Philosophy is no more than the last and highest achievement of Induction, applied to the facts of Nature. It is merely made up of maxims culled

* Bacon's Works, vol. i, p. 424.

from facts of observation. It is nothing but the rarest and ripest fruits of learning, gathered by the faculties while taking the most extensive and thorough search of the Universe without, such as Humboldt realized in his "Cosmos;" and not a systematic statement of the primitive cognitions and laws of thought, which constitute the basis of all knowledge, such as was accomplished by Kant in his "Kritik of the Pure Reason."

Bacon, as a Philosopher, never soared beyond the realm of sense; he took no flight above or beyond the world of matter. His theory did not permit it. "We never," says he, speaking of his method of philosophizing, "abstract or withdraw ourselves from *things*, and the operative branch of Philosophy."* His universal maxims, then, were only the widest generalizations from Nature, framed according to the rules of his mechanical Method.

His Metaphysics, too, were "earthly and sensual"—drawn from matter, not from mind; the product of Induction, not derived from Intuition; born of the Understanding, and not of the pure Reason. And this is evident from his own language. Thus, he declares: "Natural Science or Theory is divided into Physics and Metaphysics; wherein I desire it may be considered that I use the word Metaphysics in a different sense from that that is received."† And further on, he says that he has

* Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 383. † Ibid., vol. i, p. 195.

"brought it in as a branch and descendant of Natural Science."

The same is also true of his use of the word *forms*. By this he means, not the abstract ideas of Reason, but the fixed and necessary laws or causes of things; and he complains of Plato, who, with his deep philosophic insight "descried that forms were the true objects of knowledge," that he "lost the real fruit of his opinion by considering forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not defined and determined by matter." * And he further explains, that, by the word *form*, he means the law which, in each branch of Inductive Science, is found to produce or determine "individual effects." †

That Bacon recommended the cultivation of Metaphysics and the inquisition of "forms," does not, then, when we understand the sense in which he used those terms, free him from the charge of Sensationalism, but rather fixes and fastens that charge upon him beyond the possibility of relief.

SEC. 7. *The many passages of his writings explainable, and only explainable, upon the ground of the Sensationalism of his Philosophy.*

And now we are prepared to understand the Baconian contempt for the old Philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle; the low estimate which he put upon ethical studies; his frequent cautions against an inquiry into final causes; and his oft-

* Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 375. † Ibid., pp. 372, 383.

repeated declaration, that Philosophy must be "bounded by," that is, must not intrude into, "Theology." * He was a thorough Naturalist; believed matter—its modes, qualities, and operations—to be the only fit subject for scientific examination, and was accustomed to discard and despise all those parts of learning which would not permit the employment of his favorite Method, Induction. He had no faith in, or interest for, any species of knowledge which could not be "reduced to use and practice," † which did not tend to assist in the discovery of material causes, and the multiplication of mechanical inventions.

Hence, the following complaint he brings against the systems of the Greeks: "Of all signs," says he, "there is none more certain or worthy than that of the fruits produced; for the fruits and effects are the sureties and vouchers, as it were, for the truth of Philosophy. Now, from the systems of the Greeks, and their subordinate divisions in particular branches of the Sciences during so long a period, scarcely one single experiment can be culled that has a tendency to elevate or assist mankind, and can be fairly set down to the speculations and doctrines of their Philosophy." ‡ And for this reason, in his judgment, their systems were good for nothing.

Whatever speculations or doctrines did not have

* Bacon's Works, vol. i, pp. 426, 427.

† Ibid., pp. 81–83. ‡ Ibid., vol. iii, p. 354.

for their end the improvement of man's physical comfort and dignity, he thought were frivolous and vain, and unworthy the attention of scholars. And so he pours contempt upon the "divine" Plato, and the immortal Aristotle, in the following style: Speaking of them, in comparison with the chattering Sophists and Rhetoricians of their day, he says: "There was only this difference between them: the latter were mercenary vagabonds, traveling about to different States, making a show of their wisdom and requiring pay; the former, more dignified and noble, in possession of fixed habitations, opening schools, and teaching Philosophy gratuitously. Both, however," he adds, "were professorial, and reduced every subject to controversy. . . . So that their doctrines were merely (what Dionysius not unaptly objected to Plato) the talk of idle old men to ignorant youths."*

Hence, too, his assertion, that "in the preceding ages, philosophic meditation and labor were chiefly occupied and *wasted* in Moral Philosophy, the Theology of the heathens;" and that "the age in which Natural Philosophy appeared principally to flourish among the Greeks, was but a short period; since in the more ancient times, the seven sages applied themselves to Moral Philosophy and Politics; and at a later period, after Socrates had brought Philosophy down from heaven to earth,

* Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 354.

Moral Philosophy became more prevalent, and diverted men's attention from Natural." * And all this, notwithstanding these old worthies, by dint of thinking, and by "spinning out the thread of their own cogitations," had wrought out and perfected an Ethical System, not much less pure and extended than our own.

Hence, also, his declaration that the scientific inquisition of final causes "is so far from being beneficial, that it even corrupts the Sciences, except in the intercourse of man with man." †

And, hence, finally, his limitation of the sphere of Philosophy, in the remark, "I hold that this knowledge must, in the end, be bounded by Religion, else it will be subject to deceit and delusion,"‡—thus excluding Theology from the domain of Science.

I take it, then, to be proved, that the Baconian Philosophy aimed exclusively at the enlargement and improvement of the Physical Sciences, and that his system was but the development of a Method looking wholly to that result. Indeed, he himself expressly confesses as much; for, in speaking of the deductive and metaphysical process of reasoning employed by Aristotle, he says, "It is doubtless a useful instrument and aid to the Understanding, in sciences which are founded by human opinion, as the moral and political, but inferior and in-

* Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 356. † Ibid., p. 371. ‡ Ibid., vol. i, p. 195.

competent to the subtlety and obscurity of natural operations."* He allows it, then, to be the true and competent Method upon all subjects depending upon the abstract notions and forms of the Understanding, and the convictions and judgments of the Reason ; for these must be what he means by those "founded in human opinion." But, he concludes: "Induction remains the last and only refuge for Matter; nor are our hopes placed in it undeservedly, since it can collect laborious works, and the certain evidence of facts, and lay them before the mind."† He here assigns the true limits of Induction, and designates its appropriate sphere of application. And hereby are we justified in concluding this part of our discussion, with the remark we made on entering upon it, namely, that Bacon did not, originally and intentionally, contemplate the employment of his "Novum Organum" in any department of learning, save that of Physics. And the establishment of this proposition goes far toward proving, that this mode of investigation, or of reasoning, is not legitimate, as applied to any other department.

* Bacon's Works, vol. i, p. 429. † Ibid., p. 429.

CHAPTER III.

EFFECTS OF THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY UPON MENTAL SCIENCE.

AND now, let us briefly inquire into the effects upon Psychology, produced by the Baconian Philosophy. What has followed from the indorsement of its principles, and the use of its Method, by the cultivators of Mental Science?

Let us here apply the rule, which the author of the "Novum Organum" himself lays down, that "of all signs, there is none more certain and worthy than that of the fruits produced." In this, we shall be following out the line of indirect argument, relating to the subject under consideration, upon which we have entered, and, more especially, instituting a fair test of the real character and tendency of the Baconian Method. For "time," as says Bacon, is "the author of authors, and itself the greatest of authors;" or, as Cousin still more significantly expressess it, "Time is the greatest of Logicians;" and we may be sure that this great teacher and logician will draw forth from every system its whole contents,—all its immanent principles, and expose the truth or falsehood contained in them, by the nature of the conclusions it shall at length deduce therefrom.

Tried by this test, the Inductive Philosophy is vindicated, as a guide of the Intellect in the investigation of Nature. We cannot speak too highly of its achievements in the domain of Physics. By its light, man has been enabled to explore almost every part of the Material Universe. The greatest discoveries in Natural Science have followed its application; and to it can be directly traced those wonderful improvements and inventions, in the mechanic arts, which have illustrated the progress of modern civilization. In this field of research, then, the truth of this Method is fully established by "its fruits."

But how is it in Psychology? What have been its effects upon the Science of Mind? And does it demonstrate the validity of its principles, as a guide in the exploration of the contents of Consciousness? Not unless Materialism, Sensationalism, Skepticism, and Positivism are the true Philosophy. For these have flowed as directly from it, as streams from their fountain-head.

SEC. 1. *The Materialism of Hobbes and Hartley.*

The first disciple of the Inductive School, who gave his attention to Mental Science proper, was Hobbes. And Hobbes was the bosom friend and pupil of Lord Bacon. And from the theories of the pupil, we may learn the nature and tendency of the principles of the master, when employed for the inquisition of mental laws and causes.

Hobbes was a thorough and radical Materialist. Having embraced the fundamental tenet of the Baconian Logic, that "all our knowledge is derived from experience," and is introduced into the mind through the senses, he laid down this proposition as the corner-stone of his Psychology, namely, that all our ideas, all our elements of knowledge, are but Sensations. And since Sensation has matter, or material existence, alone for its object, he concluded that Matter was the only existence, and that hence the Mind itself was nothing but a peculiar form of material organization. Ideas, or sensations, he held, were communicated to the brain or mind by impact or pressure upon the outward organs of sense, through the nerves as channels. The impressions which they made upon the inner sensorium, when subsequently revived, gave rise to Conception or Imagination, and Memory, whose operations he explained by his theory of the mechanical association of ideas. This was "the first-fruits" of the Inductive Philosophy, when its mechanical rules were made the guide of the faculties, and the measure of truth, in the domain of Mental Science.

In Psychology, Hartley was a disciple of Hobbes. He embraced precisely the same tenets, instituted similar hypotheses, and arrived at almost identical conclusions. Indeed, Hobbes may be taken as the great representative Materialist; and by a study of

his system, we may learn all that can be learned, by the most diligent perusal of all the authors belonging to this school.

By showing, therefore, that the Materialism of Hobbes was deduced from the Inductive Philosophy, we prove that all forms of modern Materialism have sprung from the same source. And the statement I have already given of the logical procedure by which Hobbes was led along in the development of his theory, sufficiently indicates its connection with, its production from, the postulates laid down in the "Great Instauration."

If, as Bacon maintained, all our knowledge comes from experience, and experience begins and ends in sense and sensuous observation, then does it logically follow, that we know, and can know, nothing but Matter—its modes, qualities, and changes. And from this, it is easy and natural to conclude, that Matter is the only existence.

SEC. 2. *Does Materialism really result from the application of the Inductive Method to the facts of Consciousness.*

But, though we may derive these results from some of the principles of the general philosophy of Bacon, it remains still a matter of inquiry, whether the Inductive Method can justly be held responsible for these pernicious consequences. And this is precisely the question with which we are now concerned.

In undertaking the determination of this ques-

tion, I remark, in the first place, that the Inductive theory can justly be charged with all the consequences which have been logically drawn from the principles, which its author found it necessary to assume or assert, in order to its proper statement and defense. And, secondly, since Bacon formally claimed for his Method that it was an organ of universal scientific knowledge, while, at the same time, as we have abundantly shown, he really limited it, in its practical application to Physics, he thereby virtually asserts Physics to be the only science, and that a science of Mind is only possible on the supposition, that mind and its operations are the subjects of the same modes and rules of research that are to be used in the study of Material Nature, thus sinking the distinction between Nature and Spirit.

But again, thirdly, let us turn our attention directly to the Inductive Method itself, and consider it apart from the postulates, which its author conceived essential to its formal scientific elucidation and support: and suppose we grant, as I readily do, its truth and validity when concerned with material facts, we can, then, also, easily discover how Materialism proceeds from its application in Psychology. For, from its very nature, it rests upon sensuous experience. It can draw no conclusions, save from facts which come under the cognizance of the senses, and are related to a nature foreign to the mind, that is, to Matter, as we shall

take occasion presently to demonstrate. If, then, it shall be assumed by any to be the true guide for the faculties in the discovery of mental forms and causes, will not this be likely to carry with it also the assumption, that Mind and Matter are identical in their essence and modes of manifestation?

It is by no means illogical to conclude, that those natures which can be known, and whose laws can be discovered, only by the same modes of examination, are one in essence, and in their processes of development. Such, at least, we know has been the inference drawn by those Psychologists, who, in their science, have made a practical and rigid use of the Baconian Method.

SEC. 3. *Modern Sensationalism a product of the Inductive Philosophy.*

From the Inductive Philosophy sprang, also, modern Sensualism or Sensationalism. This system of Psychology differs from Materialism only in its ultimate conclusions, and not in its first principles. It assumes that all our knowledge is derived from, and confined to, sensations; but is restrained, either by timidity or lack of vigor, from any inquiry into the essence of things—whether of Mind or Matter—otherwise, it would land its advocates and champions precisely where the more daring logic of Hobbes carried him, namely, in blank Materialism and Atheism.

The founder of this school is John Locke. The

question with which he begins his Essay, is that relating to the origin of our ideas; and the answer which he returns hereto, gives character to his whole system. Although he does not quote from Bacon, it is evident enough that he was familiar with the Baconian writings, and a true disciple of the Baconian Philosophy. He commences, therefore, as we might suppose, with the favorite dogma of his master, that "all our knowledge is gathered from experience"—that is, sensuous experience. Hence, he holds that the elements of knowledge, the original ideas, the rude materials from which the understanding by analysing, comparing, and combining, constructs all its theories, and is supplied with all its furniture, are communicated to the mind through the senses. He does, indeed, formally declare, that reflection is also an original source of ideas; but since he himself explained, that he means by ideas of reflection, only the acts of the mind when employed upon sensations—such as perception, recollection, reasoning, and the like—his distinction is not radical, and does not relieve his system of its sensualistic character and materialistic tendency.

That, by this statement, we do Locke no injustice, is evident from the fact, that his most ardent admirers, and most enthusiastic disciples, both of the English and the French schools, and especially of the latter, eliminated from his system, as an unnecessary and incongruous appendage, his whole

theory of ideas of reflection, and drew forth from the "Essay on the Human Understanding" a pure and unmixed body of Sensualistic doctrines.

That this whole modern Sensational movement derived its impulse from the Inductive Philosophy, is indicated by the remarks above made upon the Materialism of Hobbes and his followers; for those remarks apply equally in this connection. The principles of the "Novum Organum," as applied by its author, had exclusive relation to Physical phenomena, and when employed by Psychologists in the study of mental phenomena, naturally and inevitably directed their attention solely to that class of mental facts which have their origin in the senses. If Natural Philosophy is "the mother of the Sciences," as Bacon so often asserted, then, it was argued, are sensation and perception the origin and foundation of all our knowledge. If we must be inducted into an apprehension of all scientific truth, through facts of sensuous observation and experience, then, it was concluded, the elementary facts of consciousness are all to be referred to sense. And thus did the bias, and the dogmas of the Baconian Logic, give rise to the Sensationalism of Locke, and the more absolute Sensualism of Condillac and the French encyclopædists.

SEC. 4. *The Baconian Philosophy has given birth to the Skepticism of Hume and others.*

To this same source can we as readily trace the

Skepticism of Hume, *et id omne genus*. Sensualism must always end in Skepticism, when once the question concerning the origin of ideas is abandoned, for an inquiry into the grounds and validity of our knowledge. And this was the subject to which Hume bent the forces of his logical intellect, from the stand-point he had gained, and the postulates with which he was furnished, by the aid of the antecedent Philosophy.

He agreed with the Sensationalist, that the mind derives all its ideas from the senses. With Locke, he held that all our knowledge is the result of experience. But then he diverged from his master; and this constitutes the peculiarity of his system, namely, that he limits experience to the consciousness, and hence assumed that we know only the facts that come under our internal observation. To these facts, he applied the Method of Inductive reasoning, in order to determine the great question of Ontology, namely, how we know, and what is the truth of our knowing, any thing beyond our ideas—whether Matter or Spirit.

Since, therefore, Induction can never carry the Understanding above, or away from, the facts of observation, upon which it depends—as is explicitly stated by Bacon when he says, "We never abstract or withdraw ourselves from things"—and since the "things," which Hume claimed to be alone within the grasp and cognizance of the mind, are the facts

of consciousness, he rigidly and correctly, from his premises, and by that Method, drew the inference that we could prove the existence of neither Mind nor Matter—of nothing, indeed, beyond the ideas of which we are conscious. And, he further argued, since we cannot prove the existence of Mind and Matter by a process of Inductive reasoning upon the ideas in the consciousness—the sole data for reasoning that we possess—the fact of their existence must ever remain to us a subject of doubt, of proper and legitimate Skepticism. And, starting exclusively with this premise, and supplied alone with this organ of reasoning, who can escape an acceptance of his conclusion? In the whole compass of philosophical writings, a more perfect specimen of Inductive reasoning, as applied to the question of Ontology, cannot be cited, than the argument of Hume, synoptically stated above.

Skepticism will always result from an attempt to argue, according to the rules of the Baconian Logic, from the facts of consciousness, to the truth of being. And it was this skeptical issue of the Logic of Physics, employed to elucidate the mysteries of thought and the Soul—a result at once so opposed to the instincts of the Moral Sense, and so at variance with the intimations of Reason—that impelled Reid, and Kant, and Cousin, and the most distinguished disciples of each, to the (unconscious and unacknowledged) adoption of a better Method of

Psychologic investigation—grounded in Self-consciousness, Sub-consciousness, and Intuition, which it is my purpose presently to describe.

SEC. 5. *Positivism the Product of the Baconian Philosophy.*

If, however, we take the Philosophy of the "Great Instauration" as a whole, we shall find its truest expression in Positivism. This is its "bright consummate flower." Bacon has culminated in Comte. There is no principle or postulate of the "Novum Organum" which Comte has not seized and drawn out to its ultimate consequences; no feature of the Inductive theory, which he has not boldly delineated, and placed in its true systematic relations, in his work on "The Positive Philosophy." The correctness of these statements will appear, as we proceed to give a brief exposition of the system of Comte.

I have already characterized it as a system of Absolute Naturalism. Its fundamental notion is, that all the phenomena of Nature are under the control of fixed and fatalistic laws of antecedence and consequence. The discovery of these laws is the sole business of science; and they can be discovered in no other way, than by a careful and patient observation and analysis of facts, and an application thereto of the Inductive process of reasoning.

Such are the end and Method of the Positive Philosophy. From it, its author rules out Theology,

abstract Metaphysics, and genuine Pyschology. He reprehends any inquiry into causes, first, second, and final; and reduces all Science to the single work of determining the laws of things, that is, the order of their occurrence in invariable antecedence and sequence. Intellectual Philosophy, according to his theory, becomes identical with Logic, whose laws and rules are to be determined, not by internal reflection, but by an experimental examination of the modes of operation of the human mind, as these have been manifested in the results that have been achieved in the study of the material world. He advocates the cultivation of a branch of learning having for its special object the Philosophic harmonizing and unification of the Sciences, by deducing from them all such general laws as enter into each, and explain their mutual interdependence and connection. He openly professes, and strenuously claims, to be a disciple of Bacon, and to make the most scientific and rigid application of the rules which Bacon laid down for the interpretation of Nature.

And none, I think, can justly deny Comte this distinction. In all these points we have just enumerated—and these are the distinctive features of his system—he has not announced a single original conception. He has simply taken them, each and all, whole and entire, from his master.

For did not Bacon, also, tell us that man, as a

learner, was only the minister and interpreter of Nature? And did he not teach, by his example, the exclusive cultivation of Physics? and by precept, also, as being the only branch of learning that promised any commensurate results for the labor expended? Did he not exalt the Natural Sciences, calling them the "root" and "mother" of all science? Did he not exclude Theology from the domain of Philosophy? Did he not condemn abstract Metaphysics as vague and fruitless and meaningless? Did he not say, that the inquisition of final causes, rather than helping, corrupted the Sciences?

Though he talked about forms and causes, as objects to be inquired into and investigated, did he not explain them, as being no more than laws, or invariable antecedents, of certain facts or appearances? Did he not put the ban upon Psychology, when he said, "When the mind applies itself to Nature, it draws from it a science as real as Nature; but when it turns inward to a contemplation of itself, it ends only at frivolous reveries?" And was not his "Prima Philosophia" an exact counterpart of Comte's "Scientific Generalities?"

Such, then, are the fruits of the Inductive System, when used as a universal Method, or when employed as the Method of Psychologic investigation. From such application of it, as we have seen, have sprung Materialism, Sensationalism, Skepticism, and Positivism, in direct and logical sequence.

There is not a single distinguished name, connected with any of these forms of Philosophy, who did not profess to have embraced, and to be governed by, the principles of the Inductive system. And if the true test of a speculative system is the "fruits" it brings forth, what verdict must we then pass upon the Baconian Philosophy?

SEC. 6. *Other Pernicious Effects resulting from the application of the Principles of the Inductive Method to the phenomena of Mind.*

But, we have not yet quite concluded this part of our argument. We can discover the injurious influences of the attempt to apply the Physical Method of the "Novum Organum," in the prosecution of Mental Science, in many other ways. Such an attempt has been partially made by several eminent psychologists of the Ideal-Realistic school; but always with poor success, and, so far as actually made, to the corruption of their speculations.

1. Many of them, under the influence of the Baconian maxims, have been wont to introduce into their writings, in explanation of mental facts and processes, physical analogies and comparisons, which here always mislead and deceive. For there can be no possible likeness between the activities of spirit and material forces; nor can the one be used to elucidate the other, without misapprehension and falsehood as the result. A nomenclature free from sensuous meaning and physical meta-

phors, is necessary to the purity and accuracy of every treatise upon the human Mind.

Such a nomenclature is the great thing needed, in the successful development of Metaphysical and Psychologic truth. But the construction or attainment of a system of terms, precisely adapted to the literal expression of states and facts of the consciousness, and modes and forms of the Reason, has been much hindered, by the modes of reasoning and forms of expression employed by those Ideal-Realists who have professed to belong to the Baconian school.

The use of sensuous terms, and those containing material metaphors, to describe purely mental acts, introduces a foreign and mischievous element into the account; and thus warps and misleads the Reason in its conclusions. And such is the habit of those who bring to the study of mind, the notions and terminology of Inductive Science.

2. But, worse than this, these Baconian Psychologists of the Ideal-Realistic school, have entered upon their researches into the mysteries and ongoings of the human spirit, under the impression, derived from those habits of thinking acquired by their training in the Inductive Method of reasoning, that these mysteries and ongoings are under the control of laws similar to those which govern the operations of Nature. The mind has been viewed by them from the naturalistic stand-point. It has

presented to them the aspect of a piece of mechanism — a machine, differing somewhat in its essence, to be sure, from a physical organism, but not in its ways of acting. And so, guided by this mistaken notion, they have proceeded to refer all its phenomenal functions to fixed and constant causal powers; which, like the forces of the physical world, are ever acting under the control and guidance of invincible and necessary laws.

Thus have they divested the human spirit of its supernatural character—of the dignity of its personality, and the life of its freedom. It is this natural necessity, which the Inductive Psychologists have been wont to impute to all the functions and acts of the soul, that has led to a questioning and denial of one of the plainest and most vitally interesting facts of consciousness—the freedom of the Will; and to an ignoring of those spiritual facts, equally discernible to the intuitive eye-glance of self-reflection, from which the Christian religion derives its subjective truthfulness and practical reality.

Nothing has tended more to retard the progress of reflective inquiry, into the real modes of free thought and free action of the intelligent spirit of man, than this notion of a mechanical necessity governing all its activities, derived from the Physical Logic of Bacon.

Wherever, then, the Inductive Philosophy has

been allowed to exert any influence in the department of Mental Science, we find that influence to have been pernicious and disastrous. And it follows, from hence, as such effects could not arise from the application of a genuine Method, that the Inductive is a false Method of interpreting the phenomena of the human mind.

SEC. 7. *No Idealist has furnished us with a genuine example of the Application of the Rules of the Inductive Method to the Facts of Consciousness.*

But, as another point in this indirect line of argument,—not a single Idealist, though in profession he may have gloried in the name of Baconian, has ever prosecuted a study of the contents of consciousness, under the precise direction of the rules of Philosophizing which he professed to have adopted. There is not one of this class, indeed, who has not abandoned and repudiated these rules in practice, whenever he has made any advance in the knowledge of mind, or assisted, by his explorations of the realm of consciousness, to discover or settle any new principle in Mental Science.

1. Especially is this true, when predicated of efforts to unfold the higher mysteries of spiritual being—such as the prerogatives of the human Will, the intimations and utterances of the Moral Sense, and the suggestions and dicta of the Intuitive Reason. Induction has never been *scientifically* attempted in this province of Intellectual Philoso-

phy, even by those Idealists who are loudest in shouting forth its praises, save by one, namely, McCosh; and he, notwithstanding his professions, has failed to furnish us a single genuine instance of its practical application, in all his Psychologic writings.

2. The eras in the modern history of the Philosophy of the human Mind, made luminous by great discoveries and large progress, are marked also by the practical repudiation of the rules of Physical inquiry, and the employment of those that are more rational, and better adapted to the nature of the subject. The Scotch Philosophers, of whom Reid is the head, when demonstrating the existence of original cognitions and convictions in the Reason, as the ground-principles of common sense and the basis of all human knowledge, gave no practical heed whatever to the Logic of the "Organum," but placed the ear of self-consciousness down upon the throbbing bosom of the living spirit, and listened to the responses which came direct from thence. They went below the simple and apparent facts of consciousness, by the aid of a discriminating Intuition, and by immediate sight and insight learned the powers and prerogatives of the Pure Reason.

3. And how was the great Philosopher of Konigsburg enabled to discover and unfold, in his immortal "Critick," the laws of thought, and the prime truths of Reason? Was it by the process of

"rejections and exclusions" from the collected facts of consciousness, until "nothing remained but the given nature" and the fact or nature upon which it depended,—after the manner of the Logic of Physics? No; his Method is precisely the opposite of this. By the use of a keen and discriminating insight, he goes at once to the very fountain-head of rational thought, and gazes directly, and with an intuitive glance, upon *a priori* truths and necessary cognitions, discerned by the highest element of the Intellect.

4. Did Cousin trace the streams of thought and feeling, revealed in the consciousness, to their original sources in the human soul, by Baconian rules, or by the pure and radiant light of Reason itself, which clearly discloses all the workings of the inner being, to him who is gifted with the marvelous power of self-inspection?

5. Was Hamilton empowered to detect the hidden germs of thought, and lay bare to view the most delicate threads and fibers of sub-conscious processes, by the skill he had acquired in the use of the blind and mechanical modes of reasoning which constitute the Method appropriate to the Natural Sciences? The question is absurd. He, and all the great lights in Psychology, achieved their successes in that science by the exercise of a superior Intuitional insight, bestowed by nature and sharpened by constant practice, which gave them a

direct apperception of the postures, states, and workings of the soul.*

6. McCosh himself, anxious to claim as his own the patent for applying Induction to the detection and delineation of the Intuitions of the Mind, proceeds to show at length that these Philosophers did not employ that Method. And yet it must be acknowledged, that the science of Psychology is more indebted to them for its enlargement and perfection, than to all others of modern times. And it may be pertinently queried, How were they, under the guidance of a false system of Mental Logic, enabled to accomplish such great things, and discover so much truth?

Is it not incredible, that a false system should lead to so much excellent truth; and that a correct one should end, as we have already shown, in so much falsehood?

7. And let us here take a glance at those great Philosophers of antiquity, Plato and Aristotle; not, indeed, for the purpose of analyzing and expounding them, but of admiring the stateliness of their proportions, and their symmetry, beauty, and strength; and thereby satisfy ourselves that, before Bacon gave to the world his "Novum Organum," the human mind by the exercise of its own high powers of intuitive thought and psychologic meditation, had produced much that was solid, durable, and useful.

* See "Intuitions," p. 96.

Has the Logic of Aristotle, during these many centuries since he taught it to his pupils in the walks of the Lyceum, been invalidated, or scarcely at all enlarged and improved? With admirable skill and clearness did he detect and delineate the forms of the Understanding, and the laws of the logical Reason, and combine these into a system which still remains, both as an undecayed monument of his genius, and the truthful exponent of the processes of syllogistic thought. Aristotle is still, as ever, the world's master in the art of thinking; and as such he will continue, until the present constitution of the human mind shall be destroyed.

And so, the bright visions of Truth and Goodness and Beauty, "the archetypal ideas" of the "divine Plato," have lost none of their significance since he first revealed them, in his own glorious and gorgeous language, amid the groves of Academus.

The writings of both these sages have been as perennial fountains, to which the scholars and thinkers, of all ages since their day, have repaired to slake their thirst for knowledge, and to gain inspiration to pursue and carry out their own speculative labors. Even now, they serve far more to cultivate the taste for philosophic study, and exert a stronger influence in the domain of the speculative and liberal sciences, than do the writings of Francis of Verulam. And yet, they are the productions to which the latter pointed as examples of that vague-

ness, frivolity, and inanity, which he claimed must ever result from neglect of Natural studies, and the cultivation of solitary and subjective cogitation. These are the productions, to which he referred with sneers and contempt, and which he characterized—quoting the words of an ancient vilifier—as the "vain talk of idle old men to ignorant youths." Nothing had come forth from them, he persistently urged, to increase the physical comfort of man, or to extend his dominion over Nature; and, therefore, they were naught.

True, neither Plato nor Aristotle taught how to tame the winds, to direct the course of the lightning, or to apply the power of steam. But a nobler task was theirs: to teach the world how to think; to present to the vision of aspiring youth the ravishing ideals of the True and the Good, and the modes by which to attempt and achieve their realization. If the Philosophy of Bacon has given us the clew for exploring the labyrinths of Nature, that of Plato and Aristotle has opened, and assisted to traverse, the world of ideas.

If the one has furnished us with valuable mechanical inventions, and multiplied our facilities for physical enjoyment, the other has furnished us with rich materials for discursive thought; for the development of our intellectual powers; and for the expansion and elevation of our inner life.

There must, then, be truth and soundness in the

Method of Philosophizing, employed by these ancient worthies, when confined to its appropriate sphere, and applied to subjects coming within its proper range. But we know that their Method was not Induction; and if we did not, the sneers and ridicule of Bacon would inform us of that fact. And thus the splendid achievements and abiding truthfulness of these ancient speculations, are a standing proof of our thesis, namely, that the rules of the Inductive Logic do not indicate the true course of procedure of the intellectual faculties in the acquisition of all forms of knowledge, especially those higher and more abstract forms, relating to the Mind. And with this remark, I conclude the indirect line of argument bearing upon this theme.

CHAPTER IV.

Positive Refutation of Induction as a Psychologic Method.

And now, from what has gone before, we are in a favorable position to appreciate and admit the full force of those more direct reasons we shall proceed to assign, in support of our thesis. Having thus cleared the way, we are ready to take a more candid and impartial view of the reasons and arguments which grow immediately out of the subject itself before us.

Sec. 1. *Mind and Matter distinct Natures, and hence to be examined by different Methods.*

Both the subjects and the ends of Psychologic research demand the employment of a distinctively Psychologic Method—one wholly different from that which finds legitimate application in the Physical realm. The fact that Induction precisely points out the course to be pursued in investigating the laws and qualities of Matter, is enough to convince us of its inadaptability as a guide in the exploration of the acts and powers of the Mind. The nature, facts, and forces of the Psychical world, being unique and *sui generis*, necessitate, in their examination, a peculiar procedure of the rational faculties.

1. Every distinct nature, or order of existence,

must be examined according to a Method peculiar to itself.

The forms of space and number admit only of the application of demonstrative processes of reasoning. In this department, the attempted employment of the Inductive process would be an utter absurdity and failure.

Deductive and syllogistic reasoning must alone be made use of in dealing with the abstract forms and generalizations of the Understanding.

Æsthetic harmony, proportion, and beauty must be decided upon and determined by the immediate action and utterances of the sentiments and delicate emotions of taste. Induction here would be as much out of place as "a bull in a china-shop."

In morals, every thing is submitted to the final and authoritative decisions of the conscience; and all reasonings are but preliminary and preparatory hereto. In the whole field of abstract morals, we find no forms of reasoning that approach to a likeness to that laid down in the "Novum Organum."

Each distinct realm of thought and being demands investigation by certain peculiar modes and courses of intellectual procedure, corresponding to its own nature, and the nature of the ideas and subjects it involves. Induction, we see, is far from being the universal Organ of truth. And why, since its acknowledged and appropriate sphere of operation is Physics, should it be *assumed* to have supreme

dominion and authority in Psychology? Is a human soul no more than, or the same as, a clod of earth? To assume that the same process of inquiry is as applicable to the scientific study of Mind, as to that of Matter, is so to assume and assert. If these two forms of being are essentially distinct in kind, and in their modes of manifestation, how can they be subjected to the same rules of examination? And that they are thus distinct, reason and common sense declare.

We all instinctively admit and insist upon such distinction. Nay, we can but hold Mind and Matter to be the very antipodes of being, having nothing in common, except the reality of their being.

And yet, it is insisted, we can know the powers and faculties of the Mind, only by following the same course of procedure that we adopt in searching out the forces and qualities of Matter. If this be truly insisted, then does Reason set at naught, in this instance, its own precedents, and abandon those laws of procedure which it has set up for a guide everywhere else.

2. But, if we will turn our attention to an analysis of the Baconian theory itself, we shall find that it has been framed with precise and sole reference and adaptation to the inquisition of a nature foreign and distinct from the Mind, that is, Matter.

This theory goes upon the assumption, that the nature to be investigated cannot be discovered or

known by any instinctive or intuitional action of the intellectual faculties, or by any of the ways and modes of acting by which these faculties know themselves, and thence proceed to resolve and combine their own ideas and notions; but, that the given nature, the one upon which this theory of Method is to be tried, is shrouded in complete mystery and darkness to the human soul, its inner nature not being in the least understood, and its process of development being in no wise caught and apprehended by the *a priori* principles of Reason, or the original ideas and dicta of the Intellect.

Hence Bacon's disquisition upon the "idols of the Mind," in which he teaches that, before we are prepared to make use of his New Organ of Science, the Understanding must be purged of all preconceived notions, of all formulas of reasoning, and of all conceptions of ideal truth, derived from reflection or spontaneous suggestion; and that, like a smooth and polished mirror, it must be set so as to receive the very image and impress of that foreign nature which it is proposed to examine. Were it not a nature foreign to the mind, which by this Method is to be investigated, there would be no need for this work of purging and purifying the Intellect, but the original notions, the peculiar ways of thinking, instinctive to the mind when busied with its own conceptions, would assist in the operation, and help in arriving at correct conclusions.

That it is a nature foreign to the mind, that is, Matter, to whose investigation the Baconian Method is alone adapted, is proved also by the cautionary maxims, so frequently repeated in the "Organum," against any anticipations of the result, against any reachings out of the Reason in the effort to gain the prize, before the completion of the process shall have been duly attained by the patient and mechanical way of "exclusions" and "rejections." Such a caution could only be in place, with reference to a subject or nature concerning which the mind could have no knowledge, and could gain no cognitions from its own inherent action and spontaneous modes of thinking.

3. In the study of the soul itself, be it borne in mind, these anticipations, these outreachings and forereachings of the Reason, constitute the precise Method to be pursued, and are the only way by which we can here arrive at the truth. To follow the lead of its own thoughts, the bent of its own inclinations, the direction of its own activities—this is the very thing to be done by the mind that would know itself. And, in the performance hereof, the mechanical process of "exclusions and rejections" is not to be adhered to; but rational sight and insight are to be called into requisition, and the Reason encouraged to declare and disclose its own laws, by the Intuitional analysis of single concrete facts of consciousness and sub-consciousness.

For, in Psychology, the Reason is not called to search into the qualities and dispositions of a foreign substance, concerning whose nature it must hence be totally in the dark, but into its own laws and modes of action; concerning which, therefore, it must have instinctive intimations, and must acquire the most direct and intimate knowledge by Intuition. For the Mind is always present to itself, and true to itself, and open to its own inspection. And it is to be scrutinized in its own bright light, by the direct gaze of the interior eye of the soul; not through dim media, and the examination of faint reflexions and deceptive appearances.

Dugald Stewart, even while defending Induction as the proper Method of Psychologic inquiry, was obliged to confess that "our conclusions concerning the principles and laws of the human constitution differ, in many respects, from discoveries in Physics." * And it is to us a matter of surprise, that it did not suggest itself to his thoughts, that, because of such difference, a different course of investigation must be pursued.

SEC. 2. *Psychical and Physical facts essentially distinct, and hence require examination by different Methods.*

But the force of these considerations, upon which we have now entered, is greatly increased, when we add to the diversity of the nature to be examined,

* "Philosophical Essays," p. 53.

the diversity in the nature of the facts which they respectively present to the attentive intellect, the diverse relations which these two orders of facts respectively sustain to the knowing faculty, and the difference in the instruments by which these differing facts are made known to the mind.

1. Those facts which Matter presents, and which constitute the proper subject of Inductive examination, are nothing but *appearances* in the strictest sense of that term. They do not, and cannot, because of the foreign and unknown nature of the substance in which they inhere, disclose to observant thought the true and inward powers which produce them. The eye of sense cannot penetrate into the secrets of Nature, and by direct vision trace these outward manifestations up to their ultimate and real causes. The senses, here, are the sole instrument of observation; but they discern only the superficial changes that occur in the outer world, not the remote and real changes: and, hence, the necessity of Induction; hence the need of this slow and creeping process of search, by which the accidental and adventitious may be excluded, and by whose aid the Intellect may feel its dark and devious way along, till it shall perchance at length attain to the real.

2. Besides, material facts are only *reported* to the Reason; they are never present to it. They are only superficially present to sense; and they lie in

the sense, and can never be taken into the mind, to be there resolved and scrutinized by the searching glances of the mental eye. To know them at all, the Intellect must go forth in perception, must go out of itself, and grope darkling amid the mists and shadows of illusory sensations. But even then it never touches the alien nature, which is the source of these sensations; never mingles with and grasps Matter itself.

Hence, if it would know any thing of material laws and causes, it must have recourse to Induction, as its last resort and only hope. This is the sole thread by which it can feel its way along the intricate labyrinth, which it immediately enters when it goes forth into the world of Matter.

3. When, however, it would explore its own recesses, and discover the laws and causes of its own operations, it is shut up to no such necessity; it neither does, nor is obliged to, employ any such Method in order to discover the truth. For here the facts to be examined are given in consciousness and self-consciousness. They are wholly within the Mind itself, and are immediately and entirely under the inspection of the Reason. They are not merely reported; but are there in *propria persona*. They conceal, they can conceal, nothing relating to themselves; but their appearance and their reality are identical.

Their seeming and their being are one; and are

perfectly known to the self-reflecting Intellect. The Reason may grasp them in their entirety; for it touches them at every point and stage of their evolution; overlies and underlies them; mingles with and penetrates all through them, and makes them wholly its own; since they are but the Mind, and its own powers, in action.

What need then here of Induction?

What demand for a process of reasoning, to lead the Mind, to an apprehension of that which it knows by direct sight? Nay, what possible ground for such a procedure here exists, as to all the *facts* of the inner world of consciousness?

SEC. 3. *The different Methods by which the Intellect discovers the Principles, Laws, and Causes of Mind, and those of Matter, set forth.*

By way of reply to the foregoing, it may be said, that simple facts are not the sole object of the inquisition; that facts do but furnish the data and occasion for the discovery of the ordaining law and the producing cause, which underlie the facts, and which constitute the real object of scientific search. And we grant the correctness of this statement, as a definition of the real object of Psychological science.

1. But I deny that such is really the object of Inductive investigation. "We never abstract or withdraw ourselves from things," says Bacon. His Method does not permit the leaving of facts; nor

can it ever advance a step beyond them. The forces it recognizes are phenomenal. The laws and causes, which it admits, are still but facts of sense, and nothing else or more. They all lie open to the senses, and are to be tried and tested by experiment, conducted by the aid of sense-perception. Facts, here, are not so much as the *occasion* of a deeper knowledge; they are not the data upon which the Reason, acting, leaps by its own motion to the cognition of the abstract and hidden powers that give rise to them. Induction allows no such leaps and anticipation. It begins and ends with facts. They are the foundation and top-stone of the entire procedure.

The problem, the sole problem, which Induction does, or can, propose for solution is, a certain nature or fact being given in sense-perception, to determine the sensuous nature or fact upon which it depends. And how is this to be determined? The father of the Inductive Philosophy answers, "By a series of exclusions, until, of the collected instances, nothing remains but the given fact, and that with which the given fact is found to be always associated." This latter is the Inductive law, or cause, as the case may be. Thus, then, by this Method, we never get beyond or beneath the facts, to an apprehension of the genuine and ultimate cause or law, of whatever kind of phenomenal manifestations.

To prove that we do not misinterpret or misunderstand the force of this Method, take the favorite example which Bacon introduces for its illustration —the phenomenon of Heat. What is the "form" or "cause" of Heat? he inquires. And after collecting, in well-arranged tables, all the known instances in which this nature appears, and then rejecting, one after another, all those natures with which it is found not to be always connected, he at last has left only a certain "expansive motion;" and so concludes that in this does Heat consist.*

Here he has advanced no further than from one phenomenon to another. And, as this is his own chosen illustration, it may properly be supposed to represent the full force of his logical system. In the realm of Physics, this system is suitable and truthful; but not in Mental Science. For, in this latter science, the inquiry does not relate alone to the apparent facts of consciousness and self-consciousness, but also and especially to the formative laws and underlying powers from whence these facts emanate, and by which they are determined. And such laws and causes, Induction, as we have seen, confesses itself powerless to discover.

2. Indeed, it is evident that when once the Reason shall advance beyond the facts presented, it must abandon the Logic of Physics, which has to do with nothing but facts, and trust to its own inherent

* Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 375.

strength, and arrive at its conclusions by Intuitions, either single or in series. This is precisely the course pursued by the Reason in its search after the truth, relating to the ongoings of the Mind.

And I challenge the adduction of a single instance to the contrary. The mental operations, which transpire in consciousness, are reproduced in self-consciousness; and are therein, as we have shown before, subjected to the immediate inspection of the highest faculty of the Intellect—the Reason; and are, hence, perfectly known by direct and instantaneous vision. They cannot be known at all, in any other way. So far, then, there is no approach to the Inductive process.

3. But, in these patent and envisaged facts themselves of consciousness, we do not discover any of the mental laws, principles, and powers. These lie below, sometimes at a profound depth in the soul, and are revealed to the intuitive eye-glance of Reason in sub-consciousness. And this act, also, by which they are known, is instantaneous, and unattended by any process of argumentation. That is, the apparent facts of Consciousness being furnished as the occasion, the Reason at once apprehends the law, the principle, or the power, by Intuition.

And I here appeal to every thinker, whether this is not the true account of the mental procedure, when he engages in self-reflection for the purpose of studying the elements and constitution of the human soul.

4. But, if any shall still insist that our knowledge of mental principles, causes, and laws, is the product of Induction, and not of Intuition, let us suppose, for their benefit, that we undertake the discovery of the cause or power, producing any particular class of conscious phenomena, by an exclusive examination of the phenomena themselves. And for this purpose, let us begin, after the Baconian fashion, with the collection of these phenomena or facts into "tables"—affirmative, negative, and mediate. And, after they are all thus carefully noted and written down, let the Reason commence to work upon them by excluding and rejecting, as directed in the "Novum Organum;" if one could refrain from laughter, and preserve his patience long enough to go through the evidently absurd operation, what can we conceive would be the "residuum?" What could remain? Nothing. The whole series of facts would dissolve in the process, and "pass off in smoke;" and that after which search was made, would nowhere in the procedure be evolved. For, facts of consciousness, objectively considered, and apart from their actual conscious environments, are dead facts, and have no significance, and disclose no truth whatever. The only condition of their rendering the slightest assistance to the Reason is, their being held in the mind—being reproduced in self-consciousness; and there subjected to the discriminating action and abstraction of Reflection. It

is not till each item of this condition is fulfilled, that we can discern the least trace of law, or order, or causative force, in the supposed mental facts. But, when this condition is wholly fulfilled, the formative law, the necessary order, and the producing power, are called out and revealed in sub-consciousness, to be apprehended by the intuitive eye-glance of the Reason. To withdraw conscious facts from the inner world, and from the radiant light of rational personality, which there shines forth and illumines that wondrous realm of being, and give them an objective expression and classification in written "tables"—as may be done with material facts—is to take them out of that sphere, and away from those relations where they belong; and thus to deprive ourselves of all clew to their origin and meaning. It is to remove them from under the eye and cognizance of the Reason—the faculty alone competent to their investigation—and submit them to the examination of the Understanding, which possesses no native power to grasp and analyze them, or to give them a scientific explanation. Self-Reflection, that is, the Reason introverted, and looking straight in upon the actual workings of the soul, is the sole instrument for the perception of psychical facts; and it is the Reason alone, while retaining this attitude of introversion, that can make the discovery of psychologic truth. And the idea of committing this work to the perceptive and

logical Understanding, is as absurd as to make the senses the judge and arbiter of mathematical demonstrations, or to attempt the deduction of the actual laws and causes of Nature, from abstract metaphysical notions, by a course of syllogistic reasoning. To abstract the facts of consciousness from the mind itself, with a view of analyzing them by the force of objective thought, is equal to the folly of withdrawing ourselves from sense, and confining ourselves to our own internal cogitations, in order the better to understand the qualities and tendencies of Matter.

Holding these facts in self-consciousness, and scrutinizing them there, and questioning the mind itself in connection with the reflective act; this is the only way by which we can gain any enlightening responses, and attain the knowledge which we seek. These facts held up to, and, so to speak, pressed upon, the soul, call out responses, in subconsciousness, from the living powers and spiritual causes which first produced them; and these responses are immediately caught and understood by the listening ear of Reflective Reason.

BOOK III.

TRUE PSYCHOLOGIC METHOD.

CHAPTER I.

THE VARIOUS ENDS OF PSYCHICAL PHILOSOPHY REACHED BY INTUITIONAL PROCESSES.

I KNOW of none of the ends or aims of Mental Science, which are not achieved by the Intuitive action of the Reason.

Not only are the facts of consciousness, when reproduced for the purpose of examination and critical analysis, directly perceived in Intuition, and known to be what they are by immediate rational vision, but also every thing else concerning them:—every thing having to do with their nature, genesis, the powers producing them, the laws regulating their procedure, their internal relations, and logical order. And to search out and expound these, their nature, causes and laws, is the special aim of Psychology.

Though Physical Science may find its chief consummation in mere observation, not so with the Science of Mind. It goes below the envisaged and perceived facts of consciousness, and inquires into the causal and legal rationalè of these facts.

This is the work which Psychology principally aspires to accomplish. It uses the observation of facts, as being merely preliminary to higher and nobler achievements.

In its observation of phenomena, it is not, indeed, a whit behind Physical Science, as to carefulness, patience, thoroughness; while, as to the clearness and certainty of its mode of observation, it far transcends that science. Its observation is directed to facts, which lie wholly within the grasp and comprehension of the Rational Intellect; while the observation of Physical Science is turned to phenomena lying in a substance which possesses a nature, powers, and modes of action diverse from those of the Mind; and which, therefore, cannot be thoroughly penetrated and understood by the human Intellect.

Let us, then, proceed to consider the various aims of Mental Philosophy, and show that they are all realized by rational Intuition.

SEC. 1. *Psychologic Classification Intuitional.*

The first of these aims is Classification. This is but a step in advance of mere analytic observation and abstraction, and is the lowest office of the Science of Mind. And, therefore, we may truly say, that Mental Science begins where Physical Science ends: for the latter can never really go beyond the mere classification of phenomena. Its labors must end, in referring the observed

phenomena of the outer world to the various classes to which they seem to belong. For, it is destitute of any means or instruments for discerning the inner meaning of those phenomena. Their real nature and rationalè, it can no more than guess at, from their outward appearances as presented to the superficial gaze of sense-perception. And, hence, its classification of them is grounded on nothing but seeming analogies and apparent general resemblances. Positive accuracy is here entirely out of the question.

But, how is it with Psychologic classification? I answer, it may attain to absolute accuracy. This is its privilege. For, the analysis and abstraction, which the Reflective Reason is empowered to effect upon the facts that are brought under its immediate inspection, in Self-consciousness, are exhaustive and perfect. Each fact, brought under the powerful lens of the interior eye of the soul, and held there under its burning and shining light, is at once reduced to its most elementary principles; its inmost nature is known, its essential properties are seen, and every thing pertaining to it fully understood. And, therefore, its kinship to other facts of consciousness is precisely determined, and with the utmost certitude.

The concepts of the genera and species into which mental phenomena may be grouped, become the exact measure of the essential likeness and

similitude of the phenomena included in those genera and species.

These concepts may be constructed with a precision which will render them exactly comparable, in this respect, with Mathematical Ideas.

Every element and quality may be eliminated from them, which does not really and essentially pertain to the facts which they respectively include. Indeed, from the thorough analysis and abstraction of *one* concrete fact of Consciousness, the Reason may frame a concept which shall serve as an exact basis of classification for all conscious facts of like nature.

For, such analysis and abstraction enable the Reason to detect and reject every element and quality pertaining to the fact, that is, of a special or incidental nature, and thus to form an idea, or concept, solely of those elements or qualities that are essential, and inhere in its very nature; and which, hence, enter into all other facts that are really the same in kind. In truth, and as an item which still further distinguishes Psychological from Physicological classification, we do not arrange the envisaged facts of Consciousness under distinct heads, or into separate classes, in all cases, or even for the most part, according to their *apparent* points of similarity as seen by viewing them in comparison; but by reason of their agreement as to origin, or source of generation; which agreement is not ob-

served in the facts themselves, but is intuited by the Reason simultaneously with the observation of the facts. In other words, the Reason classifies the facts of Consciousness, not by comparing and combining them according to their apparent and seeming similarity or resemblance, but by its Intuitive apperception of the law or the faculty from whence these facts are derived.

Should it attempt their classification, by confining its attention to the facts themselves, and in accordance with the perception of their apparent resemblances, it would be deceived and misled, and construct the most heterogeneous combinations. For there are many species of conscious phenomena, differing as widely as possible as to the sources or faculties from whence they emanate, which, nevertheless, present almost precisely similar features to the eye of perceptive reflection.

Take, for instance, the phenomena of Perception, Memory, and Imagination. The conscious and subjective facts of Perception present the same general appearance to the eye of Reflection, as do the conceptions or images of outward scenes and objects called up in the Imagination, or as do the recollections of either or both reproduced in the Memory. And had the Intellect no other means of determining their real character than the appearance they present in consciousness, it would mingle and confound them together indiscriminately. As it is

however, the Reason never mistakes, as to their essential dissimilarity; because, instantaneously, it beholds by Intuitive Insight, while gazing upon them in reflection, the mental source or power in which each has its origin. In every instance of Perception, it gains, through sub-consciousness, an Intuitive intimation of the faculties employed therein, self-evident and unmistakable; and when the precise image of that perception is called up and repeated in conception, Reason, just as readily and instantaneously and certainly, discovers, hereupon, the conceptive and imagining power of the mind, to which the conception is to be referred; and the same is true, when the perception is repeated in Recollection; then, at once, and with this as the occasion, an Intuitive knowledge is gained of the memorizing faculty. And this being true of each and all of the mental operations, the Reflective Intellect classifies them, by means of the Intuitive knowledge it possesses of the faculties which produced them, and the laws which govern them; and not by a careful and laborious comparison of these operations among themselves, according to their apparent similarity or resemblance, after the manner of the Inductive process.

But, the simple classification of the mental phenomena is the lowest and least important office of Psychologic Reflection. Much else is devolved upon it, of far greater difficulty, and far higher sig-

nificance and value. But, whatever may be the question here proposed for solution, the mode of procedure, as we claim and assert, is always the same, that is, that of immediate Sight, or Intuitional Insight, of the Reflective Reason. Nothing in the science of Psychology can be learned in any other way, by the use of any other Method.

Still further, to convince us of this truth, let us take up and examine the various other questions which belong to Mental Philosophy, and illustrate and make good our position, by adducing specific instances under each.

SEC. 2. *Subjective and Logical Order of Ideas Intuitively Determined.*

And of these questions, perhaps that relating to the Order of Ideas, in the concrete mental operations, may properly be considered as first in interest and importance. At least no other question in Mental Science has engaged the attention of modern philosophers, to a greater, if to an equal, extent; and especially that relating to the order of ideas in Perception. And this, therefore, because of its greater familiarity, we will take to illustrate and prove the truth of our Method under this head.

Nor do I here propose to discuss the various theories of Perception, or, indeed, any one of them, which has been propounded and constructed by modern speculation. My only aim is, to determine

the mode by which the Mind gains a knowledge of its own operations.

1. And the specific question immediately before us here is, How do we settle the Order of Ideas in concrete mental processes? And, for a definite instance and example, How in the case of Perception? We answer, it must be by one of two modes, either Induction or Intuition; for Deduction is here manifestly ruled out and impossible, since it could not, in the nature of things, be furnished with any data, any premises, with which to begin.

Is it, then, Induction? Do we, when we undertake to settle the order and concatenation of ideas involved in Perception, proceed to call up in Memory all the instances of Perception which we, from first to last, have performed, arrange them into "tables," and then commence the process of "exclusion," in order to find in the residuum the exact order of each operation? To ask the question is to answer it. Every man, who has cultivated the habit of self-reflection, knows better. No Psychologist ever thinks of discovering and settling the order of ideas in Perception, or in any other concrete act of the mind, by a course of empirical reasoning.

All Psychologic knowledge is gained by a course of Reflection, that is, by sight or insight, by immediate perception or direct Intuition. And so here, when the true student of the Mind would learn the precise order of ideas in the perceptive process, he

brings up before the eye of Reason in Self-consciousness, an instance, a single instance, of Perception; he discriminates, analyzes, and abstracts its various elements; and with these abstracted elements clearly before it, the Reason decides *ex cathedra*, and by its own proper authority, what the true order is, and what it must be in every case. It reconstructs the abstracted elements of the concrete perception, and arranges them in their logical and natural and necessary order.

2. How else than by an instantaneous and Intuitive act of the Mind could it be settled, that in every act of Perception, the first thing in the series is, an impinging of the mind, by which the sense of self is awakened; and that, next, the subjective sensation is apprehended; that then the idea of outness, and of space, is evolved; then that of body, as the cause and source of the sensation? For, be it observed, the first step in this series, and, indeed, each step from first to last, is of the nature of an ultimate fact; and no course of reasoning, especially not that of Induction, can impart to us a knowledge of ultimate facts. Such facts, on the contrary, constitute the data, upon which alone a reasoning process can be based. And such data can be furnished, therefore, only by the direct Sight or immediate Insight of the Intellect.

3. And, again, it is asserted, with absolute certainty, of the order above described, that it is in-

variable, in all instances of perception. But, it is the prerogative of the Intuitive Reason alone, to decide with absolute certainty. Induction never attains to any thing more than probable certainty; and even this probable certainty extends no further than to instances actually submitted to its examination.

4. But, again, it is asserted of the above order of ideas, that it *must* be so, and cannot be otherwise. And it will be confessed by all, that it is the sole prerogative of the Pure Reason, by its power of Intuition, to pronounce upon universal and necessary truths.

5. And, still again, simple observation, upon the apparent and seeming facts of Perception in their concrete forms, could never lead us to a detection of the above orders of ideas; for the reason, that these apparent and seeming facts present us with an almost opposite and inverse order.

Before Discrimination, Analysis, Abstraction, and Intuition have performed their work hereupon, it would seem that the first thing given us, in every act of perception, is, the specific material body toward which the organs of sense and the attention are directed; or at least that this was next in order to the subjective sensation. When we make use of our Reflective Reason, however, we know that such is not the fact, and cannot be the fact.

6. And here we come in contact with the irra-

tional distinction, which Cousin makes, when discoursing upon this very theme, between the chronological and the logical order of ideas, that is, their order in time, and their order in nature or reason. Taking the apparent or seeming order of ideas in Perception, he maintains that, chronologically, the apprehension of the sensation precedes the knowledge of the Ego, the apprehension of self; and also, that the perception of an extended body antedates the idea of space; while, in the order of rational thought, he affirms, the reverse of this is true—viz: that self-knowing precedes the sensation, and the idea of space, that of body.

To assert the reality of this distinction, is precisely to assert, that Reason and Fact are at antipodes; that we actually gain our ideas in that order, which Reason declares to be impossible; that we really know things in a way which cannot be conceived in rational thought. And this at once falsifies the faculty which he, and all other Idealists, and Ideal-Realists, claim to be the source of original truths and primary convictions, upon which all knowledge has its foundation.

Is it possible for us to know any thing, in contravention of the very order of rational thought? We cannot even conceive this to be true; and to assert it, is to contradict a primary affirmation of the Rational Intellect. And so, in the case before us, we abide by the decision of Intuitive Reason, which

declares that self-knowing must precede all other knowing; and we assert this order to be true in fact, as well as in thought—to be chronologically as well as logically true. What is the act of knowing, but self, awakened into consciousness, directing its sight to some object? In point of time, then, as well as in verity of thought, the egoistic idea has precedence, in every operation of the Perceptive Intellect.

And so, with reference to space and body; if we cannot conceive of extended body as existing without space, do we not, must we not, have the idea of space suggested to the mind, before we can gain a perception of an extended body? It is plain we do, and must. Actual knowledge must obey the principles of rational thought; else our knowledge would be irrational, that is, not-knowledge.

Cousin was led into this absurd distinction, by not discriminating, as he should, between the seeming and the real in the process of Perception. A closer abstraction, and deeper insight into the facts of consciousness comprehended herein, would have enabled him to discover, that the apparent, discrepancy, here existing between the actual and the rational, was only apparent and not real. That which especially engrosses the attention in an act of perception, is, an object perceived, and the involved sensations.

The attendant and correlated movements of the

Intellect are, therefore, but faintly portrayed in the conscious act; and when the whole is sought to be reproduced in self-consciousness, the most important part of the process is apt to be overlooked. In fact, scarcely any of the antecedent action and by-play of the Intellect directly appears in the original conscious act; such action and by-play are made known to self-reflective Reason, only in the depths of sub-consciousness. What I have here said upon Perception, will apply in every case where it is proposed to determine the real and logical orders of ideas. In every such instance, as in this, the question is settled by the direct rational Sight or Insight of the Intellect; and never by the use of the Inductive Method.

SEC. 3. *Laws governing Mental Operations Intuitively Apprehended.*

But suppose, in the next place, that it be proposed to determine the Law governing any given class of mental manifestations, what course, then, shall we pursue? what plan of inquiry shall we then adopt? Must it be that of inducting the phenomena—the facts of consciousness—whose law is the object of search?

1. Not at all. For, as we have before explained and shown, in the facts themselves the law is not revealed; and an induction of facts leads us to a knowledge of nothing beyond, or out of, nothing but what enters as an element into the facts them-

selves. But, every mental law lies beyond or beneath the facts, and is a constituent of the mind itself, a part of its constitution; and to know it, as such, is, in every such case, the object of our search.

To the accomplishment of this, Induction is manifestly and confessedly incompetent. And besides, were it competent hereto, there would be no occasion for its employment here; for, while the law is not revealed in any or all the facts of Consciousness, it is at once made known to the Reflective Reason, by every such fact, when reproduced in Self-consciousness. Any one fact, belonging to the class, whose law is under investigation, being held up clearly before the mind's eye, and discerned in all its features, becomes an occasion of the evolution of the law itself in Sub-consciousness, where it becomes the object of Intuitional insight to the Rational Intellect.

2. And I deem this a fitting opportunity, for giving a brief explanation of the terms—Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and Sub-consciousness. Already, during the progress of this discussion, I have made frequent use of these terms; but I have purposely refrained from any attempted definition of them, until I came to treat of the *laws* of mental action and the method of their discovery; as I thought here I might be furnished with the best illustration of the meaning I attach to the last, and most unusual of them, namely, Sub-consciousness.

What I understand, then, by Consciousness, is that knowledge of the internal mental state, and condition of the concrete mental activities and phenomena, which obtains and exists in the soul, when the mind is originally and spontaneously engaged in action; whether intellective, sensibilitive, or volitional.

In Spontaneity, as well as in Reflectivity, every phenomenon of the inner world is revealed to the seeing eye of the soul, by the light radiating from the mysterious center of rational Personality, and ever illuminating every department of the mind.

Every concrete act and fact of the soul stands out in this light, and is compelled to declare and disclose itself to the gaze of the rational Ego. It is a marvelous power possessed by rational Personality of co-instantaneously acting, and knowing its acts. And this knowing is as essential as the acting. Indeed, it may with truth be said, that the mind neither thinks nor feels nor wills, without this knowing. So that, the envisagement of the spontaneous operations of the mind in Consciousness conditionates their reality.

What I mean by Self-consciousness is, the reproduction of the state and phenomena of Consciousness. This reproduction is always attended with a distinct idea and sense of self, and of personal identity; and hence the propriety of the term—Self-consciousness. This mental condition differs from the

former, not only by the attachment thereto of the clearly-revealed idea and sense of selfhood, but still further by the attitude of the Intellect, that of introversion and self-reflection. The power of reproduction in Self-consciousness is the prime condition of all psychologic knowledge. With the most, this power is weak; many scarcely possess it in any degree.

But what significance shall we further attach to the word Sub-consciousness? Can there be any thing more, connected with, or involved in, the process of self-study, than what is contained in the foregoing forms of consciousness? I think there is. Let me attempt to explain.

In addition to the reproduced state and phenomena of Consciousness, and the superadded idea and sense of selfhood, contained in Self-consciousness, I find in every introspective effort of the Reason, when the concrete phenomena have been resolved into their abstract elements, and these abstracted elements have been distinctly delineated to the eye of Reflection—beyond and beneath these phenomenal elements, at a profounder depth of the soul, a sort of subdued repetitive action of the laws and faculties which were originally concerned in their production, awakened by their reproduced presence in Self-consciousness; a sort of by-play and undertone of the constitutional powers and constitutive laws of the soul; which the Reason is

fully competent to understand, and by which it attains an intuitive apprehension of these laws and powers themselves. I have somewhere read, that if a stringed instrument be played in the vicinity of other instruments of its kind, each of its tones will by them be answered and repeated, in subdued and gentle undulations. And this is a fitting illustration of my meaning.

When the concrete facts of Consciousness are recalled, and discriminated, analyzed, and abstracted, and, thus resolved, held up in the clear light of Reflection, amid the living spiritual activities of the soul, from whence they originally proceeded, they will call forth, and be responded to by, these very activities themselves—in gentle and subdued undertones, in which the Reason will intuitively behold the source and mode of their original production. And this is what I call Sub-consciousness.*

3. Of the reality of this power or condition of the soul, no better exemplification can, perhaps, be found than in the detection of mental laws. Take, for example, the laws which regulate the association of ideas, and which preside over the mental acts we call *recollection*. And, for a specific example, let some single particular case of associated suggestion be selected; as, for instance, when the sight of a tree has called up in the memory the recollection of a man, and the man a discourse.

* See Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics," p. 515.

Let now this instance of association, consisting of the three ideas—a tree, a man, and a discourse—be reproduced for examination in Self-consciousness. And let it be inquired, Why did the tree suggest the man, and the man the discourse? Or, in other words, What is the law of the mind calling up and regulating this series of ideas? It is plain, now, that if we should direct our attention, in the settlement of this question, exclusively to the facts or ideas themselves, we would never gain the information we desire. For these ideas have not the least internal connection or resemblance. They are essentially diverse, and we might question them forever, and not receive an answer. And, if instances of this kind were multiplied indefinitely, the same would be true; and, hence, from this investigation, Induction is excluded; and so, also, in every other case, where the inquiry relates to a mental law. But, in the example before us, how would we proceed to explicate the reason of the association of the ideas mentioned? I answer, by holding the resolved phenomenon of recollection in Self-consciousness, and questioning the mind itself—not the facts or elements involved in the association. The law will then at once proclaim itself in Sub-consciousness, to be detected by an Intuition of the Reflective Reason. Instantaneously will it be announced from the Memorizing power itself of the mind, with reference to the instance before us, that under that tree we

once beheld the man whose image it suggested, and, there and then, we heard him pronounce the remembered discourse. Nearness or contiguity of time and place, is thus instantly discovered, by a single instance, to be a law regulating the association of ideas in the Memory. And such we declare to be the mode of conducting the inquisition of mental laws, in all cases.

SEC. 4. *Mental Causes or Powers Intuitively discerned.*

If now, we consider the next great aim of Psychologic investigation, namely, the discovery of mental Causes or Powers, it will be found that the same Method holds good.

1. Upon the presentation, in Self-consciousness, of any, and of every instance of mental action, whether of thought, feeling, or will, the Reflective Reason instantaneously gains an insight into the constitutional power of the soul, from whence it emanated, by the responses of Sub-consciousness. In fact, so decisive is its clairvoyant insight, in this respect, that, as we have already observed, it becomes the real basis of the classification of all the mental operations. Each species and kind of conscious phenomena has its boundaries and limits assigned, by a reference of its facts to their causal faculties. Their causes are, therefore, as clearly and readily discerned, as are the facts themselves. And an inquisition of them by the Inductive process, or by

any other process of reasoning, is a work of supererogation and folly. That which is already known, with absolute certainty and entireness, by intuition, need not be further inquired into, or further sought to be known, by any other means.

2. Nor does the Reflective Reason here ever make a mistake. It never attributes an act of Judgment to the Memorizing faculty, or an act of Perception to the Imagination, or an act of Desire to the power of Will. However similar the facts may be, as to their conscious appearance in concrete spontaneity, with unerring and infallible accuracy, does the Reason refer each to its appropriate faculty. In every case of mental action, it as truly beholds the cause in Sub-consciousness, as it does the Ego in Self-consciousness. And it were as rational to seek to attain and designate the idea of Self, by the application of the Inductive Method, as to undertake to find out the nature or essence of any power of the mind, by that Method.

We have thus shown, that in the work of observing and classifying the mental phenomena, determining the subjective and logical order of our ideas, apprehending the laws, and discovering the causes of mental activity, Rational Sight and Insight—the direct vision of the Intellect, the Intuitional action of the Self-knowing Reason, alone suffices, and is alone brought into requisition.

And what besides the above work, I ask, is in-

cluded in the purview of the science of Psychology? In the Philosophy of the Mind there is, indeed, no more to be considered or examined. In such examination, applied to all departments of the mind, is the "be-all" and the "end-all" of Psychology. And, therefore, I say that throughout the whole extent of this science, Induction is "ruled out" and excluded—since every step is here taken by direct Rational Sight or Insight.

3. In resolving each of the questions which it is the business of Mental Science to settle, we have found that *one* "instance" is as good as ten thousand. Every fact relating to the particular subject under examination, whether it be of subjective order, of regulative law, or of causative power, is exactly an *experimentum crucis*, and furnishes the Reflective Reason with an adequate occasion for attaining to an accurate Intuitional determination.* No laborious and painstaking Induction of facts is demanded, or even permitted.—Nothing but careful reproduction and accurate reflection, until the Law, or Cause, or Order, emerges to sight, and is limned upon the retina of the soul's introspective eye.

4. We attain to no genuine knowledge of the soul, by conducting an argument, by laying down certain propositions or facts as the basis of the logical procedure, and herefrom drawing out a

*See Cousin's "Hist. Phil.," vol. ii, pp. 265, 266.

concluding statement. But, on the contrary, we have found all such knowledge to be direct, instantaneous, and intuitive. Here no form of syllogism is employed, or can render the least assistance. Whatever the seeing eye of the soul does not behold, or obtain an insight of, by its own direct vision, must forever remain shrouded in darkness, and can never be known at all. Here is no blind and mechanical "feeling out" the way to an unknown and unanticipated conclusion, by the aid of negative instances and rejections; but an immediate seizure of positive instances, and a consistent and infallible anticipation of the truth herefrom; not a "walking by faith," but by spiritual Sight and rational Insight.

CHAPTER II.

PURE IDEAS AND PRIME TRUTHS OF THE REASON, HOW GAINED AND COGNIZED. CRITICISM OF MCCOSH'S ATTEMPT TO EMPLOY INDUCTION IN THEIR DETERMINATION.

HAVING now completed a general survey of the ordinary mental operations, in the support of our thesis, I propose, for the further elucidation hereof, to examine a particular class of spiritual phenomena, namely, the Original Ideas, Prime Truths, and Spontaneous Convictions of the Pure Reason, commonly, but very loosely, denominated the Intuitions of the Mind.

SEC. 1. *Reasons for undertaking a special examination of this class of Rational Facts—the Intuitions.*

I am induced to this special examination for several reasons.

1. In the first place, the unique and remarkable character of this class of conscious facts, must ever invest them with a peculiar interest, to the mind of every student of Psychology. They are entitled to special consideration, because of the distinctness and peculiarity of their essential nature. And, again, they challenge special attention, on account of the important relation they sustain to all other forms of intellectual phenomena; in fact, constituting the

very beginning and foundation of all knowledge—of all Science and Philosophy. Their discussion, also, forms one of the most important chapters in the history of modern Psychology. To elucidate them, has been the great work, to which many of the most distinguished modern Philosophers have devoted their time and attention.

2. But, in this discussion, which I have undertaken with the purpose of showing the irrelevancy of the Inductive Method to Psychologic investigation, and of expounding the true Psychologic Method, I am urged to a special examination of this particular class of mental facts, chiefly because of the recent attempt of a distinguished living philosopher to prove, that the ideas, truths, and convictions of Pure Reason can be known and designated only by the process of Induction.

The work of McCosh, on "The Intuitions of the Mind," was written for this express and avowed object. The attempted substantiation of this position is about the only merit the work possesses, or can justly claim. For beyond this, it has no marked feature of originality to recommend it; while its views and positions, which do not relate immediately to this, do not, in the main, differ from those advanced and advocated by Reid, Hamilton, and Cousin. By criticising the arguments, which this author has employed in the advocacy of his principal thesis, we may, then, at once both estimate

and fix the true merit of his work, and weigh and understand the full force of the arguments by which Induction, as the Method of research in the Philosophy of Mind, is to be supported; and at the same time, if we succeed in fairly answering and refuting these arguments, we shall still more firmly establish the main position of our own thesis, and also find additional evidence in proof of the truth of that Psychologic Method, which we have already indicated as being the only legitimate and truthful one.

3. We have said, that McCosh is the only Philosopher, who formally pretends to apply the rules of the Baconian Logic in critically examining and designating the Intuitions of the Pure Reason. And this is the fact. Indeed, he claims for himself, in this respect, the merit of original invention. *

And, the truth of his assumption upon this point cannot, I think, be fairly questioned. Nor would I be understood to draw an inference herefrom, unfavorable to the soundness of his theory. This fact, however, does, in my estimation, derogate, on the start, somewhat from the genuineness of his theory upon Method, namely, that those Philosophers from whom he derives all that he himself has set down relative to the derivation, distinctive character, and significance of the Primary Intuitions, save where his pecular notions of Method interfered

* "Intuitions," Book I, chap. iii, first edition.

and prevented, should have arrived at such accurate and rational views, as he confesses they have, by the use of, as he claims, a false Method of procedure.

And, with this suspicion awakened in our thoughts, we look back to what we have already said and shown, respecting the mode of inquiry to be pursued in the study of the ordinary operations of the mind; and suspicion ripens into doubt and positive disbelief. For, we cannot suppose that a Method of search true for one department of the soul, should not be true for all; or rather, that a Method true for the ordinary, should not be true for the extraordinary activities of conscious being.

4. And then, again, when we take into account the peculiar and essential nature of these facts, whose proper mode of examination we are about to consider, it would appear to us almost self-evident, that they cannot be scientifically known and explained by any application of the Inductive process. Respecting this class of facts—the original Intuitions of the Pure Reason—those ideas, principles, and convictions which directly and spontaneously emerge from the highest and most authoritative faculty of the Rational Intellect, it is asked, How do we know them? How can we reflectively detect their nature and qualities? In the very nature of things, it would seem impossible that they could be known by any faculty less authoritative, and hence by any faculty, other than that by which they are originally and

spontaneously declared. And to suppose that they can, is to suppose that in passing out of spontaneity into a reflective and scientific form, they lose their essential character of self-evidence; that is, that they cease to be Intuitions. But, I am here anticipating a train of thought, which can be followed out to better advantage, when we come to the critical review of the positions and arguments of the author before us.

5. McCosh does not, by any means, deny the existence of the original Intuitions of the Mind. He acknowledges, and even unconditionally affirms, their existence. Nor does he seek to invalidate their truth, or shake our confidence in their trustworthiness. On the contrary, it is his avowed intention to so establish and fortify them in the belief, as to increase, if possible, the confidence we instinctively incline to repose in them. His object is, "to see," as he says, "that the foundation be well laid, that the root be properly planted."* But, by the manner in which he conducts the examination, he virtually removes the "foundation," and plucks up the "root;" as I shall proceed to show.

SEC. 2. *Materialistic Tendencies observable in this work of Dr. McCosh, derived from his Principles of Method.*

It is curious and instructive to note the materialistic tendency given to this author's views and

* "Intuitions," p. 6.

speculations—indications of which are to be found on almost every page of his book—by the Baconian principles he had imbibed, and which he sought to carry out to their fullest extent, in this highest realm of Mental Philosophy.

1. Had this author's courage, and the force of his logic, been equal to the task of unfolding the germs of doctrine contained in many of the statements and assumptions, which he found it necessary to lay down in support of his theory of Method, he would have landed at length in downright Sensualism. His partiality for Locke is every-where displayed. He even quotes, with approval, the sentiments advanced by Locke, when developing his theory of the origin of our knowledge, in opposition to the doctrine of innate ideas; and says that that Philosopher, strongly and truly apprehended the real mode of mental procedure herein. "It is, as I reckon it, the true merit of Locke that, in the second book of his 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' he shows how, in the ideas we form of such subjects as space, time, substance, cause, and infinity, and in the general maxims employed in speculation, such as that 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time,' there is involved a process of the Understanding founded on a previous experience." * And that he had embraced, in the main, the system of this

* "Intuitions," p. 15.

great founder of the Sensualistic School, is evident throughout his work on the Intuitions. Virtually, and, in fact, explicitly, does he take the position, that the Reason is not the source and discoverer of universal and necessary truths. Absolute and unconditional knowledge has not its birth and beginning in the Rational Intellect, he ever and anon repeats, in order to guard and fortify himself against the objective skepticism of Kant; but the Reason, he tells us, beholds and discovers in the individual objects presented, only what is really contained therein. Thus, on page 26, he declares, that "our intuitive convictions are not ideas, notions, judgments, formed apart from objects [that is, existences, known by perception], but are, in fact, discoveries of something in objects, or relating to them." And, time and again, he cautions his readers against falling into the delusion that these ideas, cognitions, and judgments emanate from the mind itself.

Why, then, we ask, need he object to the Lockian definition of the original condition of the Intellect, that it is like "a sheet of white paper, without a single mark or inscription upon it?" as he does so vehemently.

2. But take, now, in connection with the above, our author's notion of what the mind comes first to know; in other words, what is first presented to the observation and cognizance of the Intellect; found on pages 103, 104, 127, and 128 of his work on the "In-

tuitions." The following are his words: "It is through the bodily organisms that the intelligence of man attains its knowledge of all material objects beyond. This is true of the infant mind; it is true, also, of the mature mind. We may assert something more than this, regarding the organism. It is not only the medium, through which we know all bodily objects beyond itself; it is itself an object primarily known; nay, I am inclined to think that, along with the objects immediately affecting it, it is the only object originally known."

What more than this, did the founder of the Sensational Philosophy ever say? We have here, indeed, all the required postulates for the construction of a complete system of Sensationalism. Let us concede, what McCosh above demands, that the mind knows nothing which it does not cognize in individual objects, and then, as he here claims again, that all the objects originally presented to, and known by, the human intelligence, are the bodily organism, and the material bodies exterior to and brought in contact with it, and does not the conclusion inevitably follow, that all our ideas and knowledge have a sensuous origin? that "there is nothing in the Intellect which was not first in the Sense?" This conclusion cannot be evaded.

3. And especially is the charge, which we here allege against this author, more firmly fastened and nailed upon him, when it is further introduced, as a

"count" in the "indictment," that he denies that the objects thus presented to the notice of the Intellect, are the *occasion* of its discovering or cognizing something more than is contained in the objects themselves. Thus, on pages 25 and 26, he says, "Metaphysicians have often given such an account of the intuitive convictions, as to leave the impression that the mind creates them independent of objects, or that, at the utmost, experience furnishes merely the occasion, on the occurrence of which the mind fashions them by its own inherent power. I shall have occasion to show," he continues, "that the relation between the intuitive powers and objects is of a much closer and more dependent character, than this account would lead us to suppose. In Intuition we look into the object; we discover something in it, or belonging to it, or we discover a relation between it and some other object. Were the object taken away, the perception would be meaningless; indeed, it would altogether cease. Intuition is a perception of an object, and of something in it or pertaining to it."

This is as explicit as language can possibly make it; and it follows herefrom, in connection with the extracts given above, not only that all our knowledge begins with sense-perceptions, but that we know no more, and can know no more, than what is contained in our sense-perceptions.

4. I have no desire to misrepresent this author

upon this point, or upon any, that may come under our examination in the course of this discussion; and am, therefore, careful, and shall continue to be careful, to give his own words upon every important question involved. Nor do I wish to be understood as here affirming that he, intentionally and formally, announces any such conclusions as I have here drawn from his own premises above given. On the contrary, he professes to be an Ideal-Realist, and formally rejects and combats the conclusions of Sensationalism. And the very object of his work is, to show that there are, in the mind itself, original sources of knowledge, independent of experience, which he calls Intuitions. But the principles of his false Method, drawn from the Baconian Philosophy, vitiate his whole system, render impossible the accomplishment of his design, and plunge him into a thousand inconsistencies and self-contradictions, as, in the course of our review, we shall have abundant occasion to learn.

5. Take another evidence of the warping this author's mind received in the direction of Materialism, from the rules of philosophizing he had derived from the physical Logic of Bacon, to be found in the almost constant allusion he makes, throughout his work, to the laws, principles, and qualities of material action and existence, in illustration of the facts, powers, and functions of the soul; and also in the correspondence, he alleges is to be found, in

the modes by which they are to be respectively investigated. Thus, he tells us that "Matter, with all its endowments, organic and inorganic, is regulated by laws which it is the office of physical and physiological science to discover. All the powers and properties of material substance have rules of action. . . . That Mind, also, has properties is shown by its action; and surely these properties do not act capriciously or lawlessly. . . . Nor does it appear that this law can be discovered immediately by consciousness, any more than the law of gravitation can be perceived by the eye."* And, then, he goes on to affirm, that the same course of search must be instituted, for the detection of the laws which regulate the action of both Mind and Matter.

And, again, he declares: "The native principles in the soul are analogous to the laws operating in external nature. . . . Like the physical processes of respiration and the circulation of the blood, the Intuitions do not depend on any voluntary determination of the human mind; but," says he, further on, "they may be regarded as operating very much like the great physical and physiological laws of chemical affinity, or of nervous irritability, or of the reflex nervous system."† The truth of the sentiments contained in these passages, I am not now concerned with, and I only introduce these extracts as specimens of the mode of reasoning and

* "Intuitions," pp. 21, 22. † Ibid., pp. 28, 29.

comparison he has adopted throughout his entire treatise. On almost every page, will be found some material allusion, some physical comparison, metaphor, or illustration, introduced into his argument, as supports to his premises, or aids to his conclusions.

6. Than this, nothing could more clearly expose the sensualistic and pernicious influence of his principles of philosophizing. Than this, no course could be pursued so directly calculated to corrupt and vitiate any system of Mental Science.

There is no genuine analogy between Mind and Matter. They constitute, respectively, the very opposite poles of existence. Each is *sui generis* in its essence, laws, and functions. And each is truly to be known and understood, only on the condition of a separate and distinct examination, conducted in accordance with the peculiar nature of each. To attempt to blend their investigation, is to corrupt the science of both. And this is particularly the effect upon the science of Mind.

The great hinderance to its successful cultivation is, the materialistic signification of the terms necessarily employed in the definition of the ideas, and the statement of the propositions, involved in it.

Purposely to introduce physical comparisons and material allusions into a treatise upon the Mind, is unnecessarily to increase this unavoidable difficulty, and it is sure to end in error and falsehood.

Nothing could be more natural than this course,

however, to one who conceived that the rules of the Baconian Logic were of legitimate application in Psychological inquiry. And such a one is the author before us. Nor has he escaped the resultant and logical consequences of his false Method—not even the worst of them.

SEC. 3. *Pernicious Principles and Erroneous Postulates this author was induced to support, as a concession to the requirements of his false Method.*

In proof of the foregoing declaration, I now call the reader's attention from the merely incidental admixture of material terms and ideas into his processes of reasoning, resulting in their partial adulteration, to the general pernicious issues flowing from his application of physical Logic to the highest forms of Intellectual manifestation.

1. McCosh was driven, by the demands of the Inductive theory, which he had adopted as his guide in Psychology, to propound and maintain, though with many misgivings and asseverations to the contrary, the fundamental postulate of all Sensational Philosophy, namely, that all valid and scientific knowledge is derived from experience. This he does, by implication, throughout; but, also, emphatically and explicitly, in many places in his book. Take the following, which he introduces to meet this very objection to his views, anticipated by himself, as an example and proof of this statement: "I am not, therefore, to be lightly charged with con-

tradictions, as if I resorted to experience as a basis or ground of principles which I represent as original and independent. I employ Induction simply as a mean or method of finding laws that are prior to Induction, otherwise Induction could not find them. Experience is not supposed by me to furnish the ground of necessary truth; all that it can do is, to supply the facts which enable us to discover the truth, and that the truth is necessary." *

Let it be borne in mind, that our author is speaking here of Fundamental and Necessary truth, or the principles from whence such truth is derived. And he is here inquiring, as to the *knowing* of truth of this kind. His explication hereof is, that these truths or principles are given us alone in experience.

Though they *exist* independently of experience, they can only be really and truly known through it, in accordance with the Method of Induction. Now this is precisely the explication hereof, given us by Sensationalism. The affirmation of this system of philosophy is, that experience is the only means through which the human mind can acquire real knowledge—can scientifically know the truth and the principles upon which it rests. Its affirmation does not relate to the essence of truth and its principles, but to the *discovery* thereof.

Sensationalism does not say, that the principles

* "Intuitions," p. 3.

of truth do not exist independently of experience, and that they are created by it. It only declares, with McCosh, that experience is the only method by which these principles can become *revealed to*, or known by, the mind. While here deprecating the charge of Sensationalism, McCosh does, in fact, asseverate its doctrines in the baldest style.

For he here declares, with reference to the Prime Truths, the very fundamental principles of all truth, that they are given us solely in experience, in the way of Induction. No Sensational Philosopher ever went further than this, or gave a more radical enunciation of the leading postulate of his creed.

Again he says, "It will come out, in the course of our survey, that while there are regulative principles in the mind, operating altogether independent of any reflex notice we may take of them, and not depending for their authority on our Induction of them, it is at the same time true, that they can become known to us as general principles, only by inward observation, and be legitimately employed in philosophic speculation, only on the condition of being rigidly inducted." * That is, he assumes the existence in the mind of original principles of knowledge, which act spontaneously; but when we would know them as principles, and would reflectively criticise their validity, we must depend entirely upon experience and Induction.

* "Intuitions," pp. 34.

And these principles, thus known, the sole product of experience and Induction, he asserts to be the basis of all Philosophy. That is, while spontaneous knowledge may be absolute and unconditional, reflective is only experimental and inductive. In reflectivity, there is no unconditional and absolute truth; and experience furnishes us the very principles, which lie at the basis of all science and philosophy; for we know, that all science and philosophy are born of reflectivity.

2. Again, when speaking of Metaphysical principles, he says: "It is when actual examples are before the mind, that it is able to appreciate the meaning of the general formulæ. It is only when it has considered them in their application to a number of diversified instances, that the mind is in circumstances to pronounce them to be probably, or approximately, or altogether correct." * But Metaphysical principles, as he himself subsequently confesses, are the sole basis of the sciences, both mental and physical, and if they are made up from experience, and their truth can alone be tested by experience, then, virtually and formally, all scientific knowledge rests on experience as its foundation.

It follows, hence, that there is no firm and necessary foundation to Science; for experience can never rise to the knowledge of universal and necessary truth, but only of contingent and probable.

* "Intuitions," p. 54.

But, from the very idea of Science, we affirm that it has its foundation in universal and necessary truths; upon truths, therefore, which have in them no element of experience, and are not made up by Induction; but which are known by a direct and intuitive apprehension of the Reason. Else, Science is not Science, but a mass of vague guesses and probable generalizations; and Philosophy befools us with a show of solidity and certainty, when, in fact, it has neither, even in its groundwork.

3. Reflective knowledge is not devoid of absolute certainty, which is perceived by the intuitive action of the mind.

Reflection, indeed, is the very beginning and condition of real knowledge; and nothing is so certain, as that which we know by reflective processes. It may be claimed, that, prior to reflection, we know much and certainly; but it is mere blind faith and instinctive affirmation. It may be real, and have a valid content; we can, however, never be assured of this, till we criticise our faculties, and reflectively know those abstract truths which are the test of all particular truths—of all special and individual cognitions. So far are individual instances from affording us the means of determining universal and necessary principles, that we could never rationally apprehend the reality of these individual instances, but in the light of such principles. Reason at once perceives the unconditional relations of ab-

stract ideas, when they are clearly presented to it, with far greater certainty, than it does actually existing objects, that come under its sensuous observation. And this truth is exemplified in the science of Mathematics. In pure Mathematics, whose elements are pure abstractions, mere conceptions of the Reason, the processes of deduction are more easily performed by the mind, and the truth of the concluding statement is far more clearly apprehended, than in mixed Mathematics.

The introduction of the material element, derived from experience and the observation of single instances, obstructs the absolute precision of the purely abstract conception, and detracts, in a degree, from the demonstrative character of the rational procedure. And so we say, no affirmations relating to individual objects are so precisely intuitional, or appear so absolutely necessary to the Intellect, as those relating to the purely abstract ideas, which are the elements of the universal and axiomatic Truths of Reason. But there is no need that I should, in this connection, further pursue this line of argument. We shall soon find occasion to recur to it again.

McCosh was obliged, however, to take this peculiar and untenable position, and to include in his definition of genuine Intuitions, only the spontaneous convictions of the mind relating to individual objects, in order to justify, or even render possible,

a practical application thereto of the principles of Induction. For, unless he confined Intuition to the spontaneous apperceptions of the mind when directed to individual objects, and excluded it entirely from the realm of reflectivity, he would have no individual and concrete facts upon which an Inductive process might be commenced, but would leave an open path for the Reason, by which it could come at once, by reflective action, to an Intuitive apperception of abstract, universal, and necessary truths; thus rendering Induction, with reference to the prime axioms of the Reason, useless and out of place—as, at a subsequent stage in this discussion, I shall endeavor more conclusively to prove it is.

CHAPTER III.

CRITICISM OF MCCOSH, CONTINUED—HIS ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT THE INTUITIONS ARE INDUCTIVELY "FORMED" OR "MADE UP."

AND now I come directly to consider, the manner in which McCosh assumes to apply the principles of the Baconian Method, to the philosophic determination of the Intuitions. In what ways, and for what ends, I proceed to inquire, does our author claim that Induction should be employed, in this most exalted and most interesting and important field of Psychologic inquiry?

Not content with using the Inductive process for the purpose of criticising and determining the original ideas, convictions, and judgments of the Reason, he insists that it shall be brought into requisition in the very *construction* of them.

All the really universal and necessary Intuitions of the mind—that is, all those that are reflex in their character, and are made use of in Science and Philosophy, he tells us are made up by a course of Inductive reasoning. And yet, neither here, nor in fixing the character of this class of mental acts, does he give us, in fact or in form, one genuine example of Induction.

Bacon illustrates his rules, and the mode of their application, by numerous practical examples. This author does not furnish us one—notwithstanding his wonderful flourish of trumpets, and his lofty pretensions with regard to the matter. In his whole work, we find not a single "table of instances," a carefully arranged collection of facts, relating to any one of the Intuitive principles.—No exhibition of the process of "exclusion" wrought upon collected data; no "instance" to inform his readers how, from such repeated and continued exclusions, he at length discovers and derives the universal law, principle, or maxim, in obedience to the rules laid down in the "Novum Organum." We note this as an extraordinary and significant omission, to say the least. He was bound to furnish us at least one such instance, extendedly and elaborately drawn out, which might be pointed and referred to, as an example and proof of the correctness of his theory. And one such instance would have gone further toward the definitive settlement of the question, than all his general statements and asseverations. As it is, his Induction is hidden and concealed, and we are obliged to take his word for it. And, unless we are disposed to assent to assertions upon authority, we are left at liberty to doubt, and to deny the reality of his Inductive processes.

SEC. 1. *His account of the Manner in which the Intuitions are Made Up.*

But, let us now take his account of the manner in which the Intellect "forms" its abstract and intuitive cognitions and judgments, and see if that account harmonizes with the facts of Self-consciousness; and if so, whether we can find any species of Induction involved herein.

1. He affirms, as we have already observed, that all the original Intuitive acts of the mind relate to individual objects. As, for instance, when we behold the beginning of a movement, or of an existence, we at once perceive the necessity of a cause therefor; when we perceive a body, we see at once that it does and must occupy space; when a voluntary action comes under our notice, we at once behold that it is virtuous or otherwise. And thus, in every case, and always, the original Intuitions are spontaneous and particular affirmations, having reference to individual objects presented to the mind. Let him here speak for himself: "Our intuitive convictions," says he, "are not ideas, notions, judgments, formed apart from objects, but are, in fact, discoveries of something in objects, or relating to them. Whatever be their distinctive nature, they always, as Intuitions, contemplate objects as individuals. If I know or believe in any thing, it is as an existing thing, that is, as singular. If I form an intuitive judgment, that is, make a comparison, it is still in regard to two or more objects considered as singulars; and so far as we pass beyond this, there

is always, as I shall endeavor to show, a discursive process involved." * This language is not capable of being misunderstood. We have here the platform of McCosh; here is the ground which he has himself prepared, namely: the concrete, spontaneous, individual facts, upon which to make trial of his Inductive experiment.

2. How does he next proceed, or say that the process must be conducted? By "discursive thought," as above suggested. But what is the style and nature of this discursive thought, as by him explained? "The operations of the mental properties," says he, "are under the eye of Consciousness . . . and by careful observation, analysis, and generalization, we may, from the acts, reach the laws of the acts." †

That is, in case of Intuitions, we must carefully observe, analyze, and generalize those which relate to individual objects and singular instances, in order to arrive at the universal, the axiomatic truth. This is still more emphatically stated in the following passage: "It will be shown that the mind has the power of generalizing the individual cognitions and judgments of the Intuitions, and in doing so it may arrive at most important truth. It will come out, too," says he, "that Intuition may fasten on the general proposition, and pronounce decisions in which it is involved. But in the formation of the

* "Intuitions," p. 26. † Ibid., p. 22.

general maxim, there is a process of logical thought involved, for which the Intuition is not responsible." * Again, upon this point, he affirms: "The general maxim is necessary on the condition of the generalization, out of the individual convictions, being properly formed. It is to be constantly kept in mind, that the necessity attaches, in the first instance, to the singular conviction looking to its objects. But the necessity being in the individuals, may be made to go up into the general, provided the general has been legitimately drawn from the individuals." †

3. But it may be inquired, Does he himself distinctly and purposely characterize as Induction the observation, analysis, generalization, and discursive thought, which, in the foregoing passages, we are told are concerned in the proper "formation" of the axiomatic truths of Reason? We reply, he does, expressly. Take this passage as an example: In defining these axiomatic or universal truths, he says: "They cannot be appealed to in argument, only on the condition that their law has been gathered by Induction." ‡ Thus clearly using the term Induction to designate the several steps before enumerated, as constituting the process by which these universal or axiomatic truths are "formed" or gathered."

Again, in affirming the similarity of the processes

* "Intuitions," pp. 27, 28. † Ibid., p. 42. ‡ Ibid., p. 46.

to be pursued in discovering the law of the Intuitions, and the law of gravitation, he says: "The one law, like the other, is to be ascertained by an investigation of its individual acts, and this in a state of things, in which the action of one property is closely interblended with that of another property; necessitating not only an observation of facts, but a very patient and discerning Induction, so that we may catch the rule of the distinct agencies." * We now fully and precisely understand his view of the various steps, involved in the formation of reflective Intuitions. First, a collection of the individual and spontaneous Intuitions; then, an observation, analysis, and generalization of them; and then, the final induction from them of the axiomatic and universal truths.

SEC. 2. *Examination of this alleged Inductive "Construction" of the Intuitions of the Reason.*

And now, we ask, Is this a true account of the mind's procedure herein?

1. In asking this question, I appeal to every one's self-conscious thought. When we trace out the operations of the mind, in attaining to the apprehension of universal and necessary truths, do we find an accurate and truthful description of it, in the account here given? For, this is a question to be decided, primarily and chiefly, by an appeal to Self-consciousness—not by the dicta of a theory,

* "Intuitions," p. 71.

however generally accredited; nor by the authority of names, however great and venerable. If we have, in the above, an accurate description of the process, every one may know this fact for himself. He has but to reproduce the process in Self-consciousness, and test its accuracy by what he there beholds. For, observation, analysis, generalization, and induction, are all conscious acts, and may, therefore, be self-consciously beheld and scrutinized. So that, at length, we come to this—in support of our own, and in opposition to our author's, theory, that, however the mind may make up and construct certain of its Intuitions, it can know such making up and construction only by the direct sight of the Reflective Reason, and not by means of any form or species of Induction whatever.

2. Our appeal, then, is to Self-consciousness—to the magisterial faculty of Reason, looking in upon the phenomena of intellectual activity. And we ask it to inform us, how it beholds, and makes affirmation of, absolute and unconditional truth.*

And, criticising my own Self-consciousness, I must declare, that I find no such movements of the Intellect relating hereto, as are delineated by this author; no such darksome way, by which it is blindly led to the discovery of those truths most patent to its immediate apperception.

3. But, what do I find to be the Method of this

* See "Intuitions," p. 27.

procedure? How do I reflectively know, that the Reason apprehends pure and unconditional truths? This is the real question before us: for I hold, that the mind does not *make them up* at all. It has a perception of them from the first, though not at the first self-consciously and reflectively. And this is the great mistake, into which McCosh has fallen, or, rather, which he has been driven into, by his false theory of Logic.

4. First, then, in this work of reflective scrutiny of the Intuitions, I place Reproduction in Self-consciousness. The contents of spontaneity must be brought forward, and subjected to introspective examination. But is any additional knowledge hereby gained? If only the pre-existing contents of Consciousness are to be investigated, is any thing to be learned from this, which was not known before? I answer, Yes; much. For, there is much in the Consciousness which is not discerned by the mind, while it is concerned with its instinctive and spontaneous acts. In Consciousness, the mind is directed to individual objects, which then engage its attention and absorb its energies. It takes not, then, distinct notice of its own operations and activities, nor beholds, definitely, the workings of its own faculties, nor appreciates the extent and nature of the truths it incidentally recognizes—busied as it is with the objects of sight and sense, which thrust themselves upon its attention. Hence there will

be many things — facts, principles, truths—which are associated and blended with the conscious acts of the mind, and lying back in Sub-consciousness, that are never once clearly revealed to the eye of the soul, till they are recreated in Self-consciousness, and submitted to the scrutiny of the self-knowing Reason.

5. This introspective scrutiny, performed by the Reason, includes, first, Discrimination; that is, the perception of differences, by which every reproduced fact of Consciousness is distinctly individualized, and clearly distinguished from all other conscious facts. This is the prerequisite condition to Analysis, which is next in order. Analysis is a resolution of the concrete phenomena into their elements; and not alone of the apparent facts of Consciousness, but those contents of Consciousness surrounding and underlying these facts, which are half hidden, or quite concealed, in the deep recesses of our spiritual being. These last are not to be found out by Induction; it could never seize and bring them forth, for they are primary facts, and truths first spoken; and, because thus primary and original, are remote, having their sources far back in obscure depths and caverns of the soul—like the sources of rivers lying in the shades of the wilderness, or concealed amid the rocks of the cloudy cliff, and known only to the adventurous explorer. And they are, therefore, to be traced out and drawn

forth to view, by the insight of the Reason engaged in analytic action. And, thus guided by the light and sight of the Rational Intellect, may we follow up to their fountain-heads in Sub-consciousness, those whispered intimations and half-disclosed facts and truths which, at first, and in spontaneity, are dimly and not self-consciously known. This analytic power of the Reason, exercised upon the Intuitions given us in spontaneity, enables us to separate the merely phenomenal and incidental from the rational elements, and trace each up to its ultimate source, and thus arrive at pure and uncompounded ideas.

The mistake of our author, at this point, is, in overlooking and ignoring the more recondite acts and elements of Sub-consciousness, which enter into, and are blended with, the individual Intuitions, and confining his attention solely to the apparent phenomena of the conscious processes—as the mind is directed to the individual objects immediately before it.

Indeed, as I shall show hereafter, he seems to have no well-defined views of Self-consciousness or Sub-consciousness, but makes the word *Consciousness* stand interchangeably for these very different modes or states of the self-knowing Intellect; which results in infinite confusion of ideas, and errors in reasoning.

6. In the reflective criticism of the spontaneous Intuitions, next, after their analysis and elementary

resolution, succeeds Abstraction, or the separate and special contemplation of the elements, apart from and independent of the relations they actually sustain in the concrete mental acts. In such reflective Abstraction, the Reason gazes directly upon pure and simple ideas and existences.

It has now under its inspection, the seedlets of all knowing, the A, B, C's of all truth. It has now got back to the beginning of its first affirmations and judgments. It has not really gone beyond, or added any thing to, its own original and spontaneous dicta; it has merely resolved, and brought forth to view, what was in them, and went to constitute them, though before unrecognized and unappreciated.

7. And now follows, next in order, the crowning act of Reflective Intuition—all that went before being only conditional and preliminary hereto. While gazing in abstraction upon these elements —these resolved ideas—the Rational Intellect, at once and reflectively, apprehends their source. It self-consciously recombines these ideas — not according to the apparent and seeming order which they sustained in spontaneity, but according to the order of immutable fitness and necessity. It now Intuitively beholds absolute and eternal relations, as it looks on the pure and simple ideas to which it has attained by analytic Abstraction; and affirms now, upon its own proper authority,

absolute and unconditional truths. And, at the same time, it sees that such absolute and unconditional affirmations were involved in the concrete and spontaneous Intuitions, and that, without them, all spontaneous Intuition would be impossible.

When the pure and simple ideas, actually contained in spontaneity, are distinctly brought out by the analytic process, and the Reason gazes upon them in abstraction, they become themselves the elements of reflective Intuitions, which are the enunciation of absolute and universal and necessary truths. Thus, for example, when the mind shall have beheld, by its analytic sight, the simple ideas *quality* and *substance*, found in its concrete Intuitions while engaged upon individual objects, the Reason at once, and by virtue of what it sees in these ideas, and without any reference to its concrete affirmations and spontaneous convictions, decides, with absolute reflective certainty, that they have a necessary and unconditional relationship, and, in the exercise of its own prerogative, utters the abstract and universal proposition, that "all quality must be or inhere in substance." And it does this as directly and decisively, as when, looking upon an individual and particular quality, it says that it must or does inhere in a given substance. And so in all other cases of the assertion of axiomatic and universal truths.

By carefully and accurately following the Reason, when employed in reflection upon its spontaneous

cognitions reproduced in Self-consciousness, we hence arrive at the discovery of this great fact, namely, that true Intuition is not found alone in concrete forms of thought, and in spontaneity; but, that genuine psychologic analytic Reflection also ends in, and is crowned by, Intuition. And it further appears, that, in this latter, the Reason does no more than repeat what it had already, but somewhat unconsciously, done in the former.

8. It is, also, important to be observed in this connection, that the mind as readily beholds the universal and necessary truth, in a *single* individual Intuition, and reaffirms it with the same certainty and absoluteness, upon the analytic examination of that single Intuition, as though this one were multiplied by thousands. A single instance of sense-perception, together with the intuitive affirmation consequent hereupon—that the body perceived is and must be in space, being reproduced, analyzed, and abstracted in self-reflection, will give the mind as perfect and adequate an idea of pure Space and of simple Matter, as it can ever possibly attain unto. For, simple space and matter are as truly contained in one act of sense-perception, and its attendant Intuition, as in all instances; and in that one, they are as easily discernible by the Reason. And having once secured, by Analysis and Abstraction, a reflective cognition of simple matter and pure space, the Reason immediately, by its own in-

herent power, sees between them a fixed and unalterable relation; and, thereupon, it unhesitatingly utters this universal and necessary truth, that "all matter must occupy space." And this now abstract utterance of a universal truth is found, upon reflection, itself to inhere in the individual cognition or judgment, accompanying the singular sense-perception.

And what we have here said, holds good of all the axiomatic and abstract truths of the Reason, relating to existence, causation, and morality. They may all be reflectively known in the same way, by the same direct and immediate apperception of the Reason.

9. At no stage, in this whole process, is Induction employed or required. Here is nothing more, than an introspective effort of the mind, by which it may discover what is really included in its own spontaneous acts. And there is here a discovery of nothing more, of nothing beyond. A different form of affirmation, to be sure, is evolved; but only by a separation of the simple from the concrete, and the consequent reflective and intuitive apprehension of the universal and necessary in abstraction. Every step in this process, from first to last, is one of immediate Sight and Insight; that is, an Intuitive act of the Reason. It is the Reason that gazes directly upon the reproduced facts of spontaneous consciousness; the Reason, that dis-

criminates and analyzes, with its clear, unerring vision; the Reason, that holds, in abstract and immediate contemplation, the pure and simple ideas to which, by analysis, it had attained; and it is the Reason which crowns the whole by the reflective intuition (through these uncompounded and abstract ideas) of absolute and necessary and universal truths. In the acquisition by the mind of axiomatic principles, nothing more than this is done, nothing more need be done, nor, indeed, can be. And, surely, nothing less would answer the demands of Rational Intelligence. For, Rational Intelligence demands the same, or, at least, an equally solid and reliable basis for science, as for our spontaneous convictions and judgments; which could not be realized, were it not as precisely and directly Intuitional; much more could it not be realized, were it Inductive in its character. And, by our theory of Psychological Method, we find that immediate and unconditional knowledge is not excluded from Reflectivity, as is the case upon the principles of philosophizing advocated by McCosh; but, on the contrary, we find that the whole work of psychologic reflection is performed by the direct sight or insight of the Reason; and the universal and axiomatic propositions, which underlie all science, are the subject of its direct Intuitive affirmation.

10. It is not true, then, as is reiterated by this

author with such frequency and emphasis, that in Intuition the mind knows nothing which it does not see in the individual object, toward which, in the spontaneity of consciousness, its attention is directed. When looking solely at individual objects, the mind beholds only what is, not what everywhere must be. The necessity, which it predicates of singular objects, even in its particular spontaneous cognitions, is, therefore, known to it only by an act of thought more or less reflex, and subsequent to the formation of an ideal of such objects. For, the necessity is not in the existing object; nothing is in it, but actuality of being, or of mode of being. The necessity, therefore, is a rational entity, or condition of being, apprehended by the mind when the ideal of the object is consciously present to the Intellect.

The *intuition* of the object, certainly, is not a part of the object, nor in the object. It is an act of the Reason; and is, hence, wholly in the mind. And, it is with the Intuition that we are chiefly concerned, and which forms the subject-matter of present investigation. Psychology has alone to do with that which is in Consciousness, Sub-consciousness, and Self-consciousness; not what may inhere in exterior objects.

How the Reason cognizes, and what are the elements of its cognitions, are the questions now before us. Our inquiry relates specially to mental-

ity; and only incidentally to objective reality. And if it should turn out in the end, that we can know external existences only through, and by the aid of, certain media, and that nothing can be asserted of them absolutely and unconditionally, save what the Reason affirms upon its own proper authority, we should then, probably, have but arrived at the actual condition of human knowledge, inseparable from the limitations of our earthly being; nor should we have any reason to fear and tremble for the fate of our Ontological knowledge; since what the Reason beholds, as it gazes upon Sensations in Consciousness and Self-consciousness, imparts to the exterior world all its reality and constancy. And concerning Necessity, we say it cannot, in the nature of things, have any actual objective existence; it is exclusively a rational entity; and its existence is only realized in Reason and rational fitness. We affirm it of certain conditions, qualities, and relations of being; we do not, and cannot, cognize it in an outwardly existing object.

11. It is false, moreover, to hold, with this author, that the cause is seen in the effect. The cause is something which the Rational faculty apprehends lying back of, and antedating, the effect, as its condition. It is not in it, but above it, beyond it, and superior to it; and must be cognized in thought, in order to the recognition of any thing as an effect.

So, also, to say that in the instance of a body

given us in sense-perception, the mind intuitively beholds space therein, manifests a ridiculous confusion of ideas. The fundamental idea of matter is extension; for matter or body is something extended. But extension is not space; it is conditioned upon it; but is no more to be confounded with it, than succession is with time. And, therefore, the idea of space must antedate that of body or matter.

And the same is to be said of a voluntary action, and the idea of virtue. Virtue is not seen in the act; but in something which lies back of the act, namely, the intention or motive which induced its performance. And, so, the idea of right and wrong must first be known, in order that it may be predicated of any individual manifestation of volition.

Thus does Reason declare; and to deny this, is to affirm that her Intuitive decisions are invalid, and do not conform to the actual truth of things.

12. It follows, hence, that pure and simple ideas, which constitute the elements and ground of universal and necessary truths, are cognized, though not formally and self-consciously, in every instance of Intuition relating to individual objects. And these ideas, and the cognition of them, are all that imparts reality and certainty to these individual affirmations; they are the rational, and consequently the actual, condition of every Intuition having respect to singulars. They are, to be sure, reflectively known by abstraction, and the analysis which

precedes abstraction; but this analysis and abstraction does not create them; it only discovers them, and brings them forth distinctively to the view of Reflective Reason, which is thus empowered to give them a purely abstract affirmation. They are *contained* in the spontaneous convictions and judgments; they are separated and brought out in their pure form, from the concrete phenomena of spontaneity, by abstraction.

And when thus separated and brought out before the eye of the Rational Intellect, their necessary and absolute relations are more clearly seen, than those of individual objects can be. The affirmations of the Reason relating to them are the most emphatically and positively self-evident, of all possible propositions. Having their origin and seat in the soul itself, they are wholly within the grasp of the Intellect; and all that pertains to them, or inheres in them, is known by the most direct and Intuitive insight. Their cognition, and the judgments of the mind relating to them, bear the marks of the utmost certitude. The knowledge of them is of the highest possible order.—Far superior, indeed, to that which is concerned with singular exterior objects. For, the Intuition of singular objects, as we have seen, is only possible through the light which these primary affirmations afford; and hence is hardly intuitive, but partakes in a degree of deduction.

Besides, the Intuition of exoteric singulars de-

pends upon, and involves, the action of other faculties, which are not as reliable as the Pure Reason, namely, Sense-perception and the Understanding. And we know, that the dicta of these faculties have often to be criticised and corrected, before they can, with absolute safety, be received.

And the element, which they introduce into every Intuition of an individual object, obstructs, rather than assists, the vision of the Rational Intellect, and detracts from, but never adds to, its positive and absolute certainty. For example: When we behold what seems to us the beginning of an existence, or a movement, and while directing our attention thereto, we do not affirm thereof the necessity of a cause, with the same emphasis and positiveness, as when, holding the simple ideas of beginning and cause in the mind, we assert the abstract proposition—"Beginning (that is, all beginning) must have cause." When Sense-perception is absorbed in gazing upon a particular object, it is not to us so intuitively certain that it must be in space, as when, having the simple ideas of matter and space in rational thought, it is certain that "matter (that is, all matter) must occupy space."

These pure cognitions are absolute, because they are pure; and it is found that the admixture herewith of any intimations of sense, having reference to particular existences, detracts in a measure from this absoluteness.

13. Reason knows its own offspring with the utmost certitude; and pure ideas are born of the Reason. It cognizes the absolute and unconditional, by pure Intuition, and with unobstructed vision.

It can know the particular — except the phenomena of Self-consciousness—only through Sense-perception, and the notions of the Understanding. And, all it can know with certainty respecting the particular, with the exception just stated, is through the light afforded by its own already apprehended cognitions, which embrace universality and necessity.

The particulars of Self-consciousness, however, I grant Reason may and does see directly. And this may be called, the internal perception of the Reason. And the principles, laws, and powers, lying back of, and giving existence and form to, the particular phenomena of consciousness directly perceived by it, it may also cognize immediately in Sub-consciousness by Intuitional Insight. This exception to its Intuitive knowledge of particulars finds explanation in the fact, that conscious phenomena are immediately present to it; and, also, because, being spiritual or mental, they are of a nature to be at once and entirely understood by it.

Mental laws and causes, moreover, are themselves grounded in Reason; they are not exoteric and arbitrary, like those of the material world. And, hence, they may be cognized in reflection, by the Intuitive action of the Rational Faculty. And

we are brought to the conclusion, therefore, that no form of science can have, throughout, the same degree of self-evidence and certainty, as can Psychology, if we except Mathematics.

SEC. 3. *How the above course of Procedure, in attaining to a reflective knowledge of Prime and Axiomatic Truths, differs from that prescribed by McCosh.*

To this exposition, which I have given above, of the Method to be pursued in attaining to a reflective knowledge of the axiomatic and necessary truths of Reason, it may be objected that I prescribe a course similar to that laid down by McCosh, whose theory I am endeavoring to overthrow.

I reply, first: It is true that I point out and insist upon certain steps in the process, which he also enumerates. But, it should be borne in mind, that he does not define these parts of the process with any precision; nor does he assign them their true logical order and relation.

2. But, in the statement of the various steps in the process, we especially differ from him in that we exclude herefrom "generalization," which he urges with such pertinacity, and describes as the true consummation of the process.

I hold that the observational process ends with Abstraction, and, therefore, escape and deny his conclusion, that the axioms of the Reason are "constructed"—are Inductively formed out of individual

Intuitions; but, in each spontaneous Intuition, I affirm, that we discover, by Abstraction, the Universal and the Necessary. By Abstraction, we arrive at pure and simple ideas, and these are the basis of universal cognitions and axiomatic truths—not general notions. This important distinction, fatal to the theory of McCosh upon this point, I shall hereafter take occasion more fully to explain.

3. Again, we differ from him, in that we hold that every step in the critical process of reflection is taken by the Reason itself. It is the Rational Faculty which, by its own direct sight, performs the entire work of Discrimination, Analysis, and Abstraction; and, in all this, it perceives nothing, which is not included in the spontaneous Intuition upon which it is employed. It creates no new idea, constructs no general "notion," but simply separates the pure ideas, from the other parts of the concrete phenomena.

4. Then, again, we differ from him, in that we assert Intuition as the crowning act of this reflective process—not Induction. The Rational Intellect, the imperial faculty of the mind, having now reflectively cognized pure ideas, and holding them up before itself in their own clear light, affirms of them, while gazing upon them alone, certain absolute and necessary relations; and thus, it propounds, self-consciously, unconditional and axiomatic truths. Self-evidence attaches to the whole procedure, and

the end is reached by absolute Intuitional cognition.

5. And, it should also be borne in mind here, that we have been led to this conclusion, by tracing out the actual course of thought pursued by Reason itself, as this is revealed to us in Self-consciousness. And, therefore, we now find the theory of this author, to be quite as inconsonant with the facts of conscious experience, as we before found his principles and postulates to be, with the demands of right Reason and the maxims of a sound Idealism.

CHAPTER IV.

Criticism of McCosh on the Intuitions, continued. Confusion of Thought and Absurdities into which his Method betrayed Him.

INTENT upon defending a false theory of Method, this author departs equally far from the realities of existing fact, and the way-marks of logical consistency. To satisfy the claims of his theory, he seems ready to sacrifice not only the interests of truth, but also his own reputation for clearness and accuracy of insight, and force and conclusiveness of logical reasoning. He claims to believe in the Reason, as an original source and fountain of the highest forms of knowledge; but, the demands of the system of Method he has adopted, and tries to apply in his criticism of the Reason, plunge him into a sea of confusion and absurdity, and force him at length to a virtual denial of all Intuitive cognitions, and thus land him in skepticism, the most incurable and desperate. His confusion of ideas, his perpetual confounding of dissimilars and contraries, the absurdities and self-contradictions in which he becomes involved, and the ultimate skepticism of his whole course of reasoning, it is now my purpose more fully to

expose; and by such exposure, to show up the general falsity of his system of Method. It is true, that an author may perpetrate an occasional and incidental self-contradiction, and carelessly involve himself in some trivial absurdity, by an unskillful handling of principles that are sound, and of premises that bear the most undoubted stamp of truth. But the inconsistencies, confusion of ideas, and absurdities of this author, are not of this description; they are not trivial and incidental, but radical and fundamental; and they end in results, most fatal to a sound philosophy. And, hence, they are indicative of a theory, vicious and false at its base. Now let us see, if we can make good these allegations.

SEC. 1. *Confusion of Thought he displays in the use of the term Consciousness.*

Take, as an instance and proof of that lack of philosophic precision, or, rather, of that positive confusion of ideas, into which he was betrayed, by his resolution in defending a system of Method incompatible with the nature of his subject, the varying and equivocal significations, with which he employs the term Consciousness, and the absurd mistakes into which he consequently falls, when speaking of its office and functions.

1. He every-where confounds Consciousness with Self-consciousness, and makes the former perform the functions of both. Indeed, there is not, in his whole work on the Intuitions, a single passage con-

taining a precise definition of Self-consciousness, or which indicates that he had any precise idea of it and its functions, as distinguished from Consciousness.

And of Sub-consciousness, he seems to have no notion whatever, whether confused or otherwise. The following passage is conclusive upon the point: "We are conscious," says he, "of remembering a given event, of imagining a given scene, of discovering a given relation, but not of the mental power from which the acts proceed. Such considerations show that there may be operating in the mind faculties, which do not fall directly under the mental eye. What is true of the faculties," he declares, "is true of the Intuitive potencies of the mind. . . . But without dwelling on this at present," he proceeds, "it is enough to announce that the necessary principles, like the faculties of the mind, do not come immediately under the cognizance of Consciousness. The individual actings do, indeed, fall directly under reflection or the internal sense." *

Two or three pages further on, while combating the notion, that the mind has no other power but that of impressibility, he asserts almost precisely the opposite of the above in these words: "Surely the mind has something more than a mere receptivity. It is not a mere surface on which matter may reflect itself as on a mirror; our Consciousness

* "Intuitions," pp. 18, 19.

testifies that, in comparison with matter, it is active; that it has an original and an originating potency." *

2. All this confusion of thought, and contradiction of statement, comes from his ignoring Self-consciousness and Sub-consciousness, in conformity with the demands of his Inductive theory, as here applied. Now Consciousness is that internal condition of the mind, when it acts spontaneously, and while performing its concrete operations. While in this state, the mind takes no direct cognizance of any of its operations, however simple or however complex they may be; but only an indirect and cloudy cognizance of them. All the phenomena of spontaneity lie, as yet, measurably in Sub-consciousness. Consciousness can never, by any possible means, fully understand its own contents. It never truly reflects; never passes its phenomena under its own inspection.

This work is wrought by Self-consciousness, which reproduces the before dim and hazy facts of spontaneous activity, and brings out, and passes before its own clear vision, the whole contents of concrete thinking, feeling, and willing. Then, what was only consciously or sub-consciously known, becomes immediately and self-consciously known, by an analytic and Intuitive process of reflective thought. What had been but hidden sources and principles

* "Intuitions," p. 21.

of mental action, are now seen at once, and are fully apprehended by the Intuitive eye-glance of Reflective Reason; and thus, we become immediately cognizant of "original and originating potencies."

3. We see, then, how dissimilar, or at least distinct, are the offices of these several conditions or properties of the mind. But, it was necessary that McCosh should largely ignore Self-consciousness and Sub-consciousness, and confine himself chiefly to Consciousness, in order that he might find a plausible basis, in the concrete and individual facts of the latter, for an application of the rules of Inductive reasoning. Had he definitely recognized, and candidly acknowledged, the office and functions of Self-consciousness, whose critical Sight and Insight discovers with unerring and Intuitive certainty all the elements of the concrete Intuitions, even the pure cognitions in which they have their beginning and consistence, he would have exploded his own theory concerning the Inductive formation of axiomatic and universal truths. For him to say, that the pure Intuitions come not under the immediate cognizance of Consciousness, is to say nothing but what we, also, are ready, both to grant and to assert. But we say, further, that by simple abstraction, which creates nothing, which does not "make up" any thing that does not already exist in the mind, these Intuitions may be brought immediately under the eye of Self-consciousness, and apprehended with

as vivid and Intuitional insight, as can any individual object of spontaneous cognition.

4. Having thus confounded these very different mental functions, it is plain, that our author does and must fail to discern the true Method of reflective Intuition, or how the mind can possess any genuine reflective Intuitions at all, or how it can attain to any thing like axiomatic truth, save by the "generalization" of its individual cognitions. And in consequence of this failure, he is led to make the most frivolous and ridiculous statements. Thus, he charges upon those who may dissent from his theory of the constructive process, by which universal and necessary truths are "formed," the "absurdity of speaking of children and infants as employed in contemplating the ego and non-ego, personality, externality, subject, and object." * But, in fact, they are no more guilty of this folly, than is he himself.

By holding, that the mind is immediately cognitive of pure ideas, and that pure cognitions are involved in concrete Intuitions, we do not declare these pure ideas and cognitions to be direct subjects of contemplation to new-born children. We assert, as strenuously as does he, that they can be known in themselves, that is, in their pure state only when the proper conditions are supplied.

In their pure and abstract form, they are not ap-

* "Intuitions," p. 28.

prehended until the spontaneous Intuitions are reproduced in Self-consciousness, and submitted to the action of analytic reflection. But, then, they are discovered to be immanent, also, in the spontaneous convictions and judgments, and are repronounced, with even a greater degree of self-evident certainty, than when they existed merely in their concrete forms.

Reflectively to know them, and pronounce them, requires no Inductive effort of thought, but only analytic, which shall resolve the concretion and discern its ingredients.

But this exercise of thought supposes maturity and strength of mind, such as we are in no wise inclined to attribute to babes and sucklings. There are even many grown people, who have not arrived at the self-conscious age; and are, hence, about as incapable as infants, of being employed in contemplation upon pure and abstract ideas. Yet, we suppose them to be capable of Intuitive cognitions in spontaneity; and in every such cognition, pure ideas enter as the most essential element, to be known, however, self-consciously, not until the mind has gained the mental power of passing the concrete Intuitions before the eye of self-inspection. All that we assert, with reference to the Intuitive mental action of children, fools, or grown people is, that, if they know any thing with absolute certainty, the intellections involved in such knowing

must conform to the necessary laws and conditions of thought, which constitute the basis of all human intelligence. And so we say, that for a child or a man to apprehend any thing, he must first know self, either concretely or abstractly, either consciously or self-consciously.

In perceiving an individual body as existing, one, be he young or old, must have a sense of externality, and also an idea of space, either spontaneous or reflective. Nor can babe or philosopher possibly know any particular congeries of appearances as qualities, until first the idea of substance is suggested to the thoughts. And this is as self-evident, to one who has attained to reflective consciousness, as that a particular event, which has come under his observation, must have a cause. To know abstract ideas, and pronounce universal and necessary truths, then, does not demand time in order to complete an Inductive process of reasoning, but time for that mental growth and maturity, which will empower an intelligent spirit to look in upon itself, and analyze its own operations. Nor, be it remembered, is any problem in Psychology to receive even a partial or approximate solution, by the aid of hypothesis based upon the supposed action of infant minds; it can be solved alone, by the study of one's own mind, in Self-consciousness.

SEC. 2. *This author confounds the Understanding and the Reason.*

Again, the principles of this author's theory of Method required, that he should ignore the distinction between the Understanding and the Reason. And, accordingly, we find that he yields to this demand, and expresses it as his judgment, that "the distinction between them is at the best confusing." And the only distinction he recognizes here, is that of the "Reason in its primary, and Reason in its secondary, or logical, exercises." * And, in logical consistency herewith, he affirms that it is "always by a process in which the logical understanding is employed, that the mind can rise to the discovery of universal and necessary truths." †

That is, we gain an Intuitive apprehension of axiomatic principles, which he himself in another place denominates "truths of Reason," ‡ always by the aid of "the Logical Understanding;" in other words, our Intuitive knowledge is, at least in part, the product of the Logical Understanding, and therefore, not Intuitive.

He was compelled to take this absurd position, in order to make good his hypothesis, that the discovery of universal and necessary truths is always made by an Inductive process. For, Induction is almost exclusively performed by the Understanding. Now the nature and office of these two faculties are as distinct, as those of any two mental powers can well be. The Understanding has to do with the

* "Intuitions," pp. 60, 61. † Ibid., p. 61. ‡ Ibid., p. 30.

objects of sense-perception, Reason with the facts of self-consciousness, and with pure ideas, which are immediately present to its cognition. The Understanding proceeds in its work, by the formation of complex notions, the "making up" of notions embracing species, genera, and orders, out of the confused mass of things coming under our observation in the external world; Reason operates upon the concrete facts of Consciousness, resolves them self-consciously, or reflectively, into their elements, and, by means of Abstraction, gazes upon pure and simple conceptions.

The Understanding employs the syllogism, and draws inferences and conclusions; Reason is Intuitive in its action, and looks directly in upon what is, and what must be. The knowledge gained by the Understanding is contingent and probable; the knowledge of Reason, relating to facts, is always absolute, relating to pure and abstract ideas, is always necessary and universal. The Understanding never attains to Intuitive apperception, and has nothing to do with any form of Intuition whatever: Intuition is the sole prerogative of the Reason. We have already demonstrated, that the entire process of reflective cognition is the work of the Reason. Discrimination, analysis, and abstraction involve no exercise of the Understanding, save when they are employed upon the objects of sense-perception. When they are applied to the concrete facts of Con-

sciousness, reproduced and held in reflection, they are exclusively acts of the Reason, since they are performed upon objects immediately present to the mind, and which the eye of the soul looks upon directly. If the Understanding is allowed to take any part in the procedure, the whole is vitiated, and all self-evidence and Intuition are eliminated from the result. And this is precisely the mistake into which McCosh has fallen, as I shall more fully prove hereafter,—being continually misled by the false notions he entertained of the nature and province of the Baconian system of Logic, and of its applicability to Psychologic investigations.*

SEC. 3. *McCosh confounds Abstraction with Generalization, Abstract Ideas with General Notions.*

Having thus confounded the Reason with the Understanding, and made both to be employed in the acquisition of Intuitional knowledge, he could not fail, of course, to confound the abstract with the general, abstract ideas with general notions, and abstraction with generalization.

1. I do not say that he did not define them correctly, and present their distinctive differences truly, when he definitely treated upon them, without reference to his theory of Method; but I say, that in the general discussion of his subject, he quite

* See "Intuitions," p. 351; and Hickok's "Ration. Psychol.," p. 334; and Jones's "Truth," part ii.

ignored their differences, and paid scarce any heed even to his own definitions.

Glaring mistakes of this character abound throughout his work, and they fully reveal the inadequacy and falsity of his Method; for they bear a sort of logical relation to it. It was necessary, in the substantiation of his theory, that he should include generalization in the process, by which the Reason attains to a reflective apprehension of universal and necessary truths; for, generalization is a prime condition and ingredient in all cases of Induction. But, upon a self-conscious examination of the course pursued by the Reason in cognizing such truths, we do not find the least approach to generalization; the analytic process here closes with abstraction — abstraction, too, performed by the direct sight of the Rational Intellect, and, therefore, Intuitive.

2. Nothing was left, therefore, for our author in this exigency, but to affirm abstraction to be the same with generalization, and pure or abstract ideas with general notions. It was either this, or what seemed to him worse, an entire failure to show where or how Induction could possibly come in. It was not so easy for him to abandon his theory, as to practice legerdemain, and insinuatingly substitute one idea for another in the general argument.

3. Nor would I here charge him with intentional

deception; he practiced it, without doubt, blinded by his own principles, unconsciously to himself. That he is, however, justly chargeable with such confounding of dissimilars, take the following specimen examples, as proof:

And here, I first introduce several passages, found in the same section, in which he uses the terms *abstract* and *general* interchangeably. "It will be shown," says he, "that the Mind has the power of generalizing the individual cognitions and judgments of the Intuitions. . . . The individual conviction is in all men, when the object is pressed upon their attention; the general maxim is the result of thought, and especially of abstraction and generalization. . . . The particular conviction is found by all in a concrete form, when the appropriate objects present themselves; but the abstract formula is fashioned by those addicted to reflection."* These passages all occur, in fact, in the same paragraph. And here, also, are two sentences in immediate juxtaposition, in which the same jumbling of ideas is displayed: "By a sharp analysis, it is always possible to separate the different elements," that is, of consciousness, "and fix the attention exclusively on that, which alone pertains to the law or the property we are seeking to evolve." This exclusive fixing of the attention certainly is abstraction. But he immediately adds: "Examining carefully the nature of the

* "Intuitions," pp. 27, 28.

acts which seem to flow from the same principle, we generalize them; and if we do so accurately, we obtain the exact nature of the principle, and can embody it in a verbal expression." *

Again he says: "It is to be observed that the abstraction or generalization"—using these terms as synonymous—" is not got from an outward object or event, which may fall under ocular inspection." † Again, "The Intuition, in its reflex, abstract, or general form, is derived from, and is best tested by, the concrete, spontaneous conviction." ‡

And so, frequently throughout his treatise, he characterizes the universal and necessary cognitions indifferently, as abstract *or* general.

4. It is hardly necessary that I should pause here, to discriminate and define mental acts and facts so manifestly dissimilar. This author himself, when uncontrolled by his false principles of Method, states the distinction between them, fairly and fully.

An abstract idea is the cognition of a simple element or nature; and abstraction, when applied to the concrete Intuitions, gives us an apprehension of pure ideas and essences. A general notion is complex, and is formed for convenience, for the purpose of classifying the individual objects, which come under our outward observation. Thus, by generalization, we form notions of species, genera, and classes, each embracing a multitude of particulars.

* "Intuitions," pp. 29, 30. † Ibid., p. 55. ‡ Ibid., p. 53.

In ordinary generalization, genuine abstraction is not involved, but only a rude sort of discrimination, and a comparison of the most obvious qualities, pertaining to the individual objects observed. Generalization precedes Induction; but it has nothing whatever to do, with the Intuitional action of the Intellect.

General notions cannot possibly enter into the universal and necessary truths of Reason. McCosh gives us no such instance, nor can such an instance be furnished by any one. The elements of universal and necessary cognitions are pure ideas—ideas in which the Reason beholds simples and essences. To talk of a general notion of self, or of space, or of power, or cause, or virtue, or substance, or quality, as does this author, is the sheerest nonsense.

All these are simple natures, pure essences. The ego, space, substance, and all the essences of which Reflective Reason gains an apperception, are each homogeneous throughout: and hence the truths affirmed of them are universal; and since the Reason beholds in them immutable conditions and relations, these truths are also necessary.

It is a misnomer, therefore, to call these truths general maxims, generalized convictions and judgments, as does this author. There is nothing general about them; but they are prime and ultimate. They relate not to classes, but to simple natures; not to genera and species, but to pure, uncom-

pounded essences. Because of their simplicity and purity, the Rational Intellect grasps them wholly, cognizes them intuitively, and beholds in them what must be, not merely what is. The mind does not make them up and construct them out of its concrete cognitions; but searches them out, and, by analytic effort, finds them in the concrete cognitions, and, apprehending them by an act of pure Intuition, re-affirms them in an abstract form.

SEC. 4. *McCosh confounds Generalization and Induction.*

But, again, this author claims, that the process of constructing the axiomatic truths of Reason culminates and finds its completion in generalization, and then that generalization, with its antecedent and preparatory conditions, is Induction. We have shown, and we think conclusively, that the analytic process, by which Reason attains to the reflective and intuitive apprehension of these truths, ends with abstraction.

1. But, for the argument's sake, let us now concede to him all that he claims, namely, that the Mind, in searching out and endeavoring to discover universal and necessary principles from concrete Intuitions, concludes with generalization. He asks no more; he goes not beyond; he has now "got to the end of his tether." The establishment of this, as the last step in the procedure, he imagines, is the last and perfecting link of his argument in

support of his theory. This, he exclaims in triumph, is Induction.

It seems hardly credible that any one, bearing the name of a philosopher, and making any pretensions to philosophic accuracy of thought and expression, could be guilty of such a gross and unpardonable blunder. And, notwithstanding the proofs of this gross confusion of ideas already incidentally adduced, my readers will hardly be disposed to give entire credence to the fact that our author has really fallen into it, without still stronger evidence. We, therefore, proceed to furnish it, by quoting his own words, as we have done all along.

2. And, first, I introduce some passages, in which he explicitly declares Induction to be the Method by which axiomatic truths are formed or constructed. Thus, he says, "Two questions require to be answered, in all metaphysical investigation. The one is, What is the nature of the Intuition itself? and the other, What is the nature of the object at which it looks, or for which it is the guarantee? These two inquiries are to be prosecuted in one and the same way, that is, in the Method of Induction. There is really no other manner of determining the nature of the Intuitional Power, its law, rule, and manner of operation."* Again, "I employ Induction . . . as a mean or method of finding laws which are prior to Induction."†

* "Intuitions," p. 71. † Ibid., p. 3.

And in another place he affirms that Intuitional truths can be known only by "a very patient and discerning Induction." * These quotations will suffice upon this point; for there can be no dispute, with these before us, that the whole aim of his work is to criticise and determine the Intuitions, by the application of Induction.

It now remains for us to find out and settle, what he means by Induction; in what sense he uses the word, and whether he does really confound it with Generalization. And, with regard to this, he has not left any room for us to mistake, nor compelled us to make it out by doubtful and uncertain inference. He says, "Examining carefully the nature of the acts, which seem to flow from the same principle, we generalize them; and, in doing so accurately, we obtain the exact nature of the principle, and can embody it in a verbal expression." † And he characterizes the reflex Intuitions, as "the generalization of convictions carrying necessity with them, and a consequent universality in their very nature." ‡

Hear, also, what he affirms respecting the principle of causation: "If the maxim that 'every thing which begins to be must have a cause,' be, as I maintain it is, the proper generalization of the peculiarity of the individual conviction, it may be regarded as a necessary one." § And he further-

* "Intuitions," p. 71. † Ibid., p. 30. ‡ Ibid., p. 30. § Ibid., p, 42, 43.

more lays it down as a universal proposition, that, "the general maxim"—that is, the axiomatic truth—"is necessary, on the condition of the generalization out of the individual convictions being properly formed."* We do no injustice to this author, then; we do but allow him to speak for himself, and define his own position, when we represent that he uses Induction and Generalization as synonymous.

But few instances, in the whole history of Philosophy, can, I think, be cited, where an author has been willing, so much and so far, to hazard his reputation for discrimination and precision, in order to sustain a favorite theory. This, however, was the only alternative left him. He must first confound Generalization with Abstraction, and then substitute Generalization for Induction; or else abandon his thesis, and acknowledge the complete failure of the Baconian Logic, as applied in this department of science. He chose the former alternative.

3. Is it necessary, that I should spend time here to show the sophistical absurdity of his attempt? Does not the merest tyro in Philosophy know the difference between Generalization and Induction? The former is preparatory and conditional to the latter, it is true; but no more like it, than "Hyperion to a Satyr." Induction is a Method of rea-

* "Intuitions," p. 42.

soning. In every case of Induction, we lay down certain premises, that is, certain facts, or collections and classifications of facts, and from them draw a conclusion. By it, the Mind is carried forward from the known, to that which was before unknown, but which now emerges from the process as an inference. The object of Induction is the inquisition of truth, the discovery of laws and causes; though of merely physical laws and causes, as we have seen.

But, in Generalization, is there any syllogistic action of the Understanding? Is there here any illation, or drawing of inferences from certain premises? Not in the least. There is nothing more, than a construction of notions, or complex ideas.

From a rude comparison of many particular objects, certain apparent resemblances are discerned; these resembling qualities are combined by the Understanding into a complex general notion, standing for a class or species; and to it a name is given, which shall include or cover all the resembling particulars. Thus we form the notion of man, horse, tree. And this is all there is of Generalization. Its chief aim is, merely to classify and arrange the objects coming under the notice of sense-perception. It does not propose to discover any thing. Its object is, not the inquisition of truth, but the subservience of our convenience, in the or-

dinary affairs of life, and our commerce with the external world.

It never looks into, or proposes to look into, the laws and causes of things: it has respect only to the most manifest and apparent qualities of objects, and never goes below the surface, to inquire into the real and the true, as does Induction. It, therefore, merely acts a subsidiary part in paving the way, and making preparation, for the introduction and application of the Inductive process, or for the drawing of inferences by the way of deduction; but, of itself, it is neither Induction nor deduction, nor any form of reasoning whatever.

CHAPTER V.

CRITICISM OF McCOSH ON THE INTUITIONS, CONTINUED. POSITIVE AND GLARING CONTRADICTIONS INTO WHICH HIS METHOD CARRIED HIM.

WE come next to consider some of the positively antagonistic positions and statements, into which this author was driven by the principles of his Method. And the serious and glaring nature of the self-contradictions into which he was betrayed, by the mode of investigation he pursued, demonstrates most conclusively the falsity of his rules of philosophizing; for, had his rules of philosophizing been truthful, and adapted to the nature of the subject in hand, they would not have landed him at length in the grossest and most glaring contradictions.

SEC. 1. *He denies the Intuitions to be Intuitions.*

And here let the fact be called to mind, that the work of Dr. McCosh, which we are examining, is professedly devoted entirely to the Intuitions, as its title would indicate. And yet, he assumes to take up and discuss, at great length, certain axiomatic, or reflex and necessary, truths of Reason, which, he says, are "constructed," and their truth discovered,

by a process of Induction. From the prominence given to these truths by him, however, we should infer, and should be entitled to infer, that he still recognized them as Intuitions. But upon this point, we are not left to supposition and inference.

1. He, expressly and frequently, attributes to them an Intuitional origin and nature, in those parts of his book, where he is not immediately employed in explaining and applying the principles of his Method.

Until constrained by logical necessity, after he had laid down and explained the principles of his system of Psychologic Inquiry, and supposed them to be thoroughly insinuated into the minds of his readers, did he hardly dare to outrage common sense and universal belief so far, as to deny the Intuitive character of the ground-truths and axioms of science. Indeed, in many places, he calls these truths and axioms Intuitions, without any conditions or qualifications. Thus, he says, "The Intuitions may be considered, first, as laws, rules, principles, regulating the original action and the primitive perceptions of the Mind; or, secondly, they may be regarded as individual perceptions or convictions, manifesting themselves in consciousness; or, thirdly, they may be contemplated as abstract notions, or general rules, elaborated out of the individual exercises."* He here directly ap-

* "Intuitions," p. 35.

plies the name Intuitions, to these abstract notions and necessary rules and ideas, which he has characterized, in other places, as the prime truths of Reason, and the fundamental principles of Science.* To the same purport, he says, in another place, "They," the Intuitions, "may be contemplated as notions or principles formed by Abstraction and Generalization. Under this aspect, they are *a priori* notions, definitions, maxims, and axioms."†

If, then, they are Intuitive, it is because their truth is seen at once, without any kind of probation or reasoning whatever.

They are self-evident, their truth being apparent to the Mind in their own clear light. For this is what is meant, by maxims and axioms that are Intuitive. And this is, also, precisely the definition given by our author. Thus, he says, that "in the perceptions of Intuition, there is always knowledge involved, and this the most certain of all, immediate knowledge."‡ Again, speaking of the apprehension by the Mind of Intuitive truths, he says, "No doubt man cannot have mediate proof, but it is because he has what the faculties, which judge of proof, declare to be vastly higher, immediate evidence, or self-evidence."§

Of Mathematics he truly affirms, that "it pro-

* "Intuitions," pp. 42-45.
† Ibid., p. 42.
‡ Ibid., p. 46.
§ Ibid., pp. 32, 39.

ceeds on certain axiomatic truths, whose certainty is seen at once, as that if equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal." *

And generally, of all Intuitive truth, he declares, "The primary mark of Intuitive truth is self-evidence. It must be evident, and must have its evidence in the object. The Mind, on the bare contemplation of the object, must see it to be so and so, must see it to be so at once, without requiring any foreign evidence or mediate proof." †

In all this we fully agree with him. He only asserts here, what every one must see and acknowledge to be true. That which is Intuitive is self-evident; it is seen at once, and neither requires nor admits of any form of probation whatever. To assert any thing to the contrary, would be to violate the plainest dictates of common sense.

2. It is involved in the above that all Intuitional truth is of equal authority. Whether it be spontaneous or reflective—whether relating to individual objects, or to abstract ideas—being self-evident, it must possess, in all its forms, the same degree of reliability. And our author also acknowledges this; for he says, "All self-evident truths are in respect of veracity of equal rank." ‡ Furthermore he declares, that to all axiomatic truth, necessity attaches; it must be true, true every-where and at all times, eternally and immutably true.

* "Intuitions," p. 22. † Ibid., pp. 31, 32. ‡ Ibid., p. 50.

Thus in speaking of the principle of causation, he uses the following language: "That every effect must have a cause; this is a necessary judgment; I must decide in this way." * And this necessity, he affirms, inheres in every case in the self-evidence, or "flows from it," † to use his language. He furthermore, and truly, characterizes axiomatic truths as "fundamental," as follows: "They are fundamental; hence they have been described as radical, as grounds or foundations, and called fundamental laws of thought and belief. They are the truths we come to, when we analyze a discussion into its elements. . . . All demonstrated and derived truths will be found, if we pursue them sufficiently far down, to be resting on such fundamental truths." ‡

Such are the rational definitions he gives, and the truthful propositions he lays down, when, for the nonce, he forgets the necessities of his theory, and follows the dictates of Reason, and the testimony of Self-consciousness.

3. But can he reconcile herewith his assumption or hypothesis, respecting the Inductive character of these pure abstract ideas and axiomatic truths, and the conclusions which must result from that hypothesis? No; he cannot. He will be compelled flatly to contradict every one of the above rational and self-evident definitions and

* "Intuitions," p. 33. † Ibid., 33. ‡ Ibid., p. 44.

statements, in his attempt to maintain his Inductive theory.

If the universal and necessary cognitions and judgments, which we know by reflection, are the product of Induction, as he affirms, are they, or can they be, Intuitive? To assert this is worse than self-contradiction; it is gross folly and self-stultification.

And we charge, and shall now proceed to fasten, this upon McCosh, beyond the possibility of denial or refutation.

4. He calls these universal cognitions and judgments, these axiomatic truths of reason, Intuitive, as we have just seen. And we have shown, also, that he claims they are "formed" by Induction, from the spontaneous Intuitions of individual objects. Does it not follow, hence, that they are both Intuitive and Inductive? But, we know that this cannot be. Nothing could be more glaringly absurd, than such a proposition. And, while it indicates the real position of our author, he, of course, nowhere expresssly and formally undertakes to defend it. On the contrary, forgetful of the fact of his having called these truths Intuitive, when he proceeds to treat of them as the product of Induction, he is compelled, in immediate logical consistency, to deny their Intuitive character, and thus flatly to contradict himself. Thus, in precise opposition to himself, as immediately quoted above,

he declares, "It is only as applied to singulars, that our perceptions can be regarded as Intuitive." * That is, we have no Intuitive knowledge, save that relating to individual objects. The abstract and axiomatic truths, which he had before called Intuitions, he here, in the interest of his theory, denies to be such.

5. But, if these truths are not Intuitive, can they be self-evident? I have shown that this author designated them as self-evident. But nothing could be more absurd, than to describe a class of propositions as self-evident, while denying their Intuitive character. What every body, and the whole world, mean by a self-evident truth, is one which is known at once, that is, Intuitively; one, in which is involved no process of reasoning, which requires and admits of no kind or degree of probation whatever, but is apprehended by the Mind as soon as presented. Can a law or truth or principle, which can only be known to the Mind by a process of Induction, be self-evident? Every body must scoff at the idea; it is preposterous. Induction is a course or Method of reasoning. In every instance where it is applied, a conclusion is drawn from certain premises. It may be reduced to a syllogistic form; as thus: E is a given nature; it is found, in all observed instances, to depend on D; therefore, in all cases, and essentially, it does depend on D. It

* "Intuitions," p. 57.

always ends with an illation—with an inferential statement or proposition. The conclusion of a process of Induction can, therefore, never be self-evident. Its truth is not seen at once: it is not self-sustaining and independent, but depends upon what has preceded,—that from which it has been derived.

6. Dr. McCosh could not fail to be influenced by such considerations; and, although at first, as we have shown, he called the axiomatic and reflex truths of Reason self-evident, yet when he comes to treat specifically upon them as Inductive, he contradicts himself, and speaks of them as inferential and resultant. "If," says he, "I form a judgment, that is, make a comparison, it is still in regard to two or more objects considered as singulars; and so far as we pass beyond this, there is always, as I shall endeavor to show, a discursive process involved." * Again, he says, "There is a difference between Reason in its primary, and Reason in its secondary, or logical, exercises; and the Mind can rise, always however by a process in which the Logical Understanding is employed, to the discovery of universal and necessary truth." † We have already quoted his asseveration, that the truth of the axioms of Mathematics is seen "at once;" that is, that they are self-evident. Hear what he now asserts hereof, in the interest of his theory of Method:

* "Intuitions," p. 26. † Ibid., pp. 60, 61.

"I do not, without a process of discursive thought, pronounce, or even understand, the general maxim, that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another." * And, of the principle of causation, which he in one place affirms we must believe, and cannot help assenting to, he says, when considering it in the light of his Method, "The mind has not Intuitively an idea of cause or causation in the abstract; but, discovering a given effect, it looks for a specific cause." †

7. Judged by the rules of his Method, then, these abstract truths of Reason, which he repeatedly denominates "axiomatic," are not axioms at all; for an axiom is a self-evident proposition; and, according to his theory, none of them are self-evident, and no abstract and universal proposition can be self-evident, since it is the result of "discursive thought," the result of the exercise of the "Logical Understanding." All truths of this nature, so far from being axiomatic or self-evident, are, as being the product of Inductive reasoning, no more than general statements, stamped with the character of only moral or probable certainty.

For, Induction never attains, and from its very nature it cannot attain, to absolute, but only to probable, certainty. It argues from the known to the unknown, from what is perceived and observed, to what has not been perceived and observed. It

* "Intuitions," p. 27. † Ibid., p. 27.

demands the exercise of a degree of faith, in order that its conclusions may be embraced; for they are supported only by probable evidence.

This quality of Inductive reasoning has always been recognized by Philosophers; and not even McCosh would, if it were directly put to him, have the hardihood to deny or call its nature in this respect in question. But, by a just and fair application of his theory to the universal and necessary truths of Reason, these truths are at once brought down from their high and exalted position as Intuitive, self-evident, and axiomatic, to the ordinary level of the general truths of Natural Science.

8. With their absolute certainty, must also escape their necessity and universality, their immutability and eternity. For, that proposition which is no more than morally certain, though it may have the very highest degree of moral certainty, cannot be the expression of genuine and absolute Necessity. The necessity, pronounced by it, will be only of the probable kind. Take, for instance, the causal axiom, "Every beginning must have a cause." If this be not strictly Intuitive and self-evident, but is "formed" by a process of discursive thought, a course of Inductive reasoning, its necessity is conditional, and its proper expression would be, "probably," or, "it is morally certain, that every beginning must have a cause." And so of the abstract cognitions and judgments relating to space, time, sub-

stance, and all the other essences and objects known by the Pure Reason. Absolute necessity cannot be made to "go up" from the particular into the general, by any method of Inductive reasoning; but only a degree of probable necessity.

And, with the elimination of absolute necessity from these truths of Reason, genuine universality, immutability, and eternity, must also escape from them; for these qualities depend upon that, and only exist where it inheres.

9. Observe, now, the formal expression of these truths, which he declares to be produced by the exercise of the Logical Understanding. Could propositions be framed, of a more unconditional and absolute character? Such as, "Matter *must* occupy space;" "Quality *must* inhere in substance;" "Succession *must* occur in time." They are unqualified and absolute, in their very form. And such is the natural form, in which the Reason makes its enunciations. If, then, the truths, contained in these affirmations, are not really unconditional and necessary, they are—in their very form—false and deceptive; and they impose upon all who implicitly receive them.

But who does not thus receive them? Who does not instantly admit and embrace them, without qualification or mental reservation? "Show us that man;" and he is the only wise man, according to our author, the only man, who does not

allow himself to be misled by deceptive appearances. But the fact is, the whole world receives them as self-evident, and as the expression of unconditional truths. No one any more thinks of doubting them, or subjecting them to a trial by probation, than he does of doubting his own existence, and proving it by a course of Inductive argument. And so, if we may believe McCosh, the whole world most wofully misapprehends the nature of what it is accustomed, and even compelled, to regard and receive as self-evident, unconditional, and absolute knowledge. For he denies that we have, or can have, any such knowledge, in an abstract form ; and that which we dote upon as such, he maintains, is merely Inductive, probable, and contingent.

10. And yet, these very truths, thus produced and known by Induction, and, therefore, merely probable and contingent, this author gives us as the basis of Philosophy, and the foundation of all Science. In all scientific discussions, he says, we come at last, by critical and logical analysis, down to them as the ground and starting-point. * But, surely, we have not been accustomed to contemplate all Science and Philosophy, as resting on such a foundation, a foundation of only moral or probable certainty. The universal conviction is, upon this point, that they must have a basis in absolute certainty.

* "Intuitions," p. 44.

They must have their ultimate beginning in self-evident truth; or their whole superstructure is but "the baseless fabric of a vision." The principles, which form their ground, must be purely Intuitive, and stand in no need of probation; or else their ground is not well laid, and they become bereft of all certainty and reliability. These truths, with which the Intellect commences its scientific investigations, and assumes as the basis of all its reasonings, cannot be "formed" or discovered by Induction, or by any exercise of discursive thought. If, then, the reflex and abstract truths of Reason are Inductive in their origin and nature, they cannot be regarded as Philosophic principles,—as the first truths of science. If they are derived, those forms and elements of knowledge, from whence they have their derivation, must be taken as the foundation of Science and Philosophy. A thorough analytic discussion would always carry us down, beyond these derived axioms, to the elementary facts and cognitions, out of which they have been constructed; that is, according to the theory of McCosh, down to the spontaneous and individual convictions and judgments; for these alone, he holds, are truly Intuitive and reliable—these only are truly elementary, underived, and fundamental.

11. It is a fact, however, that every branch of science does rest upon these abstract axioms. And they are regarded, by the cultivators of all kinds

of Philosophy, as truly axiomatic and underived. No attempt is ever made, to go beyond or below them; and wherever any principle or fact is traced out, and shown to have its ground in them, it is always regarded as settled and established, beyond all controversy. Nobody, in conducting a scientific inquiry, ever thinks of searching out a more ultimate and primitive ground, to be found in spontaneous and individual Intuitions. Any such attempt would be preposterous; for, I put it to any man to decide, whether these axiomatic truths, which are the subject of present discussion, are not more purely Intuitive and self-evident, than are any spontaneous convictions relating to an individual object.

Besides, Science excludes all Spontaneity. From first to last, and throughout its whole extent, it is reflective. It can admit nothing, as a constituent, which has not been examined and passed upon by Reflection. *

If, then, it were required, that Science should seek after its ultimate ground in spontaneous Intuitions, it would be impossible to comply herewith; for these Intuitions would first have to undergo critical and reflective examination, and would thus become divested of their spontaneous character; and, by being subjected to critical and reflective examination, they would also cease to be individual, but

* See "Intuitions," p. 52.

would at once, and by that means, assume an abstract form. It is impossible, then, that Science and Philosophy should have any other basis, than these very abstract and axiomatic truths; and since Science and Philosophy must have their ground in Intuition and self-evidence, we must hold, with the whole scientific world, in opposition to our author, that these abstract and axiomatic truths are really Intuitive and self-evident.

12. And, with what grace can McCosh declare, that the abstract and necessary truths of Reason are of equal validity, with those given us in spontaneity, while holding that the former are derived from the latter, by an exercise of Inductive thought? And yet he does this, by calling the former Intuitive, and then asserting that all kinds of Intuitive knowledge are "of equal rank."* The Method, by which any form of truth is discovered, must determine the nature of that kind of truth—must establish the sort and degree of certainty attaching to it. And we know that, whatever may be made known or discovered by Induction, can never get to be more than probable, can never reach absolute infallibility. Hence, if the axiomatic truths are known by this process, they are surely less reliable than the individual Intuitive convictions. And so our author thinks and admits, in contradiction to himself, when his attention is especially directed to

* "Intuitions," p. 50.

this logical and necessary inference from his theory. "In their spontaneous action," says he, "the Intuitions never err, properly speaking; but there may be manifold errors lurking in their reflex form and application." * This is a logical deduction from his principles of Method, surely; but what shall we say about his consistency in calling these, in "their reflex form," thus liable to "manifold errors," "Intuitive" and "self-evident" "philosophic principles," and "the fundamental laws" of thought and belief, "upon which all science rests?"

13. If what he here asserts, and in many places throughout his work maintains, respecting spontaneous and reflective knowledge, be true, then it were better not to reflect; and the world would be the gainer, to have all Science and Philosophy banished from the earth. For, he tells us, reflection leads to, and ends in, doubt and uncertainty; spontaneity is the higher and more reliable form of knowledge; and the peasant knows more than the philosopher, since his cognitions are more spontaneous. Our spontaneous convictions, he holds and teaches, never err; they are wholly Intuitive, and have an immediate vision of reality. Not so, however, with the reflex. They are, according to the deductions of this theory, liable to "manifold errors;" and they never give us absolute certainty. The less self-conscious we are, then, the more likely

* "Intuitions," p. 56.

are we to know the truth—the better conditioned to cognize the real and actual; and to arouse ourselves to self-consciousness and reflection, which has been supposed to be the way by which to increase in wisdom, is the directest course we could pursue, to divest our minds of infallible certainty, and plunge ourselves in doubt and darkness.—And it would be for our advantage not to cultivate habits of critical thought; for these must serve to hinder us in the acquisition of genuine and reliable knowledge; which is most readily gained by the spontaneous and unreflective action of the rational faculties. The educated and uneducated are not, upon this theory, reduced to the same level, as having the same number and quality of individual convictions;* but the former, by the reflective habits they have formed, are placed at a disadvantage, as compared with the latter, and cannot—because of these habits—acquire real truth with so great facility.

A theory from which such nonsense results, must certainly be defective and false.

14. But what boots it, for this author to proclaim the existence in the Mind of certain principles, which give me to know absolute and unconditional truths, when at the same time, he tells me, that I cannot know these principles themselves, nor assert their positive subjective existence, save by a course

* "Intuitions," pp. 49, 50.

of Inductive reasoning,—which carries not infallibility but only probable certainty with it? The principles themselves must surely be recognized with infallible certainty; that is, they must be self-evident and Intuitive, or we could never know, that individual and spontaneous exercises of the Reason, involving them, give us infallible certainty. The individual convictions must be traced to their originals, and must be known in their principles, before they can be regarded as reliable, and we be authorized to declare of them that they "never err" and are absolutely trustworthy. And, hence, if the principles, in which the spontaneous and individual convictions take their rise, can be detected by us only by the Logical Understanding, in the use of Inductive reasoning, we can never know the absolute truth of even our individual cognitions and judgments. By reflecting upon our spontaneous Intuitions, we arrive at a knowledge of their laws, and of the pure and abstract cognitions by which their veracity is to be tested, says this writer. This knowledge, therefore, must be infallible, that is, purely Intuitive, or the test cannot be applied with assurance, and there is room for doubt as to the veracity of spontaneous Intuitions. To assume that we have absolute truth given us in spontaneity, is manifestly unphilosophical, however comfortable the thought may be. That we may know this fact, we must reflectively criticise the contents of

spontaneity. But, our author says, such exercise of thought can only be performed by Induction. Then, we say, since by that Method we arrive at nothing more than probable certainty, we can, by no possibility, certainly know that absolute truth is given us in spontaneity.

15. Our spontaneous cognitions and judgments "never err," says McCosh. We ask him, how he made that discovery. How did he authenticate them, and establish their unvarying veracity? Did he take this for granted, because of their spontaneous character? If so, his assertion of their veracity rests upon belief, and not upon knowledge; and we are not bound to accept and rely upon it. Did he criticise and analyze them; and by criticising their contents, and a discovery of their principles, learn their infalliable truthfulness? Then, according to his theory, he made use of Inductive reasoning; and he could not, by this means, demonstrate their absolute truthfulness. He could only show it, with moral or probable certainty. Thus, we see that his Method does not, and cannot, establish the validity of the Intuitions, whether spontaneous or reflex, whether concrete or abstract. Unless, when I reflect upon the Intuitions of Reason, I do so by the use of Reason itself, in Intuitive action,—unless, when reproduced in self-consciousness, I look upon them directly, and apprehend their absolute truthfulness immediately, and with-

out any sort of probation or reasoning, I can never be satisfied of their unerring veracity, nor rely upon the immutable certainty of their decisions.

But, McCosh excludes from self-conscious reflection, the employment of the Intuitive Reason; excludes herefrom all those acts and apperceptions, that are stamped with self-evidence and infallibility; and ascribes the work of self-reflection to the Logical Understanding, which reaches its conclusions by a process of reasoning, and, in this case, by a course of Inductive reasoning. And this renders it impossible for us to know the validity of our faculties, or the reliability of their affirmations. We are left, indeed, without any means of determining with certainty, whether we have any Intuitive knowledge whatever; for we can determine this, only by self-reflection; and, if self-reflection implies Induction, it gives us no more than probability.

16. A rigid and consistent application of the theory of this author, to this highest department of Intellectual activity, deprives the human mind of all absolute certainty. It denies that we have, or that we can know that we have, any knowledge that may properly be called Intuitive and self-evident, and lands us in downright Skepticism. The skepticism of Kant, which this author so strongly condemns, is not to be compared with his own. The postulates of the Kantian Philosophy, carried

out to their legitimate conclusions, cast doubt upon, or rather deny, that we may know with absolute certainty the existence of any thing exterior to the Mind. But this is not so sweeping and pernicious a skepticism, as that which casts doubt upon the primary Intuitions of the Reason itself; and thus denies, that we can know any thing—even the primary cognitions of the Reason—with absolute certainty.

And this is the only possible result of the Inductive Method, as applied to the Intuitions, when logically and consistently carried out, to its ultimate conclusions. It must end in universal skepticism. For, if the primitive sources of our knowledge are not invested with absolute certainty and reliability, we are incapable of any kind of cognition which can give us certainty. No superstructure can possess a degree of solidity and strength, that is wanting to the foundation. The conclusion of a syllogism cannot produce conviction, more absolute than that inspired by the major proposition.

17. We, therefore, discard Induction in this department of knowledge, and propose instead a Method which, at every step, gives us to know with absolute certainty. We commit the work of criticising the acts, powers, and principles of the Mind to the Reason itself—the Reason in Intuitive exercise; and hereby we attain to a form of reflective knowledge, as absolute as that contained in

spontaneity; more so, indeed, since, being reflective, and at the same time Intuitive, it possesses the character of apprehended demonstration; while spontaneous cognitions, convictions, and judgments are, to a great extent, enveloped in the haze of unconsciousness, and are accepted as truthful on credit, by an unreasoning faith. We do not know the contents of spontaneity, until we have scrutinized them. The spontaneous affirmations of Reason may be true; we can only certainly determine this, by criticising them with care, and reflectively apprehending their conditions, their essential nature, their elements, and their origin. And it is necessary that this species of criticism should be performed by that faculty which *immediately* beholds the mental acts and facts it is called to examine, and whose responses are absolutely infallible—that is, the Reflective Reason. In no other way, but this, can a science of mind be constructed; by the use of no other faculty, can Psychology be grounded upon a scientific foundation.

18. In truth, *no* science is possible on any other condition than this.

To *assume* that our original cognitions are infallible, gives us no vantage-ground upon which we may stand, and repel the assaults of the Skeptics. Nor does such an assumption satisfy the demands of the Intellect, self-consciously in search of scientific truth. This infallibility must be known by

a process of reflection, in order to meet the claims and satisfy the demands of true Philosophy. And this kind of knowledge can be secured by no method of reasoning which involves the action of the Logical Understanding—by no process of Induction, which never concludes with any thing more than probable certainty. It is to be attained alone by the Intuitive process; and, hence, only by the Reflective Reason, which beholds its objects "without a dimning veil between," and whose every affirmation is positive and self-evident.

And such is the nature, instrument, and force of that Method which I here recommend and advocate. By the adoption and application of this Method, Psychology—the *Prima Philosophia*—is made to assume the character of a science, and its fundamental principles, as well as its concluding statements, are made to bear the impress of scientific accuracy and certainty.

CHAPTER VI.

CRITICISM OF MCCOSH ON THE INTUITIONS, CONCLUDED. HIS USE OF INDUCTION IN DETERMINING THE "TESTS" OF THE INTUITIONS.

WE have now, in a brief and imperfect manner, canvassed this author's application of Induction to what he calls "the forming" or "making up" of the reflex Intuitions, or the Prime Truths of the Pure Reason; and have shown into what a multitude of contradictions and absurdities it has plunged him.

SEC. 1. *The "Tests" of the Intuitions as proposed by this Author.*

And now I come to consider, yet more briefly, the still further use he claims to make of his favorite theory of Method, in discovering, or rather, determining, the "tests" or "marks" which, he thinks, will always, and without any possible mistake, enable us to distinguish the Intuitions from all the other facts or affirmations of the Intellect.

Such "marks" or "tests" or "signs" appear to him of prime importance, in order that we may, by these, infallibly know the Intuitions, and never confound them with any other products of intellectual activity.

"There can be tests propounded," says he, "sufficient to determine with precision what convictions are, and what convictions are not, entitled to be regarded as Intuitive; and these tests are such that they admit of an easy application, requiring only a moderate degree of careful consideration of the maxim claiming our assent." *

And then he proceeds, on page 32 and onward, to define these tests or marks, and explain their utility as to the object for which they are employed.

He gives us three of these infallible tests, namely, Self-evidence, Necessity, and Universality, or Catholicity—as he sometimes calls it. And, by applying these three tests to whatever species of Intellectual conviction or affirmation, we may always know, with absolute certainty, according to this author, whether it is an Intuition or not.

SEC. 2. *Examination of the Nature and Quality of these Tests.*

Let us for a moment examine the nature of these infallible tests of the Intuitions.

1. Take the first, namely: Self-evidence. To propose this as a test of an Intuition is manifestly absurd. It is but defining *in circulo.* For what is an Intuition? It is a conviction, cognition, or judgment of the Mind, by which a truth is perceived or a fact is known immediately, and without reasoning. This author himself defines an Intuition as a

* "Intuitions," pp. 31, 32.

"perception formed by looking in upon an object," * that is, by looking upon it immediately and directly; that is, again, a perception formed without redargution or extraneous proof; that is, again, a self-evident perception. To say, therefore, that self-evidence is a test of the Intuitions is no more than to say, that Intuitionality is a test of the Intuitions. He here gives us, as the test or mark of a thing, the thing itself, and no more. We gain nothing by being furnished with this "mark." It gives us no additional clew to the thing to be determined. It is frivolous and meaningless in this connection, and only serves as a verbal definition of the word intuitive or intuition.

2. McCosh was doubtless led to commit this act of logical folly, by the momentary abandonment of his own proper stand-point of discussion, and adoption of the form of definition and division pursued by Cousin, and other Philosophers of the rational school, in their treatment of this subject; writers who occupy, with reference to this question of original ideas, convictions, and judgments, an entirely different point of observation and discussion. Cousin does, indeed, lay down Self-evidence as a test or mark of certain axiomatic truths; but he adopts the nomenclature of Kant, and denominates these truths, "Truths of the Pure Reason," "Cognitions, convictions, and judgments of the Pure

* "Intuitions," p. 25.

Reason," not Intuitions; and hence his "test" had some significance, his definition some value. Had he designated these truths by the manner or mode of their apprehension, as Intuitions, rather than by the faculty concerned in their apprehension, as truths of the Pure Reason, we may be sure he would never have been guilty of the sophism of proposing Self-evidence as their test. But McCosh, out of deference to the demands of his theory of Induction, refusing to call them, with Cousin, "Truths of Reason," but yet following that Philosopher in his subsequent definitions, falls into this egregious mistake, and not only calls Self-evidence a test of the Intuitions, but also "the primary one." *

3. And for the same reason, both his other tests are defective and false. Take Necessity. This is not an infallible test or mark of Intuitions. It is, indeed, of axiomatic truths: it is of the cognitions of the Pure Reason; but not of Intuitions, as such. Intuitions of individual objects are not characterized by Necessity, only conditionally and incidentally. And it is never the Necessity inhering in them, whether they relate to individual objects or abstract ideas, which makes them to be Intuitions. For instance: Suppose a cube or sphere is presented to my senses. As I look upon it, or handle it, I have three Intuitions relating thereto,

* "Intuitions," pp. 31, 39.

namely: first, that it is, or exists; secondly, that it exists in space; and, thirdly, that it must exist in space, and cannot do otherwise. The first two are contained in my perception of the object; and they are as truly Intuitions as the last. But who would attribute Necessity to them, as a "test" or "mark" of their Intuitive character? My perception of the cube as existing, and as existing in space, is not stamped with Necessity; such perception is wholly incidental and conditional, wholly contingent upon the presence of the cube. And as to the last Intuition, which contains the affirmation of a Necessity, it, as an Intuition, is not constituted by that Necessity, but by the immediacy of sight or insight of the Intellect, by which its essential truth is known. The Intuition, in this case, includes the Necessity; for the reason, that Necessity inheres in the subject of the Intuition, which subject is here not the cube, nor the space it occupies, but the idea of the cube, and its relation to ideally cognized space. Necessity is not, then, a mark of Intuitions at all; but, when it is included in an Intuition, it is only an index of the nature of the object to which the Intuition relates.

4. The same, or similar remarks, also apply to Universality, considered as a test of the Intuitions. There are many affirmations whose perceived truth depends on nothing but the immediate sight of the Intellect, which, nevertheless, do not possess the

characteristics of genuine Universality. Now, by Universality, as applied to the Intuitions, we mean that their truth is perceived and acknowledged every-where, and by all intelligences. But we have many Intuitive cognitions, which may not be true every-where, and to all minds. Take, for example, the facts of consciousness, the faculties which produce them, the order of their appearance, and the laws which regulate them. The knowledge of all these is wholly Intuitive, but not universal in any true sense of that term. We know these, as they are within our human consciousness, by the direct sight of the self-knowing Reason, that is, Intuitively. But they might be different; and it is not absurd to suppose, that they may be different in minds of another order. We can readily conceive, that the conscious phenomena of angelic intelligences are very unlike those of our own, in their nature, their modes of production, and in the laws which regulate their processes. Whether this be so or not, depends entirely upon the mental constitution which the Creator has seen fit to confer upon that order of beings, and not at all upon the natural and essential fitness of things. What, therefore, is Intuitively true for us, as relates to mental conditions and laws, may not be true for any other order of intelligent creatures, and hence not universally true. It follows, therefore, that Universality is not an infallible test of the Intui-

tions of the mind. It is, I grant, a secondary and conditional test of the Prime, or Axiomatic, Truths of the Pure Reason. But such truths are not the only Intuitions; nay, this author denies, theoretically, and even expressly, that they are Intuitions at all. We see at once that the relations of the ideas which are involved in the abstract cognitions of the Reason, are indissoluble, constant, and eternal; and, therefore, they must be the same every-where and to all intelligences. But, whatever we may perceive by the immediate sight or insight of Consciousness or Self-consciousness, as pertaining to the constitution of our minds, we cannot affirm to be universal, since it depends entirely upon the arbitrary creative will of God, who may have chosen to bestow upon us a singular and unique mental conformation.

It may be shown, still further, that Universality is not a test, in any proper sense, of any of the Intuitive cognitions, convictions, and judgments, whether reflex or spontaneous, individual or abstract. It is no more than a secondary and dependent characteristic of certain of them. In itself, therefore, it is not a test. It depends upon Necessity, and may be resolved into that. Only such truths as are necessary, are universal; and they are only universal because they are necessary. That which we see and know must be true, we affirm to be true every-where and for all minds. Eliminate Necessity from

an Intuitive proposition, and its Universality is at once destroyed. To erect this dependent quality into a test, is, hence, manifestly unphilosophical.

But enough upon this point. We are not so much concerned, in this discussion, with the nature of the tests or marks of the Intuitions which this author sets up, as with his Method of discovering them, and proving them to be tests.

SEC. 3. *The false and inadequate Method he employs in discovering these Tests.*

This Method, he says, is that of "a very patient and discerning Induction."* And, by this Method, he claims to have furnished us with marks by which we may always distinguish the Intuitions, from all other intellectual acts or cognitions, with absolute certainty.

1. As we have already shown, however, when treating of his alleged application of this Method in "forming" the reflex or axiomatic truths of Reason, Induction can never give us absolute certainty, never more than moral or probable certainty.

These tests, then, as discovered or fixed by this Method, are not infallible. To be infallible, they must be discovered and established, not by the Inductive process, but by Intuition. It is the baldest kind of sophistry to be told, as we are by this author, that we are capable of cognizing certain forms of truth directly and Intuitively, but

* "Intuitions," p. 72.

that we cannot know that we thus cognize them, without the use of certain tests, discoverable only by Inductive reasoning. Surely the nature and certainty of a cognition cannot be superior to the tests, by which its nature and certainty are determined. And, if this author's theory is correct, the human mind is destitute of all Intuitive knowledge.

2. But, waiving this objection, for the present, let us inquire, whether our author, in his pretended discovery of these tests by Induction, does actually conform to the essential rules of that Method of investigation. In correctly applying this Method to our Intuitive knowledge, it is evident, he must begin with, and confine himself to, the primary and original elements of that kind of knowledge; that is, our spontaneous and individual Intuitions. For, upon this Philosopher's theory, these only are the primary and original Intuitions. All other forms of knowledge he holds to be derivative, attained by a process of reasoning, and hence not Intuitive. And all this, he plainly admits, or rather, roundly asserts. For, he says, "It is only as applied to singulars, that our perceptions can be regarded as Intuitive. The tests of Intuitions, namely, Self-evidence, Necessity, and Catholicity, apply directly only to individual convictions." *

3. But is this really his Method of procedure? Does he confine himself to the individual Intuitions,

* "Intuitions," p. 57.

in his attempt to inductively determine the tests and marks of Intuitions? Not at all. He does not even pretend to do this, actually and practically. He simply takes up certain of the abstract and axiomatic principles of the Pure Reason, and endeavors to show, that the necessity and universality pertaining to them possess a genuine, practical character, by reference to the individual instances of Intuitive perception which they respectively include.

Such a procedure, every one knows, is not Induction. Induction begins with particulars; and, by the slow and careful and patient examination of them, it deduces the general principle or truth.

But, our author really begins with the abstract and universal; and he, at most, only shows that the truths of this nature have an actual realization in certain individual Intuitions.

Not in his whole work, which he heralds and recommends to us as an exemplification of the truth and validity of the Inductive Method, as used in determining the Intuitions of the Mind, do we find a single instance of an attempt to construct a "table" of individual cognitions, beliefs, or judgments. This is a very significant and singular omission, in such a work. Nay, to a work pretending to explain, minutely and in detail, by the Inductive Method, the steps taken by the mind in the formation and detection of its original elements

of knowledge, such an omission is fatal. A single instance of such a derivation of these tests from the individual cognitions, beliefs, or judgments, comprehended under a single one of the axiomatic truths of Reason, would have been far more conclusive of the whole question, than all his disquisitions and reasonings. He has not given us one. Had he undertaken this, the folly of his theory of the Intuitions would have been apparent, even to his own understanding.

4. Suppose he had undertaken to show, that the spontaneous affirmations of the mind, relating to causation, for instance, are Intuitive, because they are possessed of the qualities Necessity and Universality; and, to prove that they do possess these qualities, had proceeded to construct a table of all the known instances in which the mind had beheld the action of the causative principle, and then had gone over these instances—one by one—until it was demonstrated, by actual examination, that these qualities inhere in them all—even then it would not be settled, that, simply because they are Universal and Necessary, they are, therefore, Intuitive; it might be, even then, that they are Universal and Necessary by reason of the causal element entering into them.

There is nothing, surely, absurd in supposing, that an Intuitive perception may relate to a fact of being, as well as to a necessity of existence; in

other words, that the mind may Intuitively behold what is, though at the time it may not apprehend in the object perceived any *necessity* of being. In many cases, the mind may, directly and immediately, see what is, as well as what must be.

This consideration removes infallibility from our author's tests of the Intuitions. One real instance of Intuition not embracing Necessity and Universality, utterly destroys their character as tests. And we have already shown, that not only may such instances be found, but that they are to be found on every side—numerous and palpable; for example, in all cases of sense-perception, and also, in all cases of what may be called introspective perception; in other words, in the observation of external existences, and of internal or conscious phenomena. No cognition, relating simply to an actual existence or phenomenon, does possess the characteristics of Necessity and Universality: and yet numberless cognitions of this nature are Intuitions.

5. Manifestly, the tests proposed by this author, by which it is claimed we may try and know, without mistake, the Intuitive cognitions and judgments, are not adapted to such Intuitions as relate to individual objects. For, these tests are themselves of an abstract nature, and are stripped of all individuality and speciality. If tests at all, they are, in their very nature, competent only to try

such intellections as are purely of an abstract character; only such intellections can possess true necessity and universality. There is a manifest incongruity, if not absurdity, in employing abstract tests in order to try and determine spontaneous and individual convictions. If such convictions, as is assumed by McCosh, are the elements and beginnings of all knowledge, they ought to be so clearly cognized as to need no tests for their clearer apprehension. And, if they do need certain tests to be applied to them, in order that they may be demonstrated to be what they are, what becomes of the infallible and absolute certainty which this author ascribes to spontaneous and individual cognitions? If the very beginnings of our knowledge can be known as such, only by the aid of certain marks and signs, how can we know any thing absolutely? especially when we cannot determine these marks and signs themselves, save by a process of Inductive reasoning? "We must hold ourselves ready to prove," replies this author, "not, indeed, the truth of the first principle, for this is impossible in the nature of things, but that it is a first principle. We are required to show that it is self-evident." * By affirming that first principles, that is, Intuitive or self-evident propositions, are absolutely true, but holding, at the same time, that they cannot be known as self-evident or Intuitive

* "Intuitions," p. 65.

with as infallible a certainty as that, being self-evident or Intuitive, they are infallibly true, we have no advantage whatever over the skeptic, who denies the absolute certainty of first principles, or self-evident propositions. Unless we know truths which are self-evident, to be self-evident by an Intuitive act of the mind, 'tis a deception and a cheat to say, that absolute certainty pertains to Intuitive or self-evident truths. And, therefore, if tests are required to prove and establish the self-evident nature of propositions, and these tests are discovered and fixed alone by a course of Inductive reasoning, there can never be absolute certainty —never any thing more than probable certainty, attaching to such propositions.

To this conclusion, then, are we inevitably brought by the "test" theory of this author, namely, that our knowledge of even our spontaneous and individual Intuitions, which he claims is wholly reliable and can never deceive us, rises not above moral or probable certitude.

SEC. 4. *These Tests declared by this author himself to be unnecessary, in determining the Spontaneous Cognitions and Judgments.*

McCosh himself, notwithstanding he declares, as we have shown above, that these tests or marks of Intuitions only apply directly to the spontaneous and individual cognitions and judgments, does, at the same time, assert that they are not needed

in order to determine such cognitions and judgments; and for a most obvious and sufficient reason, namely, because the spontaneous and individual Intuitions are directly and perfectly known to the Reason, in consciousness and self-consciousness.

1. Speaking of the necessary principles of the Reason, he says, "Did they fall immediately under the eye of consciousness, the work (of detecting them) would be a comparatively easy one; we should only have to look within, in order to see them."* But he also affirms, in this immediate connection, that "the individual exercises" of these principles do come under the immediate notice of the consciousness. Also, in another passage, he takes precisely the same ground, and says, that while "the necessary principles do not come under the immediate cognizance of consciousness, the individual actings do, indeed, fall directly under reflection or the internal sense."† The spontaneous convictions and judgments, then, which are "the individual actings" referred to, are, as this author holds, "easily detected;" they are known at once in self-consciousness by the internal sense; and hence there is no need of tests, by which to fix upon them with certainty. We cognize them by direct sight of the Intellect; and all that pertains to them, their conditions, qualities, relations,

* "Intuitions," p. 30. † Ibid., p. 19.

and contents, we know in the same way, namely, by direct internal perception—that is, Intuitively. If they have any tests or marks, these are discerned at the same time with the spontaneous Intuitions themselves, and by the same introspective eye-glance of the self-knowing Reason, and they can, therefore, furnish no aid in detecting the Intuitions.

2. Thus, though our author at first acknowledges that his theory of testing the Intuitions by marks and signs, discovered by the Inductive process, does only properly apply to the spontaneous cognitions—since he claims that these alone are truly Intuitive—he afterward confesses that it has no applicability whatever to them, since they "come immediately under the eye of consciousness." And, it is plain enough, in the very nature of things, that though these marks—were they real, and did they possess any validity—might be drawn from the elementary or spontaneous Intuitions of the mind, they could never be applied to them as tests. For, they can only be regarded as tests, on the sole condition of being previously known as essential characteristics or conditions of such Intuitions; that is, in logical order of thought, the individual or spontaneous Intuitions must be known, and known as Intuitions, before their tests can be detected; and, therefore, for them no tests are needed. Indeed, our author himself speaks of the

spontaneous and individual convictions as themselves being tests of the universal and abstract principles, and as being alone competent to decide upon the validity of the latter.*

3. If intellectual tests are here needed at all, it must be for determining such abstract and axiomatic principles, as, this author imagines and asserts, "do not come under the direct cognizance of reflection or the internal sense;" † such, in other words, as he claims are made up from the spontaneous and individual cognitions. This is the use which he himself really makes of these tests; and this, he shows, is their only proper use.

But, we say, if there are any such "principles" in the mind—principles thus made up by Induction, inasmuch as their truth would not be a matter of immediate or self-evident perception—they could not be considered as Intuitive in any sense. Whatever tests may be applied to a proposition whose truth is not apparent to the Reason at sight, they cannot make it to be what it is not; hence they cannot make it Intuitive. McCosh's theory of the nature and formation of the abstract and axiomatic truths of Reason, settles in the beginning their derivative character; and hence that they are to be apprehended only by a process of reasoning. And, having eliminated, on the start, self-evidence or Intuitivity from truths of this class, he afterward

* "Intuitions," p. 54. † Ibid., p. 19.

professes to give us certain tests by which we may demonstrate them to be self-evident and Intuitive!

4. Nay, as if to cap the climax of absurdity, after having shown us how the reflex and axiomatic Truths of Reason are drawn forth, or made up from the individual and spontaneous convictions and judgments of the mind—according to the rules of the Baconian Logic, which could invest them at the best with no more than a high degree of moral probability—he proceeds to furnish us with certain tests, discovered also by Induction, and, therefore, not absolutely trustworthy, by which we may infallibly know such reflex and axiomatic truths to be Intuitive and absolute!

In other words, he employs certain Inductive signs or marks to prove, without the possibility of mistake, that certain Inductive principles or axioms are not Inductive, but the enunciation of absolute and unconditional truths, self-evident and Intuitively perceived. No writer could go further in the direction of the logically ridiculous. No philosopher ever before undertook the scientific exposition and application of a theory, which ran out, so soon and so directly, into the extreme of nonsense. Having, in theoretic consistency, denied the self-evidence of the axiomatic affirmations of the Reason, he undertakes, by use of the rules of the Baconian Logic, to prove that these affirmations

are self-evident. And having, in the same way, eliminated necessity and true universality — for genuine necessity and Universality can by no possibility belong to axioms which are the product of Inductive reasoning—he straightway gives us these very qualities as the infallible marks and tests of such axiomatic affirmations.

5. But, it is manifestly the height of folly to set up any marks or tests, as being requisite in order to determine the Intuitions. When the Reason beholds a fact, or apprehends a truth, by an Intuitive act, it must know such beholding and such apprehending, at the same time with the beholding and the apprehending; that is, at once and consciously. If such Intuitive acts of the mind were not immediately and consciously known to be Intuitive, no marks or signs, of whatever kind, would be competent to convince us that they were so. The Intuitions, whether spontaneous or reflex, concrete or abstract, are mental acts, and hence facts of Consciousness; and, as such, they are directly and perfectly apprehended by the Reflective Reason, precisely as is any other order of conscious phenomena. We no more need the aid of marks and tests to determine their Intuitive character, than we need marks and tests in order to decide that perceptions are perceptions, and nothing else.

6. But, further, the critical Induction and explanation of these tests by this author are useless,

both as respects the object at which he aims, and as respects the aim of all Inductive reasoning. Were his Method valid, in its application to the Intuitions, as is claimed by him, it would afford us not a particle of additional knowledge; it would lead us to the discovery of nothing, which was not already perfectly well understood. For, suppose we grant that Self-evidence, Necessity, and Universality, are the marks of the Intuitions; how, even then, are we to know that any given intellection does really possess these marks? Manifestly in no other way than by an act of self-conscious, Intuitive perception. And such act of self-concious Intuitive perception must, in every case, attend the determination of an intellection as an Intuition. It follows, then, that these marks must be self-evident, and self-evident, too, in every case, and upon the face of every Intuition. And, if this be so, why should Induction be brought in for the discovery and definite settlement of these marks? Induction is legitimately used to find out what is otherwise hidden and unknown, not what is known already, and by a much surer process. If the Reflective Reason discerns Self-evidence, Necessity and Universality, in every Intuition, by direct sight, do we gain any additional knowledge by being told that these qualities are found, by Induction, to inhere in all Intuitions, and that they are the marks by which the Intuitions can always

be detected? Not at all. But this is all we gain by the employment here of the rules of the Baconian Logic; and hence the whole operation is a work of unreasonable supererogation.

And herewith we close our somewhat extended examination of McCosh's attempted application of the Inductive Method, in his work on "The Intuitions of the Mind."

SEC. 5. *Bearing of the foregoing Discussion of McCosh, upon our Thesis concerning Psychologic Method.*

In treating upon the subject of Psychologic Method, I was induced to enter upon, and prosecute, the critical examination of this work for several reasons.

1. And, first, this book by McCosh is the most pretentious example afforded in this age, if not in the whole history of Mental Philosophy, of the attempt to apply, with rigid and scientific accuracy and completeness, the principles of Induction to any special department of Psychology; and the only attempt, within the whole range of Modern Philosophy, at a scientific employment of the Method of the "Novum Organum" in the construction and determination of the Prime or Axiomatic Truths of Reason. It lay, therefore, directly in the line of that course of argument and investigation which I had marked out for myself; and the exhaustive analysis of its ground principles, in treating of the

Intuitions, afforded me the most favorable of opportunities clearly to unfold, illustrate, and explain the principles of my own Method; while furnishing, at the same time, a practical exemplification of the consequences which must ever flow from the employment of the physical Logic of Bacon, in investigating the phenomena and laws of the human mind.

2. And we have seen, that, so far as McCosh admits and abides by the legitimate and necessary conclusions of the Inductive Method, his work is a failure, or a falsehood. It neither gives us the genesis of the Primitive Cognitions of the Mind, nor the characteristic marks by which we may always detect them. But, in so far as it is penetrated and molded by the theory it was intended to substantiate, it is grossly inconsistent and self-contradictory, full of the grandest blunders in definition and reasoning; and, worst of all, it denies the human mind the conditions necessary to all positive and absolute knowledge, and lands us at length in that most sweeping and hopeless of all forms of Skepticism, namely, distrust of those powers of Reason which are the source of our original cognitions and convictions. Nor is this failure, in the main object and aim of his work, to be attributed to any lack of ability on the part of this author.

It is wholly referable to his vicious theory of Method. For, when uninfluenced hereby, he dis-

plays keen discrimination, a penetrating Psychologic insight, and extraordinary power of self-conscious reflection and analysis. And, despite the constraints and misleadings of his pernicious Method, his book abounds in valuable suggestions, and just observations upon the ways and workings of human thought, pertaining to the most interesting, least understood, and most recondite province of Psychologic study.

3. Nor, must the abortionary conclusion of this author's Inductive labors be referred to the peculiar field of mental research which he selected in which to try, and, as he thought, to demonstrate, the soundness of his principles of Method. Though a thorough and truthful exposition of the Intuitive acts and processes of the Intellect may be a pre-eminently difficult department of Mental Philosophy, it still is not singular and unique in respect to the mode or means by which it is to be prosecuted. Precisely the same Method is relevant here, as is suited to the proper investigation of the other departments of the Mind. We behold the Intuitive phenomena of the Intellect with the same instrument, and learn their laws and relative order in exactly the same way, that we do the recollective or associative phenomena of the Intellect, or, indeed, any other species of mental facts. And if Induction is inapplicable and irrelevant here, so it is, also, throughout the whole realm of Psychologic

science. Wherever applied in the study of the mind, it will always lead to the same mistakes, confusion, and absurdity, that we have seen follow in its train when employed in the examination of the Intuitions. The refutation of McCosh, then, was in the direct line of my argument, and serves, by implication, to substantiate my own theory of Psychologic Method.

CHAPTER VII.

LOGICAL RESTATEMENT OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS, ACTS, AND STEPS IN OUR METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGIC INVESTIGATION.

AND here it is proper that I should restate, with somewhat greater particularity and amplitude, the various Elements, Acts and Steps of that Method, whose general outline and characteristics I have, more or less fully, indicated in the course of the foregoing discussion.

SEC. 1. *Prerequisite Conditions in the employment of this Method.*

1. The first thing requisite, in order to a complete and truthful investigation of the mind, its constitution, laws, and powers, is the manifestation of facts in Consciousness. Conciousness is, and must be, the ultimate foundation of all Psychologic knowledge. And Consciousness is spontaneity. The constituent elements, laws, and powers of the human mind must first display themselves in spontaneous activity, in the Conciousness, before they can be reflectively known. And here is the great mystery of intelligent, personal existence, that it takes cognizance of its own actings, while they are occurring in spontaneity. That is, the personal

human intelligence acts, and observes its actings, coinstantaneously. So that, in every instance of conscious activity, though there is general spontaneity, there is, also, at the same time, the paradoxical fact of reflectivity, or self-observation, though it may be only slightly and faintly manifested. It is, hence, evident that the rational element of the mental being penetrates, and is transfused through, every department of the soul; or else there would be, there could be, no conscious knowledge of mental facts except those of the Intellect. There could be no consciousness of feelings, or of volitions; for the reason that Consciousness is itself a mode of intellection or knowing; and it is impossible for the rational element of the mind to intuite facts that are not present to it. But, since all the facts of the inner world, whether intellections, feelings, or volitions, come, with the same clearness and coinstantaneousness, within the cognizance of Consciousness, it follows that that element of the mind whose prerogative is to know, permeates and underlies all the other elements which enter into the constitution of personal existence.

Rationality, then, is the foundation of our personal being.

Consciousness stands as a perpetual and conclusive refutation of the theory of Cousin, and others, that the Will is the ground of our personality, and

that Reason is impersonal. Personality, in fact, has its prime source in rationality, not in mere volitive power. The mystery of Consciousness, the power which the mind possesses of cognizing itself and its actings in spontaneity, is a perpetual witness of this truth; nor can its testimony be gainsaid or evaded. And Consciousness, and its contents, are the prime condition of all Psychologic science.

2. The second condition is Self-consciousness; that is, the power of reproducing the facts and states of Consciousness. Self-consciousness is more or less volitionary; Consciousness is not. In Self-consciousness, the seeing eye of the soul is intentionally turned within, and its attention directed to the reproduced phenomena of Consciousness. While force and intensity of original mental action seem to be the condition of clear and distinct cognizance in Consciousness, the ability of voluntary introspection is the condition of truthful apprehension in Self-consciousness. In fact, this state of mind is called Self-consciousness, because of the special action of the Self-determining power characterizing it, and which must be expended in order to its existence; and, also, because in it the attention is turned inward, and the thoughts receive a subjective direction; both of which serve to render more vivid the original intuition of the Ego, and to strengthen and intensify the spontaneous sense of personal self-hood. So far from agree-

ing with certain philosophers, who assert that pure intuitive, absolute knowing must be involuntary, and wholly independent of personal will, I assert, that the knowing consequent upon voluntary attention, involved in Self-consciousness, is the purest and most absolute form of Intuition.

Surely, spontaneous knowing is not the most absolute. It may be the most assertative and confident, since it accepts the results of its perceiving and affirming without questioning, and is usually backed up by the assurance of a blind, instinctive belief. True, rational, scientific knowing is reflective,—is that kind of knowing which has reviewed its own processes; and, hence, enjoys an intelligent and satisfactory apprehension of the correctness of these processes. That which may be accepted as an absolute Intuition in the spontaneity of Consciousness, cannot be known infallibly to be such, until it shall have been criticised in the reflectivity of Self-consciousness. Concrete forms of thought, which, in the spontaneous workings of the mind, end in positive and unconditional affirmation, may contain much that is superfluous, much that serves to vitiate the result, and which can only be purged away by self-conscious criticism. We know not, indeed, what is wrapped up in the concretions of spontaneous intellections. In order to know what is therein involved, we must awake to Self-consciousness, and intentionally question and

examine them. Science, which is the purest form of knowing, is far from being the product of spontaneity; it is the outcome of the criticism of spontaneity, has its very beginning in reflectivity, that is, in self-conscious, volitionary intellection.

Science commences with self-questioning, with the putting forth of intentional effort to know; with the volitionary review of our primary, and merely conscious ideas, perceptions, and notions. To be sure, we must not strive to make our intellections conform to our volitions. For knowing, in itself, is not volitionary; that is, we cannot know as we will. But the taking of an intellectual stand-point, directing our attention, turning our thoughts this way or that, placing the sight of the Reason at a given angle of vision, all this is, more or less, a matter of choice and intention, and is involved in the acquisition of genuine scientific knowledge of all kinds. When the attention, the thoughts, the eye of the Reason are thus of choice directed within, to the study of mental manifestations, the introverted condition of mind which ensues is called Self-consciousness. And it is certain, that herein all genuine Psychologic knowledge has its systematic beginning and consummation.

It deserves to be here repeated, however, that Consciousness is the antecedent and prerequisite of Self-consciousness. The latter is wholly dependent upon the former, and is, and must be, forever

limited to the use of the materials which it furnishes. Self-conscious reflectivity can prosecute its researches only as it seizes upon, and employs itself about, the reproduced phenomena of Consciousness. The reproduction of the concrete facts of conscious spontaneity, that is its initial and most fundamental work. The truth of all its subsequent affirmations and conclusions is dependent upon the accuracy with which that work is done. The reproduction must be exact, adding nothing, subtracting nothing. Nor let it be supposed, that there is involved in this confession the least acknowledgment of fallibility or uncertainty as to the basis and principles of the science of Psychology. For, though the truth of Psychology does rest upon the accuracy of the reproduction, in Self-consciousness, of the concrete facts of Consciousness, and so would seem to depend upon the constitutional veracity of the reproducing power of the mind, yet it is a fact, wholly relieving us from this apparent dilemma, that the Reflective Reason possesses the ability of deciding, by an act of intuitive knowing, as to the precise accuracy, or otherwise, of the reproduction in Self-consciousness. Strange though it may be, yet so it is, that the Reason, looking in upon any reproduced fact of Consciousness, is enabled to detect at once whatever flaw or defect there may be therein, and to know with certainty when it is precisely exact; and thus is there found

here a perfect guarantee against any unavoidable intrusion of error.

For proof of the correctness of this statement, I refer every one to the testimony of his own mind, when engaged in the act of Self-conscious reflection. A concrete state, act, or fact of Consciousness seems to impress its form indelibly upon the Rational Personality; and, when this form is attempted to be filled out by an effort of Self-conscious reproduction, the eye of the Reflective Reason at once spies out whatever deficiency there may be in the work of rehabilitation.

3. I have previously suggested, and would here especially insist upon, another and third condition, namely, Sub-consciousness. Its definition, I have already, in another place, partially essayed. But I desire, in this connection, to present an ampler definition.

Sub-consciousness is not an act, any more than Consciousness, or Self-consciousness. It is a state and a faculty of mind combined. As Consciousness contains the living and actual facts of spontaneity, and Self-consciousness contains those facts reproduced, so Sub-consciousness contains, if I may so say, the order, laws, and powers which make these facts to be what they are. In Consciousness and Self-consciousness, we have given us the actings of the mind; in Sub-consciousness,

we have given us the springs and sources of those actings.

The seeing eye of Personal Rationality, turned within upon any of the reproduced phenomena of Consciousness, and seeking to know their constitutional genesis, mode of production, or process of development, beholds at once, by Sub-conscious Intuition, the object of its search.

I assert the possession by the mind of this power of Sub-conscious Intuition, not as a matter of theoretic necessity, or of rational inference; but as an actual fact of our mentality, discernible as such by any one endowed with the ability of self-reflectivity. Every person, accustomed to watch the states and workings of his own mind, will readily be brought to the acknowledgment hereof. Did such a one ever question his mind with regard to the constitutional power from which any conscious fact emanated, without receiving an instantaneous and satisfactory response?

The power or faculty is always revealed at the same time with every mental phenomenon, to which it gives birth. And the same is true of the law regulating every concrete mental operation. The law stands revealed, and must stand revealed, in each of the conscious processes determined thereby. And so it is, respecting all the tendencies, dispositions, habitudes, and modes of action of Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, which appear, and are made to

be what they are, in Consciousness, as a result of the essential nature and structure of the human soul.

And that state, faculty, or condition of mind, in which any of these constitutional tendencies, dispositions, habitudes, laws, or powers of the soul, are revealed to the direct sight of self-observing Rational Personality, I call Sub-consciousness. And I am as certain of its reality, as a distinct mental state, capability, or faculty, as I am of that called Consciousness, or Self-consciousness. And I am confident, also, that accuracy of philosophic statement and psychologic discrimination requires, that it should receive its own appropriate verbal designation.

It has long been recognized as a fact, by students of Mental Science, that the Self is disclosed, and is rationally intuited, in connection with every phenomenon of Consciousness; McCosh alone, of all the modern philosophers, holding the absurd notion, that Self is known Inductively. Now, I ask, how is the idea of Self thus disclosed to the eye of Reflection, on every occasion of the occurrence of a conscious act or fact? By what means is the introverted Reason enabled to cognize the Ego, whenever there is the appearance of a fact manifested in Consciousness? By precisely the same means, by the exercise of the same mental capability, whatever it is, do I say that the power, or law, or proclivity of thought, feeling, or action, possessed by the Ego, upon which any fact, or series of facts,

envisaged in Consciousness, may depend, is revealed directly to the knowledge of the self-observant Reason. As the living Ego discloses itself by, or through, every conscious fact, so, likewise, does the living power, or law, or habitude, which creates, and molds, and regulates such fact, disclose itself also. All this, according to my thinking and naming, is accomplished in Sub-consciousness. The Self, on the occasion of any and every conscious act or fact, comes forth from Sub-consciousness to the Intuitive cognition of Reflective Reason. And, in like manner, and on every such occasion, does the self-observant Reason detect or discern, Sub-consciously, the constitutional Power, or Habitude, or Law, that may be concerned therein.

In further illustration of what I mean by the term Sub-consciousness, let me refer to the phenomena of Relative Suggestion, or Memory. Now, in every instance of remembrance, some one mental fact, present in Consciousness, serves to recall, or, rather, is employed to recall, another mental idea, act, image, or state, once present to, but now absent from, Consciousness. But whither, I inquire, has the desiderated idea, act, image, or state flown? Into what realm of being, or non-being, has it been relegated? Its dismission or departure from the Consciousness, inasmuch as it was a process effected by the action of laws inherent in the mind itself, could not have been its annihilation, in

an absolute sense. In other words, a fact of Consciousness must remain forever present in Consciousness, until removed therefrom by the action of constitutional laws and powers of the soul: and no mental power or law can absolutely destroy a really existing mental fact; that is, send it into absolute non-being. It can no more than decide upon the form, or regulate the mode, of its existence. Besides, how could a fact, that had once been present in Consciousness, be recalled, or *re*collected, were it completely and truly annihilated and non-existent? Though it may have passed out of consciousness, it must still, in a sense, be somewhere, in order to be recovered by mental action or exertion. At least, we must hold that it must continue enstamped, in its effect, upon the soul; otherwise to talk of its reproduction would be ridiculously absurd.

To what realm, then, is an idea, thought, feeling, act, image, or state, that passes out of immediate consciousness, committed, by the action of the laws of our mental being? In what region, or state, or department of the mind is it garnered up, from which it can be recalled by an effort of what is known as Recollection? I say, in Sub-consciousness. A once conscious fact, by dropping out of Consciousness, is not lost, nor annihilated; it simply sinks down into a lower depth or stratum of our mental nature, where it is held and pre-

served, and delivered up again to self-inspection, as occasion may require, by the living forces, causes, and activities of our being, which have their home in that Sub-conscious realm. Now, when a remembered fact emerges from this lower depth, into the light of Consciousness again, how is it known to have had a prior existence there? This knowing, I reply, is an act of Sub-conscious Intuition. And, precisely in the same way, and with equal clearness and certainty, does every mental phenomenon disclose its source, order of generation, law of procedure, and all the activities lying back in Sub-consciousness, which are at all concerned in its production, to the detection and observance of Sub-conscious Intuition.

What, then, if it be true, as is so often reiterated by certain philosophers, that the spring or source, mode of generation, and law of development, of mental operations, are not themselves envisaged in Consciousness, but only and simply the mental operations; does it follow, hence, that they cannot be directly and intuitively cognized? Not at all. The Intellect has an Intuitive apprehension of many facts and truths, of a psychical nature, which are not the subject of direct *conscious* inspection. In its highest capability of action, it is empowered to look beneath the superficial phenomena lying in consciousness, and to behold, by an Intuitive glance, those vital energies, causes, and

laws, lying in Sub-consciousness, which enter into and constitute the very essence and inner nature of our mental being,—the perceivable phenomena being used as the occasion of such inlooking. It seems to me, however, that these vital energies, causes, and laws of our essential being, working in Sub-consciousness, do emerge from thence, and find at least partial expression, even in the realm of Consciousness; if not so as to be seen, yet so as to be heard and intuitively apprehended. They gently, and in a subdued tone, do consciously voice themselves forth, so as to be distinctly heard and known by the attentive Reason.

And thus, though we cannot be said to see them in Consciousness, we yet have a conscious sense of their existence and nature. Take, for example, our cognition of Self. Though Self is not directly presented to internal conscious perception, yet does it, even in the domain of Consciousness, measurably display itself, so that, in the spontaneity of the soul's conscious activity, we have a sense of Self, so full and strong and emphatic, indeed, that they who are the least Self-conscious, have about as intimate and assured an apprehension of their personal existence, as do those who are the most introspective and reflective in their turn of thought. Self sub-consciously voices itself forth, even in the spontaneous facts of Consciousness; and, so it is, also, with every one of the

forces, causes, laws and habitudes which enter into the constitution of the soul.

4. By the foregoing remarks, it is suggested, and rendered proper for me more fully to state, that these three states or faculties of the mind I have above set forth as conditioning all genuine psychologic knowledge, though distinguishable in thought, by reason of their dissimilarity in nature and function, do, by no means, practically exist and operate separately and singly. They are commingled and blended together, in all the different shades and varieties of internal experience. Nature's ways of working do not much conform to our human ideas of art and scientific classification. In the living products of His creation, God causes the activities thereof to run together and interact, with infinite subtlety, and endless variety of mode and form. And this is especially true of that most marvelous specimen of His handiwork, the Human Mind. But, nowhere in the mental world, is this truth more apparent, than when we attempt to trace the interblendings of the three forms of Consciousness now engaging our attention, namely, the Spontaneous, Reflective, and Sub. It seems, indeed, almost incredible, that the mind can be endowed with the power of observing its own inworkings, at the same time that its thoughts are occupied with exterior objects presented to its perception. The verbal enunciation hereof wears the

aspect of a paradox; and, when we attempt to realize it as a matter of fact, it seems to us quite like an impossibility. Yet is this miracle involved in our Rational Personality.

In fidelity to truth and reality, we are compelled to assert Reflectivity of spontaneous Consciousness, although the assertion appears almost or quite self-contradictory. For, were there not a degree of Reflectivity in spontaneous consciousness, how could the mind take note of its own workings in that state? Marvelous as it is, it is yet true, that while the mind is engaged in conscious action, it is also self-consciously active, and employed in scanning its own moods and acts and processes. Even while the attention is absorbed in certain objects placed before the thoughts, the eye of the soul is also introverted, watching the ongoings and motions transpiring within. And, notwithstanding the lightning-like rapidity with which thoughts, feelings, and volitions succeed each other, and the infinite complexity of their blendings in spontaneity, the Reason's introverted glance does not fail to take notice of them all, and, more or less distinctly, to discern the Self in which they all inhere, the mental faculties by which they are respectively produced, the laws governing their appearing, and the various mental conditions which impart to them form, coherence, and quality.

Thus does the mind, even when in the spontane-

ously *conscious* state, have the idea and Intuition of Self, and of the various mental powers—their modes of operating, and ways of generating their respective phenomena. And herein we learn, that Sub-consciousness, also, as well as Self-consciousness, is brought into requisition, and has place in, spontaneity. And the student of Psychology discovers, that long before he had learned the introspective art, or acquired the ability of voluntary self-conscious reflection, his Reason had spontaneously connoted, in a good degree, the operations and ongoings of his mind, and had sent its penetrating glances, more or less deeply, into the profound of Sub-consciousness, where exist, and from whence are disclosed, the sources of mental activity, and all the constituent principles, laws, and habitudes of the soul. And so it is, that, blended with, and as constituting a part of, the concrete spontaneous contents of Consciousness, there are Intuitions of Self, of Personality, of the various faculties of the Mind, the laws regulating psychical processes, and the peculiar modes of generation and formation of the phenomena of the interior world. So that, in the mere reflective analysis of these concrete spontaneous facts, all these Intuitions are actually found; and only their abstraction, as there found, is needed, in order that they may receive scientific recognition and statement: Though, it is true, that the Intuition of the constituent principles,

forces, modes of acting, and capabilities of our mental being, is also enjoyed by Reason anew, and with still greater emphasis, by and through the analyzation, in Reflectivity, of the reproduced concrete facts of conscious spontaneity. In Consciousness, therefore, Sub-consciousness plays an important part, revealing, with greater or less distinctness, to the spontaneous cognition of the Reason, every thing relating to the structure and constitution of the Mind, lying within its mysterious depths.

5. In these three states of mind, namely, the Spontaneous, the Reflective, and the Sub-conscious, the Reason is the instrument, and the sole instrument, of knowledge. This fact, it is highly important, should be constantly kept in mind. For, by overlooking it, we shall be led straightway, into the error of the Inductionists, who, because they see that Psychology begins in observation, at once jump to the conclusion, that a science having its beginning and partial development in observation, must, of course, have Induction for its Method. But, when we keep in mind, that, with regard to all mental phenomena, laws, and causes, the instrument for conducting the observation is the Reason, whose acts are all Intuitive, it is plain enough that the kind of observation here employed, is not performed, or complemented by, Induction. Every step of Psychologic observa-

tion is an act of the Reason, and Intuitive in its character.

SEC. 2. *Observational part of the Process; the various steps involved herein.*

1. As to the various steps in the Observational process involved in true Psychologic Method, first in order, is, what I would call, Discrimination, or the Differentiation of Psychical facts.

This is that action of the mind, by which it gives individual form to, and distinguishes, the various and ever-changing phenomena of the inner world. Were the mind bereft of this discriminating or differentiating power, the conscious realm would be a chaos. Confusion, like that which existed in physical nature before the Spirit of God had brooded upon it, would reign and revel there. To catch and perceive the evanescent operations and movements of the mind, commingled as they are, and coinstantaneously occurring, and so to divide and distinguish them as to impart to each its own individual character, demands the exercise of the keenest power of Discrimination, the acutest power of rational vision. Incomparable alertness and sharpness of reflective sight are exhibited by our Personal Rationality, in this work of Discriminating the multitudinous and fugitive phenomena of the soul. This Discriminating or Differentiating power, it is, which imparts to the world of living spirit, unfolded to inner and introverted thought, its ap-

pearance of harmony and beauty, rendering it a genuine Kosmos, that may be explored and examined in its various departments and kingdoms, with ever-increasing wonder and delight and profit. It is this power, especially, which renders psychical study possible. In it, reflective thinking takes its rise; the same as the observation and study of the material world are made possible, and have their beginning, in the individualizing power of sense-perception.

And hence it is, that the power of discriminating psychical facts is equally brought into requisition, in both Conscious and Self-conscious thinking. No less in the Conscious, than in the Self-conscious state, for a mental fact to be observed, it must be differentiated from all the other facts with which it may stand connected, and receive its own individualization.

But, how is this act of Differentiation performed? and what is implied herein? Analyzing it, we find it to be duplex in its nature: it implies segregation and unification—the unifying act being first in order of thought, and, so, of fact; although the reverse is the apparent order. For, were not a concrete psychical fact first viewed as a unit, by the observant intellect, there would exist no possible ground for its separation from all the other associated facts.

What, then, we inquire, is the basis of the unification in Conscious and Self-conscious thought, of

the facts there individualized? How are the elements, of which they are severally composed, combined and viewed as a united whole? Does the observant Reason supply the bond of unification, by the arbitrary injection of a cementing principle? Not so. Reason, in the attitude of observation, supplies nothing but the power to observe. It only looks, and sees what exists. As the ground, therefore, of its individualization of whatever psychical fact, it discerns, among the several superficially apparent elements entering into it, some one element upon which all the rest depend, and which constitutes, in reality, the central and elementary principle of the individualized and differentiated fact. And thus, although it may be truthfully said, that the Reason, looking in upon the passing phenomena of Consciousness and Self-consciousness, performs the act of unification and differentiation, yet never arbitrarily, which would be irrationally, and in a manner contrary to its essence; but for good reason, namely, because it discovers, in the unified and differentiated facts, certain really existing principles of unity and individuality.

2. After this clear delineation and envisagement of mental facts, the next step in the process of observation, in true Psychologic Method, is Analysis; that is, the resolution of the complex psychical facts into their constituent properties and elements. For, each of the phenomena spontaneously

appearing in Consciousness, and reproduced in its concrete form in Self-consciousness, is composite in its nature, and, therefore, capable of resolution by appropriate mental action. A psychical fact is as capable of being analyzed, and thus reduced to its constituent elements, as is any object of sense-perception.

In truth, the former may be subjected to a truly perfect, and absolutely exhaustive, analytic process, so that precisely all that it is, and contains, may be fully known: while the analysis of the latter must, in the nature of the case, ever remain partial and incomplete. A mental fact is wholly within the grasp and comprehension of the Intellect; and every thing entering into it, and pertaining to it, may be made to stand forth, prominently, to the immediate sight of the introverted Reason. Not so, however, with a physical fact or existence.

This analytic action, of which I am speaking, is almost exclusively wrought in Self-consciousness. There may, indeed, be—there is—a degree of analyzation, in that notice which the mind takes of its own acts, states, and operations, in Consciousness. But it is merely hasty, superficial, and involuntary; not at all comparable with that deliberate, intentional, searching, and exhaustive analysis to which I here allude. True analytic action, of a Psychologic nature, can be exemplified, only upon the reproduced phenomena of the mind. But, as tried

upon reproduced phenomena, it can be rendered thorough, and, in fact, absolute. For, it is then expended upon objects coming immediately and perfectly under the burning glare of Reason's introspective sight, and which can be held there, until their entire contents shall have been yielded up, and deliberately scanned and tested.

I wish it here to be understood, that I include, in the reproduction of mental facts or phenomena, which are to be subjected to such analyzation of the Reflective Reason, all the *appurtenances* and *environments* of these facts as given in Consciousness. Indeed, a concrete mental fact can hardly be said to be self-consciously recalled, for psychologic examination, unless it shall be set, when recalled, in the same psychical relations and connections as appertained to its spontaneous production in Consciousness. The analyzation of these connections and relations, as blended with the facts themselves, is oftentimes the occasion and source of the richest and deepest psychologic knowledge,—since it affords more vivid glimpses of the hints and intimations of Sub-consciousness; which relate especially to the sources of mental activity and power, and the modes of generation and development of the varied movements of the soul, that constitute the special quest of psychologic study, but are not precisely contained in the patent and envisaged facts themselves.

In connection with this last statement, I can but declare, that, in the various steps included in the observational part of the Method for conducting true Psychologic inquisition, the most important and fruitful is Analysis. I think, indeed, that with reference to most of the ordinary ends or aims of psychologic inquiry, the work of Observation may be regarded as concluding with it. In my judgment, there are but few questions, whose solution depends upon a critical scrutiny of the actual phenomena of the mind, but that may be satisfactorily answered after self-conscious analysis shall have been exhaustively applied. Yet, I believe there are certain questions which, if not directly relating to the actual phenomena of Consciousness, are still proper subjects of consideration in Mental Science, and may receive therein decisive settlement, that can never be answered with perfect certainty, until after another act of Observation shall have been performed.

3. And this third and last Step involved in the work of critically observing psychical phenomena, prescribed by our Method, is Abstraction; by which I mean, the separate reflective contemplation of the resolved parts or elements of the phenomena of Consciousness, while thus resolved and held in solution. This step in the process of critical observation, which our Method prescribes, must, from its very nature, be antedated by Analysis.—That is

the necessary prerequisite to it. Abstraction is wholly impossible, unless it be preceded by Analysis. And, in the sense in which I here use the term, Abstraction can only be performed upon the reproduced facts of Consciousness; that is, it can only be performed in Self-consciousness. It is entirely a deliberative and reflective act of thought.

In the scientific examination of certain species of psychical phenomena, Abstraction plays an important, and sometimes an indispensable, part. And, indeed, there cannot be any very profound or exhaustive scientific thinking, upon any class of mental phenomena, in which Abstraction is not, to some extent, involved. To be sure, certain Philosophers have inveighed against it, not only denying its scientific value, but declaring that it must inevitably lead to error and untruth, and is the chief cause of the impractical and worthless nature of so large a portion of philosophic literature. Thus, Berkeley assails it with great ardor of feeling, and charges upon it most of the errors into which philosophic thinkers have fallen, in all departments of Science. It is, according to him, a wholly vicious and frivolous mode of thinking. But, he was induced to take this unreasonable position, from his resolution to support his very peculiar theory of knowledge, which taught that Ideas are entities, and must, therefore, be considered solely in their actual concrete state, since any attempt to

abstract them could but serve to reduce them to nihility, and land the thinker in complete mental vacuity. For one to feel all of Berkeley's horror of Abstraction, and of Abstract notions, he must fully embrace that philosopher's theory of Ideas. But they who regard ideas as no more than the mind's mode of perceiving, conceiving, and knowing, and not as substantive existences, can experience no difficulty in seeing that the analyzation of them into their constituent elements, and the formation herefrom of abstract ideas or concepts, is conducive to the highest scientific accuracy and certainty. The analyzed elements of certain facts of Consciousness must be abstractly considered, that is, separately and singly considered, and apart from their concrete connections and relations, not only to enable the mind to understand what is contained in those facts, but also to empower it reflectively to cognize the most fundamental truths—truths which are primary, and which constitute the basis of all science.

It is by Abstraction, alone, that the Intellect acquires Pure Ideas, that is, the apprehension of Simple Entities, and the conception of Pure Essences, that exist in the natural fitness of things. This acquisition of Pure Ideas, or cognition of Pure Essences and Simples, the Reason gains by an analysis of the primary and concrete acts of the Intellect when concerned with individual objects; acts, which spontaneously take the form of uncon-

ditional affirmations, and are the enunciations of self-evident truths suggested by such individual objects. Analyzing and Abstracting the contents of these spontaneous acts and enunciations, reproduced in Self-consciousness, we gain those Pure and Simple Ideas that are the elementary principles of all scientific and absolute knowledge.

And, indeed, upon the contents, elements, and relations of all kinds of mental phenomena, as well as those of the Reason, Abstraction can be brought to bear advantageously. It serves to afford us a deeper and more accurate knowledge thereof, and the ability to decide, with the highest certainty, as to the origin, mode of subjective generation, and the essential significance, of the various elements entering into every kind of psychical phenomena, and to give to each its true and sufficient explication. The essence and inner meaning of no elementary principle of thinking, feeling, or acting, can be as truly known, when viewed alone amidst its concrete connections and environments, as when abstractly contemplated. In saying this, however, I would by no means assert the absolute necessity of reflective Abstraction in the Psychologic explication of very many, or even of the most, of the ordinary facts of Consciousness. I am inclined to think, as I have before said, that ordinarily we may safely conclude the work of Observation, in our process of Psychologic investigation, with

Analysis, and that degree of spontaneous Abstraction necessarily involved therein.

4. These three acts of Introspective Observation are each Intuitive in their nature. Each is accomplished by the direct Sight or Insight of the Reflective Reason. In performing these acts of reflective observation, nothing intervenes between the seeing eye of the soul and the object seen. The conclusion, or rather, the knowledge arrived at, in each case, is not the result of reasoning, or of any form of "discursive thought" whatever. It is the result of *immediate* intellectual vision.

Simple Observation must end here. It cannot possibly go further than Pure Abstraction.

SEC. 3. *The Crowning Act Prescribed by our Method.*

Psychology, however, does not end with Abstraction. Its purpose is by no means realized in any act of simple Observation. It does not stop with pure Abstraction. But, though we now abandon Observation proper, in the further prosecution of Psychologic investigation, we are not, on that account, compelled to resort to moral or probable reasoning, nor, indeed, to any species of reasoning whatever. All that is necessary at this point to be done or wrought, in order to realize the ends of true Psychologic Science, comes under the head of Intuition, and is the subject or product of Rational Sight and Insight.

1. Rational Intuition is the finishing stroke, the crowning act, of the process prescribed by our Method of Psychologic Research. All that has preceded is but preliminary hereto. The main purpose of all scientific Observation is, to pave the way for the Reason to gain an insight into what lies back of the facts observed, namely: those forces, laws, habitudes, forms, and realities of being which produce the facts, and make them to be what they are. This, at least, is the prime intent of Psychologic observation. And, in this department of science, this intent is consummated by an act of immediate Rational Sight or Insight.

The work of scrutinizing psychical phenomena, in the three ways I have above described, having been faithfully done, it only remains for the Rational Intellect to move on directly to the Intuitive cognition of any or all the causal entities, powers, and laws in which, and by which, such phenomena have been made to appear. At this stage of the process, there can exist no impediment or barrier to hinder the Reason from knowing these at once, and with absolute certainty. Nothing here intervenes to screen them from its penetrating gaze. The application or employment, at this point, of Induction, would be not only irrelevant, but really impossible, and the attempt hereat grotesque and farcical beyond description. Why should the Intellect busy itself with Inductive guess-work about

matters, which the light of its Intuitive Rationality enables it to pierce through and through, and perfectly explore? Take any phenomenon of Consciousness, and, it having been Self-consciously reproduced, let it be discriminated and analyzed, and its analyzed principles or elements considered in Abstraction, as we have just explained, and there is no question relating to it, raised by science, or coming within the range of scientific solution, that cannot be decisively answered by an Intuitive act of the Reason. Such exhaustive analytic observation, being directed to any concrete mental fact, precisely prepares the way for this kingly power of the Intellect immediately to intuite all that lies back of the production of such a fact. The Reason can but discover, at a glance, the scientific explanation of every psychical phenomenon submitted to its inspection, after that phenomenon shall have been by it fully analyzed and reduced to its simplest constituent elements.

When, indeed, a concrete psychical fact shall thus have received this analytic treatment, and its elements shall have been observed in Abstraction, the Reflective Reason will be sure to apprehend, as connected with, and in one sense forming a part of, such fact itself, the intimations and outspeakings, from Sub-consciousness, of all the mental operations, habitudes, and powers concerned in the generation and envisagement of said fact in Conscious-

ness. For, there is no psychical phenomenon, occurring in Spontaneity, which is not then accompanied with a more or less vivid revelation in Consciousness of the various activities, powers, and laws of the soul which had to do with its production. And, when the reflective analysis of it, and abstraction of its elements, shall have been completed in Self-conscious thought, the prior spontaneous apprehension of these originating activities, powers, and laws is also recalled, and still more clearly beheld to be an invariable accompaniment of the concrete phenomenon. And, from the very nature of the case, we can see that it were impossible for the living, conscious mind of man to act, or be acted upon, without there being made a co-instantaneous disclosure to itself of the inherent forces and susceptibilities of its own nature, which were thereby called into requisition. And these spontaneous Intuitions, which the mind enjoys in Consciousness, of the forces, capabilities, and proclivities of its own constitution, come up in Subconsciousness, at the same time with the reproduced phenomena with which they were associated or blended in concretion; and may be distinctly recognized, in their own proper character and relations, by means of that analytic observation which I have heretofore described.

2. I desire, also, in this connection to state, with emphasis, the fact that, by means of the foregoing

process of Psychologic observation, the Reflective Reason is enabled directly to discern, and make positive affirmation of, the mental law, cause, order, and habitude involved not merely in the production of the single phenomenon submitted to its inspection, but also of *the entire class* which that phenomenon may represent. In other words, one single concrete psychical phenomenon, that shall be reflectively resolved into its constituent elements or principles, and shall have these elements or principles scrutinized in Abstraction, furnishes a full and sufficient occasion to the Reason to intuite all the laws, causes, susceptibilities, and habitudes concerned in the production and regulation of all like phenomena. One fact of Consciousness, reproduced, and critically examined in Self-Consciousness, will aid the Reason to as clear a discovery and enunciation of all the forces and modes of action inhering in the constitution of the soul, that must be brought into requisition in the occurrence of all similar facts, as will whatever number subjected to the same introspective criticism. For, when to a single reproduced fact of Consciousness, reflective Discrimination, Analysis, and Abstraction are applied, in the manner heretofore delineated, whatever elements, of a special, individual, or incidental nature, may appertain to it, are thereby recognized as such, and so may be readily eliminated, so that only those elements that

are *essential* shall remain. And thus does the fact, reconstructed herefrom, become purged of its individual characteristics and incidental accessions, and transformed into a representative fact, possessing only those qualities that appertain to all the facts of its class. There is no psychical fact, which shall thus undergo the analytic scrutiny and abstraction of the Reflective Reason, but may be made to answer every legitimate scientific question that can be raised, concerning the class of facts to which it belongs.

That the Reason may, by means of Analytic Observation, as above set forth, eliminate all special and incidental qualities from any of the reproduced facts of Consciousness—thus imparting to them a representative character, is very plainly exemplified when the trial is made upon any of those concrete Affirmations of the Reason in spontaneous action, which contain the attribute of Necessity. Take that affirmation of this nature, for instance, which accompanies, and is contained in, all instances of the perception of Body, namely, that the body perceived must occupy space. Whenever the mind perceives a particular material substance, it spontaneously sees and affirms that that particular substance must be in space. Now, let any concrete affirmation of this sort be reproduced in Self-consciousness, and then submitted to the reflective examination we have above described; and, from

that single asseveration, relating to an individual object of perception, the Reason instantly constructs the universal and unconditional affirmation, that body, that is, *all* body, must occupy space. It does this by striking out from the concrete affirmation every element of particularity, every merely incidental and accidental quality, and reconstructing it with only those elements remaining that are absolutely simple and essential. And the same is true of all those primitive assertions of the Reason, containing Necessity—relating to quality and substance, beginning and cause, rational volition and morality, which are given in Spontaneity, and have special reference to individual cases or objects. By eliminating from them the special and accidental, as seen in Abstraction, the Rational Intellect self-consciously apprehends and asserts Universal and Necessary Truths concerning the abstract and simple natures thus beheld in pure thought.

3. That this peculiarity of rational thinking, of which I am now speaking, by which unconditional truths, relating to the laws of the mind, the constitutional and logical orders of ideas, the inherent workings of the laws of the soul, and the immutable relations of pure Essences and Simples, may be discovered and asserted from single facts of Consciousness, reproduced and analyzed in Self-consciousness, was dimly and partially seen by

Cousin—but, only dimly and partially. Thus, in one place, when speaking of the Prime Truths of the Reason, he says:* "At the same time that the Consciousness seizes the two terms [which enter into each of these truths], the Reason seizes their relation, and, by an immediate abstraction, which has no need of relying on a number of similar facts, it disengages, in a single fact, the invariable and necessary element of its variable and contingent elements." Though this important statement is here given us in such a positive and assured form, I must still hold, that the principle of rational thinking here announced by this author, was but partially and feebly grasped by him. For, in the first place, he only asserts this of certain kinds of facts of the Reason; whereas, it is equally true when predicated of any other species of conscious facts. Secondly, he nowhere else in his writings, that I am aware of, announces, or makes any allusion to, this great truth of human thinking. Nor, thirdly, does he draw from it the conclusion which, had it been fully and firmly grasped by his intellect, would inevitably have been suggested to his thoughts, namely: that the mind does, and must, attain to all knowledge of itself and its own operations, which is of a truly scientific character, by means of Intuitive Sight and Insight.

* "History of Modern Philosophy," vol. ii, p. 265.

The principle of rational thinking which is here asserted, is decisively fatal to the supposition, that the Inductive theory is applicable to the investigation of mental phenomena. If the Reason can discover in single facts of Consciousness, when duly analyzed and abstracted, the positive solution of all questions legitimately raised in Psychology, then is such solution wrought by Intuition; and Induction has not the least relevancy here.

Induction is based on the widest collection and comparison of facts, relating to the nature or subject about which inquisition is made. And the reliability of its inferences, or theoretic assertions, depends upon the correctness with which they express the points of perceived agreement between these collected facts or instances. With *one* fact or instance, bearing upon a given nature or question, Induction can do nothing. Rational Intuition, however, can use it as the occasion for the positive and certain discovery of a law of mind, a constitutional or logical order of thought, or a universal and necessary truth. And, it is with this species of Intellection, as we have found, that we attain to the ultimate solution of every question embraced within the scope of Mental Science.

SEC. 4. *Truth of the Foregoing Exposition of Psychologic Method Exemplified and Illustrated.*

Let us here attempt a brief, but somewhat more practical exemplification of the principles and statements, contained in the preceding portions of this chapter, by specifically applying them to the several ends and offices of Psychologic inquiry.

1. Let us, then, suppose the three Acts of Observation, already indicated, to have been expended upon the reproduced facts and states of Consciousness; it may be that the end hereby desired to be gained is, the Classification of these phenomena; for, this is one of the objects of Mental Science, though, it must be confessed, the most rudimentary and lowly.

Now, Classification is achieved, ordinarily, by the formation of complex ideas from abstract qualities belonging to many individuals. But, Psychologic Classification, being preceded by Intuitive Discrimination, Analysis, and Abstraction, may be rendered perfect, by the creation of such complex ideas as positively exclude all qualities or elements that are not seen, with infallible certainty, to inhere essentially in the objects classified. Genuine Psychologic Classification is only achieved in the formation of such complex ideas, as bear a precise resemblance to the ideal conceptions of Mathematics; complex ideas which are the creation of the Rational Imagination, and are, therefore, perfect in themselves, and capable of exact definition. Such is the nature of Psychologic Classification; it is based on con-

cepts or ideas possessing the same exactness and necessary connection, as do the prime conceptions and ideal forms of Geometry. Though, as we have said, this Classification is performed by the Imagination, yet it is by the Rational Imagination, employed about ideas beheld and furnished by the Reason; and containing nothing, therefore, not surely and absolutely known.

2. But, if the object of this triplex Observation shall be, not merely to classify what is contained in the obvious and palpable phenomena of Consciousness, but also to learn what lies back of them, as the principle and spring-head of their production, this object is also consummated by an act of pure Intuition—following after and complementing the Discrimination, Analysis, and Abstraction, which have already been applied.

Let the fact, which has been subjected to this critical examination of the Reflective Reason, and which is hence perfectly cognized as to what it is in itself, be held up against the beating, throbbing breast of the self-knowing Spirit, and the question propounded, Whence is this fact? what the source of its generation and development? and the unerring response, quick as light, coming up from Subconsciousness, will be heard and caught by the Intuitive Reason. There is demanded here no redargution, no Induction, no Deduction; but only the power of quick and penetrating Insight; the

power to detect the answer which the soul itself immediately returns to the propounded question. Never, yet, was a mental Faculty discovered by reasoning upon the facts which that Faculty may have produced. But, take a single one of the facts, and give it a critical examination—according to the threefold process of observation we have indicated; and the Reason at once beholds, in Sub-conscious Intuition, the Faculty from whence it proceeded, with unerring directness and certainty.

3. The Law effecting the production and formation of every conscious fact, and the Order regulating the progress of every series of conscious facts, are declared to the Reflective Reason coinstantaneously with the reproduction of the fact, or series of facts, in Self-consciousness. Immediately, the fact, or series of facts, being reproduced in the mind, and there reflectively held and retained, amid its living activities and powers, there comes up from Sub-consciousness a disclosure of the law and the order of their original and spontaneous occurrence, clearly and Intuitively apprehended by the attentive Reason. Any one fact of Consciousness, when it shall be recalled in Self-consciousness, and resolved, by the Intuitive analytic action of rational thought we have just described, into its simple elements, becomes the occasion of revealing, fully and accurately, to the Reflective Reason, by a Sub-conscious

process, the law and the order of the class of facts to which it belongs. One mental fact, thus analyzed and resolved, enables the introverted Reason as clearly to perceive the immanent law and constitutional order of the class it represents, as would the most extended "table" of similar instances. For, every mental fact contains the essential elements of all the facts of its kind; and when one shall have been analytically resolved into its essential constituents, and these constituents are seen in pure Abstraction, by the Reflective Reason, they become to it the sufficient data for the Intuitive affirmation of the regulative order and producing law, inhering in the essential nature of the mind, that give birth and form to all activities of the same species. To illustrate: take an instance of spontaneous syllogistic reasoning; and let the problem be, to determine, from this single instance, the Law of thought, and the Order of ideas, entering into, and governing, this and all similar species of intellectual action. All that is needed is, to have one such instance of syllogistic reasoning reproduced in Self-consciousness; and, while thus held, to have its phenomena subjected to the threefold process of analytic Reflection above indicated; and, from out the resolved phenomena of this single subjective syllogism, there will sub-consciously emerge, to the perfect apprehension of the Reason, the Law and the

Order governing the mode of thinking and the concatenation of ideas, not only of this, but of every other like process of Reasoning. And the statement hereof—the formulated statement hereof—can at once be expressed in the use of the most abstract and universal terms.

CHAPTER VIII.

SPECIAL ADAPTATION OF OUR METHOD TO THE EXPLICATION OF THE MOST RECONDITE FACTS OF THE INTELLECT—OUR METHOD NAMED.

BUT, suppose the special aim we wish to achieve by our course of Psychologic examination, to be, not the classification of the ordinary mental phenomena, or the discovery of the Sources and Faculties from whence such phenomena are derived, or the laws and constitutive processes governing their action and fixing the order of their occurrence, but a critical scrutiny of the contents of the Rational Intellect, its Ideas, Perceptions, Cognitions, Affirmations, and Judgments, with the intent to learn their nature, validity, and varying degrees of reliability; then, as before, the same conditions are involved, and the same Method must be employed.

Although, in the spontaneity of conscious and primary activity, we may feel the trustworthiness of our knowing faculties, and may enjoy an undoubting assurance of the reliability of their decisions, we are not, when we have arrived at self-conscious maturity, satisfied with this native confidence we have in their credibility. We desire to gain, also, a *reflective* assurance of their cred-

ibility. And we are constrained to criticise them, and determine their trustworthiness, by the use of scientific rules and tests.

SEC. 1. *A Critique of the Reason a Philosophic Necessity.*

A Science of the Reason is one of the prime demands of the mind of man, when it is moved with the impulse of knowledge. And, as all science has its birth in reflectivity, so, much more, the Science of the Reason has its birth there. It begins in the desire and effort of the Knowing Faculty reflectively to examine its own products and modes of acting.

To *assume* the entire accuracy and truthfulness of its individual and spontaneous cognitions and affirmations in Consciousness, as does the author whose principles of Psychologic Method we have considered at such length, is, to the last degree, unscientific. To start with such an assumption, is to declare, and to render, a Science of the Reason an utter impossibility. In constructing a Rational Psychology, we commence with, or upon, spontaneous intellections, it is true: not, however, by assuming their truth and validity; but, by taking them to be simply what they are, and bringing them forward again in Self-consciousness, in their entirety. Thus being simply reproduced, with nothing being taken for granted concerning them or about them, except that they are as they are,

they compose the sole data upon which to construct a Science of Rational Psychology. But, let it be borne in mind, that it is this reproduction which becomes the prime condition of their being used as the material of this Science. So that, as we have said, the Critique of the Reason, that Science which demonstrates the validity of the Intellectual Powers and the reliability of the affirmations and decisions of the Reason, begins in Self-consciousness.

It could begin nowhere else. For, the attempt to question the Knowing Faculties, and discover the nature and truth of their cognitions, is an introspective effort of the Reason, and can have no other data to work upon, than the prior conscious actings of itself in spontaneity, self-consciously re-enacted. And, it is plain enough, that the scientific fabric to be reared on this foundation, must be wholly constructed by reflective processes, since, after and beyond the foundation, the entire work of construction is one of criticism of the Rational powers, and of their products; that is, a work of self-conscious reflectivity.

SEC. 2. *The true Criticism of the Reason can only be accomplished in Intuition.*

It is, furthermore, evident, that, in the erection of a Science of the Reason, not only must no assumption of the entire validity of the spontaneous products and convictions of the Intellect be suffered

to vitiate the Science at its base, but, in this most exalted and primal department of scientific research, which has to do with the critical examination and authentication of the very instrument itself of all knowing, every step in advance must be one of absolute certitude,—one of direct, perfect Sight; that is, of Introspective Intuition. In no part or stage of the construction, can merely probable knowledge be allowed to enter; no Induction, no Deduction, no Illation whatever; nothing but the immediate vision of the Knowing Faculty; nothing but pure Intuitive Sight or Insight. For, the Reason, we at once see, can never be authenticated by any thing short of absolute knowledge.

SEC. 3. *How can a Perfect Criticism of the Reason be Effected?*

Now, absolute knowledge is given to us in the theory of Investigation and Criticism, I have endeavored to unfold. And, therefore, this theory fulfills the conditions of an adequate Scientific Critique of the Rational Intellect. It does this, in that it presents to us, at every step and stage in the process, the Rational Intellect itself in introspective Intuitive action: Not in ordinary Intuitive action, as when engaged upon singular objects; or, as when, employed upon pure and abstract ideas, it cognizes and affirms Axiomatic and Primary Truths; but, as turned inward upon itself in introspection, and gazing, with clear,

perceptive vision, upon its own actings and productions: thus verifying its own knowledge, questioning and deciding upon the validity of its own Faculties and modes of cognition, and empowering itself, with absolute certainty, to make the marvelous and seemingly paradoxical assertion, that it has absolute knowledge that it knows with certainty. The Self-conscious Criticism of the Reason is only effected, in the realization of this marvelous paradox of Personal Rationality. The authentication of the contents of the Rational Intellect is only possible, on condition that the Reason, engaged in self-inspection, can accomplish the miracle of *knowing that it knows*. And this miracle it can accomplish in Intuitive self-inspection; and in no other way.

Every cognition, belief, judgment, or affirmation of the Rational Intellect, given in spontaneity, when reproduced in Self-consciousness, and subjected to the gaze of the Reflective Reason, must, there and then yield up all that it contains, and be precisely what it is seen to be. Every one of these must wholly disclose itself, in its elements, relations, modes of genesis, and degrees of certainty, when analyzed by the Reason in intuitive, self-conscious action. If, in its primitive cognitions, beliefs, and judgments, as these exist in spontaneity, the Reason, thus scrutinizing them, beholds intuitively in them the elements of absolute certainty, it must

acknowledge and accept such beholding, with all that it contains. For, whatever remains in a primitive affirmation or cognition, after being reproduced in Self-consciousness and subjected to the analytic observation of the Reason in self-reflection, is valid and genuine, and must be acknowledged and accepted for precisely what it is.

Besides, those primitive cognitions and affirmations, which are seen by the Reason in self-conscious action to possess the characteristic of absolute certainty, are seen to be Intuitive; and a cognition or affirmation which is self-consciously seen to be Intuitive, that is, to be directly apprehended by the Reason, is absolutely known, and perfectly authenticated; for, it is the Reason itself, beholding, with an Intuitive eye-glance, the fact that it possesses infallible knowledge.

All the actings and productions of the Rational Intellect, as reproduced in Self-consciousness, are perfectly cognized by the Reason. For, they are thus placed immediately under its own inspection, where they can be seen with perfect clearness and thoroughness. And, again, being actings and productions of the Reason, they must be wholly known to it, when subjected to its direct observation in self-conscious reflection. Precisely, therefore, as they are then seen to be, so they are. Do any of them, as thus scrutinized, disclose the quality of infallible certainty, as being the perceptions or af-

firmations of the supremest power of the Intellect in Intuitive action? Then it is surely known that such quality inheres in them, and that they are absolutely reliable.

SEC. 4. *What Results are given us, in an Adequate Criticism of the Reason?*

The Reason, self-consciously scanning its own contents, directly looks in upon, and beholds, in certain of its cognitions and judgments, the quality of positive, clear, immediate vision or perception. They are seen to be, purely acts of knowing, nothing but that; simply seeings of the Rational soul; only what is beheld, by the clear, pure sight of the Reason. And, herefrom, do we gain a different view of the nature and office of the Pure Reason, from that taken by most of the Philosophers who have devoted special thought to the examination of this department of the Intellect. The nature and office of the pure Reason are as fully disclosed in its products, as are those of any other power of the mind in its products. And, since the products of the Pure Reason are cognitions and judgments wholly Intuitive, that is, the beholdings of pure Rational Sight and Insight, we discover herein the fact, that the Pure Reason is that power which the mind possesses of seeing certain things in the realm of thought and of reality, without mediation; the power of looking at, and knowing, ultimates and simples, precisely as they

are, and discerning, by immediate vision, the relations they sustain to each other. We learn, by studying the acts and facts of the Pure Reason, that it is the power of direct Sight into ultimate and simple essences, and their relations. So do these acts and facts positively declare. For, these acts and facts are, in themselves, but cognitions of certain things as they are in essence, and affirmations concerning them in that state. The primitive cognitions and asseverations of the Reason are seen, when reproduced in Self-consciousness, to be, not emanations from the Reason, but, what it intuites and beholds, in its own dry, white light. They do not burst forth from the matrix of the Reason as its offspring, formed and fashioned according to the action of certain laws immanent therein, and which bestow upon it its inward, subjective constitution. They are the acts and contents of the Eye of the Rational Soul, when its perceptive vision is directed to objects coming within its legitimate range. Examining, self-consciously, the Intuitive cognitions of the Reason, we Intuitively see that they are what the Reason beholds, in the world of reality and the world of necessity; and not what it discovers within its own bosom as produced by its own "regulative laws."

Observe the nature and form of these cognitions: They make unconditional affirmation of what is, not of merely phenomenal appearances; of what

absolutely must be, not what the Reason is compelled, by its own constitutive principles, to regard as necessary; of what essentially, and in the eternal fitness of things, will ever abide and continue, not what its own nature requires it to regard as essential and eternally appropriate. Take, as an illustration, the cognition of the Pure Reason relating to Cause, namely, "Every Beginning must have a Cause;" or, in still more abstract and precise phrase, "Beginning must have Cause." In this proposition, the Reason predicates nothing concerning *itself*, conditionates nothing upon its own nature, or laws, or constitutional modes of acting. But, with its vision wholly directed to the abstract essences, Beginning and Cause, it beholds in them, and declares of them, the existence of an immutable and eternal relation. It sees and affirms, that this relation depends, not upon its mode of looking upon Beginning and Cause, but upon the intrinsic nature and essence of these rational entities.

The same is true of all the cognitions, affirmations, and judgments which have been named "Prime or Axiomatic Truths of the Reason." Their unconditional and absolute form of asseveration comes not from the constitution of the Rational Intellect, as we learn by questioning these Truths in the light of Intuitive Self-consciousness; but, from what is Intuitionally seen to exist, and to inhere, in reality and in the internal fitness of things.

Were the absolute and unconditional form of statement of these cognitions, affirmations, and judgments, derived from constitutive laws and regulative principles of the Reason, and not from the absolute and unconditional nature of the objects themselves to which these cognitions, affirmations, and judgments relate, this fact would find disclosure, as they should be brought before the eye of self-conscious Reflection; and this would, indeed, at once destroy their unconditional and absolute character. Reason cannot conceal from itself the nature of its own declarations, when these shall be brought under its reflective analysis. And, should its own constitutive laws and regulative rules inject the absolute and unconditional element into its spontaneous and conscious affirmations, this fact would be revealed, when these affirmations should be reproduced self-consciously. Then, by the eye of the Reflective Reason, it would be seen, that their unconditional and absolute character had been subjectively imposed upon them; and that this character is fictitious and created by the limitations of the Reason: for, the Reason could not help but see its own processes, when they should be subjected to self-conscious questioning: and they would immediately drop their original and absolute form, and their announcement would be prefaced by the formulas, "I must think so and so;" or, "I am compelled to think thus and so, and cannot think

otherwise." Such is not the case, however. Reflective examination of the Axiomatic Truths of Reason does not cause them to lose their positive and absolute form of asseveration, concerning the essential nature and relations of things. These Truths, when self-consciously analyzed and reaffirmed, do not transfer their positive and absolute assertions from certain objects or things to which the attention of the Reason is directed, to certain regulative modes, necessary conditions, and constitutive laws, of the Thinking Faculty. They, then and always, relate to the necessities of being, and to unalterable relations in the eternal fitness of things; which are wholly independent of the mind perceiving them.

SEC. 5. *The Resultant Theory of the Reason.*

By an application of our Method of Psychologic investigation to the operations and contents of the Rational Intellect, we are led to a very different Theory of the Reason, from that propounded by Kant.—Rather, we are enabled to discover the falsity of that philosopher's Theory of the Reason. He took the position, that this highest faculty of the Intellect, even in apprehending Primary and Axiomatic Truths, which possess the characteristics of Self-evidence, Necessity and Universality, is wholly governed and guided by its own regulative laws, and can only affirm these truths by virtue of its own constitutive forms of thought, and not by

virtue of its ability to perceive their actual and eternal verity—as existing in the realm of being, and in the natural fitness of things. And, even Dr. McCosh, in his work on the Intuitions, though he combats Kant, and assails many of his positions with the greatest vehemence, does yet give his sanction to this philosopher's Theory of the Reason, in what he says about the "Intuitive and Necessary Principles of the Mind:" for he (McCosh) represents these "principles" as inhering in the Reason itself; as molding its "individual actings" in spontaneity; and declares, that they are "just the fundamental principles and regulative laws of the faculties."* By conceding and asserting this, he virtually declares with Kant, that our most fundamental knowledge is only relative to the mind possessing it; that it is colored, and even created and fashioned, by the Rational faculties of the soul; and that we have no guarantee whatever that it conforms to the actual truth of things.

By our Method of Criticism, on the contrary, we discover in the Intellect the power of pure cognition, the faculty of seeing—in a dry, white light, without the least discoloration or refraction; and, thus, of knowing things as they exist in the absolute necessities of being, unaffected by any innate conditions, or "principles" of the mind. By this Method, which teaches us to reproduce, and Intui-

* "Intuitions," p. 19.

tively analyze, in Self-consciousness, the cognitions, affirmations, and judgments of the Reason, we also learn the falsity of that Theory of McCosh, which his Method of mental search compelled him to adopt, concerning the "formation" of the Abstract and Axiomatic Truths of a universal and necessary character from the spontaneous convictions and judgments relating to individual objects. In the infallible light of the Reflective Reason, we see that these Abstract and Axiomatic Truths are even more clearly beheld and positively affirmed by the Rational Intellect, than are those which relate to individuals.* They cannot, therefore, be "constructed" or "made up" from the latter. Besides, were they thus constructed, they would be only general truths, not universal; and the ideas entering into them would only be of a general character, not pure or simple, and representing pure essences. But, our reflective Method of Intuitive Analysis shows us, in the resolved Axiomatic and Fundamental Truths of Reason, pure essences, and ideas relating to simples: And we perceive, that it is only by virtue of their being pure and uncompounded, that the Rational Intellect beholds in them Universal and Necessary Relations. In general notions, the mind could not, of course, discover the universal and necessary. It is while gazing upon pure ideas and simple essences, that the

* See Hickock's "Rational Psychology," p. 126.

Reason discerns the actuality of immutable and eternal relations, and makes unconditional announcement of them.

SEC. 6. *A Distinctive Name applied to our Method.*

And, now, having pointed out the various steps and processes in this our Method of conducting Psychologic inquiry, and having shown it to be of a distinctively unique and peculiar character, it would seem to devolve upon me to designate it by a Name, that shall properly and adequately set forth its nature, qualities, and uses. A unique Scientific Method deserves, and demands, that a Name shall be appropriated to it, which shall be its distinctive designation. I am aware, however, that such an attempt at Christening is a difficult and delicate affair. The suggestion of a fitting and acceptable term for the designation of a philosophic and scientific process, is a piece of good fortune, not often vouchsafed to even the most learned and ingenious. And I am far from imagining that the necessary conditions for a successful venture of this sort, are to be found in me. And yet, under the pressure of the conviction that the attempt, in this instance, ought to be essayed, and that, herein, no great risk is to be run, since failure here could hardly be esteemed discreditable, I shall assume the responsibility, and hazard the consequences. The Name I would propose, by which to designate the Logical process to be employed in conducting

Psychologic research—whose various steps I have endeavored, in this treatise, to unfold, is, THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD. This Name seems to me to be a fitting and appropriate one, for two reasons, namely: First, because it suggests and indicates the realm of fact, in which alone this Method is to be employed—the Consciousness; and, secondly, because it sets prominently forth the characteristic feature of this Method, namely: the knowing of the Causes producing the Facts, and the Laws regulating the occurrence and sequence of the Facts, concerning which inquisition is to be made, at the same time with the knowing (*con scio*) of the Facts themselves, that is, coinstantaneously with their conscious reproduction.

And, with this brief explanation, I leave this *nomen* to its fate, dismissing all concern as to its general adoption or rejection.

CHAPTER IX.

THE CONSCIENTIAL AND INDUCTIVE METHODS CONTRASTED.

AND now, having thus inadequately unfolded this New Theory of Psychologic Method, by an enumeration of the steps which it prescribes, and by designating its peculiar nature and purpose by the appropriation of a distinctive Title, I propose, right here, to hold it up to the mind of the reader in direct, sharp contrast with the Baconian Theory of Induction. Definition by contrast has the special prerogative of setting forth the thing to be defined in clear-cut outline, and with such mingling of light and shade as serves to bring out its salient and essential features to the best advantages. Let us now avail ourselves of its aid, in this final stage of discussion of our theme. And here, if I shall repeat some of the ideas previously advanced, the judicious reader will be ready not only to pardon the repetition, but, in view of the abtruseness and novelty of the Theory propounded, to approve and commend it.

SEC. 1. *These two Methods are in Contrast, because of the Dissimilarity of the Subjects to which they Relate.*

The first point of contrast consists in the dissimilarity of the subjects to which they respectively relate, namely, Mind and Matter.

The distinction between Mind and Matter is radical. So is it seen to be, from the very first dawn of rational thought. As soon as we arrive at the age of conscious thought, do we make, or, rather, behold, this distinction, and apprehend the dissimilarity of these two natures. Though we do not see in Mind and Matter any real antagonism, we can but regard them as the opposite poles of actual existence, and, subjectively considered, as eternally separated by divorce of principle and essence. That nature which we know by internal perception, and which we call Self, must ever appear to us as fundamentally distinct from that nature we come to know through the medium of Sense-perception, and which we immediately discern as the Not-Self. Any theory which would identify these two natures, or derive them from the same principle, is a denial of the deepest Intuitions, the most primitive intimations and convictions, of the Rational Faculty of our being. We come to have ideas of them, through sources of knowledge as opposite as can be conceived; and, from the first, we detect, in the one and the other, qualities having nothing in common. The Reason, in spontaneous action, judges them to be distinct and dissimilar: and no subsequent reflective and

scientific judgment, which it pronounces, invalidates or can invalidate, this its spontaneous affirmation.

Those theories called, by way of license, philosophical, which declare the ultimate and radical oneness of these two natures, are wholly hypothetical. They have not the least support in fact or in reason. At best, they are never commended to our judgment by any thing more than a specious plausibility, derived from a course of suppositional and fanciful speculation; while, continually, they are contradicted by the deepest and most operative principles of our rational being. They who embrace such theories are evermore compelled to ignore and disregard them practically. And, when they contemplate directly the conceptions of Mind and of Matter, as given to them in reflective and analytic thought, they can but discern the total dissimilarity of these conceptions, and of the natures which are beheld by and through them.

The total dissimilarity of Mind and Matter, of Self and Not-Self, requires that the modes of investigation, employed in the effort scientifically to know them and their phenomena, respectively, shall be different and dissimilar. It seems quite self-evident, that those entities, lying at the very opposite poles of the universe of actual being, should be approached and examined by opposite and unique Methods. If Mind and Matter differ in essence, how can I know them, their qualities and

powers, by the same faculties and processes of thought? It is an impossibility. In the nature of things, I must make use of such faculties and modes of investigation as are adapted to the nature of the subject to be examined. The assertion is preposterous, upon its very face, that we are to know the two substances, which constitute the substratum of the opposite poles of the universe, by the one Method of Induction, rather than by the one Method of Introversion and subjective Reflection, which we have denominated the Consciential. A system of Philosophy is but the principles contained in its Method, carried out to their consequences. And, a Cosmology which begins and ends with Induction, will inevitably deny the existence of Mind, as a distinct entity. And that Cosmological theory, which exclusively employs the Consciential Method, will, quite as surely, wind up with a denial of Matter and the external world. In other words, it will, almost of necessity, develop into a system of Pure Idealism. That, in our philosophical system, we may be able to re-affirm the original assertion of the Reason, as to the actual independent existence of both Mind and Matter, and thus escape the folly of Skepticism, which is contained in both Pure Idealism and Pure Materialism, we must recognize the legitimacy of these two Methods of Inquiry, in their respective spheres.

SEC. 2. *They are in Contrast, as to the Facts with which they Deal.*

As the next point of Contrast between these Methods, or Systems of Logic, we say, that the one has to do with the facts given us in Consciousness, and the other with the facts given us in Sense, or Sense-perception.

This point of contrast is allied to that we have just been considering; but yet, it is readily distinguishable from it. It properly comes next in order. And, let me preface my remarks hereupon, by referring to a point of similarity between the Consciential and Inductive Methods, namely, that they both begin with facts, and with the Observation of facts. But, here all likeness ends. From this point they diverge—not to meet again.

The dissimilarity, suggested under this head, is twofold, namely, first, as relating to the media, or sources, of knowledge; and, secondly, as to the nature or character of the facts. Let us begin, by examining this last-mentioned feature of dissimilarity.

The Facts of Consciousness, and the Facts of Sense, are seen at once to be of diverse nature. They are diverse in essence. They are mutually seen to be under the control of law, it is true; but the laws regulating them are discovered to be as diverse, as are the facts themselves. Upon observation, we find that the occasions, modes of occur-

rence, and orders of sequence, of these two species of phenomena, are wholly unlike and discrepant. How, then, can it be conceived, that they are each to be scientificially investigated and understood by the application of the same Logical Method? Their diversity must impose upon the Intellect, the employment of different faculties in examining them, respectively; the employment of different ways of approaching them in observation, and of different modes of apprehending their respective laws and causes. Thus, the essentially distinct nature of these two classes of facts compels the adoption of different Methods in the inquisition of them.

The same is true, if we turn our attention to the Sources, from whence we derive our knowledge of these two species of phenomena. The one source is Consciousness, supplemented by Self-consciousness; the other is Sense, or Sense-perception, supplemented by experiment. Now, let us see what is implied in the revelation of facts in Consciousness, bearing upon the subject in hand. There is, first, implied the beholding or perceiving them immediately. Conscious phenomena come under the direct sight of the soul's interior eye. For, they exist wholly in the mind, are wholly present to it, and are laid completely bare in its interior light. Their entire contents and connections may be perfectly cognized by Intuitive perception.

Moreover, these facts are perfectly understood, in all their elements, qualities, and relations; for the reason that they are *mental*, the product and emanation of the Self which perceives them. And that the Mind should know its own offspring, its operations appearing in Consciousness, with a perfect, absolute, Intuitive knowledge, is a matter of self-evidence and necessity.

How is it, now, with reference to sensuous facts —the phenomena of Sense-perception? They are only mediately known; they are apprehended through the medium of the senses. They are in the nature of *reports* to the mind as to the objects and changes of the outer world: not the direct cognition of these objects and changes. The mind has an immediate knowledge of these reports, indeed; but not of the things reported. For, while the former are present to the Intellect, the latter are out of, and away from it, as is affirmed by Consciousness in every instance of sensation, or of Sense-perception: for, in every such instance, it (the Consciousness) declares the thing seen through the sensation to be separate from Self, and to pertain to the Not-Self. While, therefore, the Sense-perception, subjectively considered, that is, as an act of the knowing Self, may be directly and perfectly cognized, as being wholly included in Consciousness, it cannot give us to cognize the object belonging to the Not-Self concerning which it

makes report through the senses, and thus only relatively and mediately. We perceive no existence Intuitively, which is not present to and within the Mind; that is, in Consciousness. A Sense-perception is included in Consciousness; for it is an act, a concrete operation of the mind itself. Upon analyzing it, there is discovered in it a sensuous element: an element seen to have been introduced causatively from without, from the realm of the Not-Self. While, therefore, the fact of the Not-Self, the outer world, is intuited in Sense-perception, the forms, qualities, and relations, which the Not-Self contains, are perceived only conditionally and mediately. In other words, these contents of the Not-Self are no more than reported to the knowing Self—the reports of them, moreover, being colored and modified, not to say distorted, by the organs of sense which render them. What these objects, forms, qualities, and relations, belonging to the outer world, are in themselves, is not contained in Sense-perception, and is never given us therein. All that is given us therein, is, something exterior which is competent to make such and such impressions upon the senses. And it is the *impressions*, only, that the mind immediately beholds. — Although, it is the outer objects, their forms, qualities, and relations, that are imagined to be the facts of Sense-perception; and it is concerning them that scientific inquisition is made.

It is plain, then, that the species of facts that come to our cognition by conscious processes, demand, in their scientific examination, a Method of their own, a unique and peculiar Method; one very different from that employed in the study of the phenomena of the physical universe, intimations of which are conveyed to our minds through the organs of sense. The former ever remain present to and within the mind, evermore subject to the immediate Sight and Insight of the Reflective Reason. The latter ever remain without, in the world of the Not-Self; and the study and inquisition of them must ever be conducted by aid of the dim, distant, and inadequate sight of Sense-perception. The Method of procedure in conducting investigations by means of conscious sight, is essentially distinct from the Method of conducting investigations by the observing powers of sense. The primary acts of the mind, in the performance of these two species of cognition, are distinct and *sui generis;* and all the subsequent movements of the Intellect, in the exploration of these two realms of fact, are equally peculiar and dissimilar.

SEC. 3. *They are in contrast as to the Courses they prescribe in discovering the Laws and Causes of these Facts.*

The propositions of the last Section bring me to mention, as the next point of contrast between

these two Methods of which we are speaking, the essentially different Courses they prescribe and pursue, in determining the formal Laws and Causes which underlie the facts presented in the two spheres, the Self and the Not-Self.

Science is never satisfied with the bare observation of facts. It evermore seeks to penetrate to the discovery of the Causes which produce them, and of the Laws regulating their production.

In reaching this ultimate end of Science, within the two opposite spheres of Mind and Matter, the Intellect does and must pursue wholly dissimilar modes of inquiry. In the realm of Mind, all the facts of which appear in Consciousness, the Laws and Causes are discerned by the Reflective Reason, in Intuitive action. The phenomena of Mind disclose, to the eye and ear of Self-reflection, their own causes and laws. Not only are these phenomena consciously intuited, but the principles from whence they emanate, and the fixed order of their occurrence, are also consciously and self-consciously disclosed. The self-knowing power of the soul sees the causative sources and the formative laws of the facts, at the same instant, and by the same act, that it beholds the conscious facts themselves. In the ability which the mind possesses of self-observation, there is implied instant discernment of the mind's various powers of acting, in the acts which it performs. The soul itself speaks out in its own

acts, and reveals to itself its own capabilities. The self-observant Reason looks down beneath the superficial facts, which appear to conscious perception, into the very roots and springs of the soul's life and activity. Underneath the visible facts of Consciousness, the attentive eye and ear of Intuitive Reflection detect at once the mental forces, which give birth and form to the facts. The Intuitions of the Reflective Reason extend to the very depths of Sub-consciousness, as well as over the palpable outworkings of Consciousness.

I know not why it should have been so generally assumed and asserted, by the students of Psychology, that the Reason, in reflection, only cognizes the reproduced *facts* of Consciousness. It is not so. If we will carefully note what is given us in Reflection, it will be seen, that, beneath these facts, we directly discover their regulative Laws and primal Causes, also. The Reason, engaged in Introspective observation, sees not only the superficial phenomena unfolded in Consciousness, but also gets a clear insight into the living fountains of power, from whence these phenomena have proceeded.

In reflecting upon the facts of Volition, the Reason at once cognizes the *power* of willing. In reflecting upon the facts of Memory, it directly and Intuitively cognizes the *power* of memorizing. And, so, with regard to all the other Powers of the

soul, together with the Laws regulating their workings. If the Rational Intellect, looking in upon the phenomena of Consciousness, did not Intuitively behold their Laws and Causes, it could never discover them at all. For, Intuition is the only method of cognition that is known to, or can be employed by, the Reflective Reason. Every department of the mind, with all its powers, susceptibilities, and capabilities, is ever wholly and immediately present to its own self-knowing thought. In the act of introspection, the subject and the object are identical. And, so, it is clear, that a self-knowing being can only know itself by an Intuitive process. This is its sole possible Method. Every thing that the mind knows about itself, it must know by Intuition; since the mind, in every one of its acts, powers, faculties, and laws, is ever immediately present to itself.

Precisely the opposite of this, however, is the case, when the mind sets before itself the task of cognizing the powers, faculties, and laws of the Not-Self, the Physical World, Matter. This material realm is not only outside of the Consciousness, outside of the mind which would scientifically explore it, but between them an immense distance intervenes. They are opposite natures. An Intuitive knowledge of its causative forces and formative laws helps not the mind, in the least, to understand the forms and powers concerned in the

production of the facts presented to the observation of sense-perception. The laws and causes of the Physical World are, to the mind making inquiry concerning them, strange and alien. They disclose not themselves in the phenomena to which they give rise. They are entirely hidden and concealed from the Intuitive Sight and Insight of the Reason. Effects, alone, are the subject of sense-perception; and they, not in their reality, not as they actually are, but only in their seeming. For, the sight of our senses penetrates not into the inward nature and meaning of the effects presented to its inspection. It no more than beholds their outward and most superficial appearances, the shell and envelope of the effects which are being really produced in the outer world. The apparent changes there taking place, do not declare their internal connections, their necessary bonds and relationships, to the observation of sense. Facts, movements, changes, in the material world, which may be in the closest juxtaposition, both in time and space, may, nevertheless, not have the least positive internal relationship or dependence. Activities and changes may be going on together in physical Nature, and—to appearance—constitute essential parts and elements of one united concrete movement, without sustaining to each other the least degree of interdependence as determined by the law of cause and effect, or having the remotest connection with each other as

established by the law of antecedence and consequence. Facts, of similar form and appearance, may there present themselves to our observation, which, for all that, may be entirely alien, as respects their origin and genesis. By simply looking upon physical phenomena, we can never discern their interdependence or connection, nor the forces which produce them, nor the laws which control their procedure. The mere observation of sense cannot decide between the real and the seeming, the essential and the accidental, what is antecedent and what is consequent. It cannot tell to which one of the multiplied and hidden powers, at work in the material realm, any given change, motion, or effect, occurring therein, is to be attributed. For, sense-perception possesses not the ability to behold the producing causes, in the effects presented to its vision; for the reason that the percipient mind is, there and then, gazing upon a foreign nature, an alien substance, whose activities, powers, and laws bear no resemblance to its own, but are strange and alien and foreign, as is the substance in which they inhere; and are, therefore, to be learned, if learned at all, by long, patient, and careful trial and experiment. While the eye of the Reflective Reason beholds at once, and with an Intuitive glance, the law and process of generation of any fact of consciousness, the defective sight of sense-perception, even after the most extended and

careful examination, aided by the most painstaking trial by experiment, can never certainly discern the link that binds a physical fact with its producing cause, nor really see and understand the various steps in the process of its generation.

SEC. 4. *They are to be contrasted as to the Powers of the Intellect which they respectively employ, namely, the Reason and the Understanding.*

The diversity of these two Methods of which we are speaking, consists, also, in the difference of the Intellectual powers, which they respectively bring into requisition. The Consciential Method, in its researches and explorations, employs the Reason; while the Inductive, in prosecuting its labors, makes principal use of the Understanding. Of the former Method I affirm, that in reaching its results, it makes exclusive use of the Reason. Such seems to me to be the fact, after careful and patient reflective thinking. In the various leading steps, prescribed in the process of Psychologic investigation which we have denominated the Consciential, we have shown—provided none of these steps have been overlooked by us, and none have been untruthfully described—that they are all taken by the action of the Reason. And, I am unable to discover, in the entire procedure, from first to last, any of the most minute, or subordinate, or trivial part of the work, that is wrought by the Understanding. The Reason seems to arrogate to

itself the sole prerogative of scrutinizing the operations of Consciousness, and deciding upon the nature, order, laws, and causes of all mental phenomena. And this, very justly and appropriately. For what more fitting, than that this highest department of philosophic activity should be presided over and directed by the supremest faculty of the Intellect?

In Induction, however, and in those fields of Science which must be cultivated in accordance with the Rules of the Inductive Method, it is plain enough that the Understanding predominates, and has principal sway. The Reason, indeed, renders assistance in the way of supplying Primitive Ideas and Axiomatic Principles. In fact, all the fundamental data which the Understanding takes for granted, and upon which it constructs its scientific fabrics, are furnished by the Reason. And all along through the various stages of development of the Inductive Sciences, the friendly aid of the Reason must be afforded, to give life and complementary finish to the somewhat dry and mechanical processes of the Understanding. Thus, for example, how could the Understanding proceed a step in the induction of that class of facts which it is its prerogative to investigate, were it not supplied by the Reason with the fundamental Axiom, "Every Beginning must have a Cause?" All the Inductive Sciences are built upon this principle. It is as-

sumed at the outset, taken for granted, before Induction begins, or can possibly make a beginning. And the living belief and confident application of this principle are evermore involved in the development and growth of every species of Inductive knowledge.

And I think it may be still further asserted, that, although it is the Understanding which supplies the elementary materials, and performs the syllogistic acts of reasoning, involved in and pertaining to Inductive Science, it is the Reason which informs the Understanding of the essential quality of those materials, and of the validity of those acts.

To my mind, it is easy to distinguish between the Reason and the Understanding. It appears to me, in fact, that this distinction is radical; and I cannot conceive how any one can undertake a critical examination of the Intellect, and fail to discern this distinction. Nevertheless, as there are those claiming the title and character of Philosophers, as we have had occasion already to observe, who deny the reality of this distinction—and since we have premised it as a ground of diversity and contrast between the Consciential and Inductive Methods—let us proceed to give a somewhat full definition and description of these two leading attributes of the Intellect, as to their essential qualities, prerogatives, functions, ways of acting, and concluding

products; and thus learn how fundamentally and completely they differ from each other.

1. In pursuance hereof, I say, first, that the Reason is a more exalted attribute of the Mind, than is the Understanding. It is the imperial faculty of the Intellect; that endowment which constitutes the very center and core of our mentality. This it is, which forms the basis of our Rationality; supplies the prime condition of free-will and free-activity, which is the essence of responsible being; and imparts to our minds the sense and apprehension of rational Personality. It is the Reason, which gives birth to our Selfhood; from its depths alone emerge the idea and sense of the Ego, together with the radiant light of our human Consciousness and Self-consciousness. And, thus, by this endowment, do we emerge from the indiscriminate mass of things surrounding us, rise above the law of physical compulsion and necessity in our inner being, and attain to the dignity and glory of supernatural existence. This, it is, which chiefly distinguishes us from the brute creation. Animals possess the powers of the Understanding; some of them in a high degree of development. They are endowed with those faculties which enable them to hold intelligent intercourse with the outer world, form notions of its objects and operations, and to use these notions as data for certain processes of reasoning. But, they furnish no evi-

dence that their intelligence ever mounts up into the region of Rationality, so as to give them any proper sense of Selfhood, or confer upon them the ability of Self-reflectivity. In our human mental economy, at any rate, we can clearly see that there are certain subordinate intellectual powers, which adapt us to our physical conditions and surroundings, which give us a sense and perception of the material objects around us, ability to form notions of these objects, and more or less deeply penetrate into their natures, and discover their susceptibilities and ways of acting. And these intellectual powers, as being of a different order, and performing different functions, from those higher and more magisterial powers we have just been considering, and which we have denominated the Reason, we may very properly distinguish by a specific title, and name them the Understanding.

2. Again, the Reason and the Understanding are to be distinguished as to their Inherent Power of Cognizing.

The former has the power of *pure* cognition; or, rather, it is that faculty of the Intellect which possesses the power of seeing existences, entities, and relations, coming under its inspection, immediately, and precisely as they are, without the least discoloration or modification derived from its own nature or "regulative laws." Indeed, it may truly be said of the Reason, that it has no "regulative

laws." And its nature is, solely the power of discernment; the ability of pure, direct intellectual vision; of beholding things precisely as they exist, and must exist in the world of reality, and in the realm of eternal fitness. Its concluding affirmations are not the result of its own laws: they are not "made up" and pronounced by the compulsory action of its own "forms" and constitution; they are, simply, the declaration of its actual beholdings, as it looks straight at its objects. And, the beholdings of the Reason are not colored, in the least, by the medium through which it looks; nor at all determined or modified by the contributions which it makes to its beholdings or affirmations, from the workings of its own elements.

Precisely the opposite of this, however, must be said of the cognitive power of the Understanding. The objects of its knowing are, for the most part, those of sense. The postulate of the Schoolmen, respecting the contents of the Intellect, is a truism when it is laid down and affirmed of the Understanding only: "There is nothing in the Intellect, which was not first in the sense." The primary data, therefore, with which the Understanding has to do, are sensations, or sense-perceptions. The objects of these sensations, or sense-perceptions are not, then, immediately cognized by the Intellect. They are seen only mediately and distantly and relatively, or, rather, regulatively. Sense-perceptions are, in

large measure, " made up " by the senses. That is, they are determined, and made to be what they are, in a good degree, by the physical constitution and laws of the senses themselves. Cognitions of the objects of Sense-perception, which constitute the materials upon which the Understanding works, and builds up its superstructures, do chiefly consist of those impressions upon the organs of sense conveyed to the mind, that are supposed to be produced by certain hidden powers inhering in those objects. Such manufactured cognitions, it is, that, as I have said, are supplied to the Understanding as its elementary material. By taking these up into its own forms, and still further molding and shaping them, in accordance with the regulative laws of its own nature, it, at length, constructs the so-called Sciences, which so inflate many of their devotees with the gas of vanity and self-confidence, as to induce them to assail the supreme dicta of the Reason, and deny those rational affirmations which alone renders Science possible. Such poor and uncertain footing is furnished by the mechanical and faithless Understanding, to those shallow " scientists " of the infidelistic school, who, in their hatred of the doctrines of God and immortality, substitute their materialistic dogmas for rational First Truths, and the conclusions of their suppositive reasonings hereupon, for the well-supported dogmas of the Christian faith.

3. The reality and fundamental nature of the distinction between the Reason and the Understanding is seen, again, lastly, in the radical difference of the concepts which they respectively form and employ, the one, for the laying down of its affirmations and judgments, the other, as the elements of its Inductive and "scientific" reasonings.

Now, the concepts of the Reason are Pure Ideas. And they are attained by it, on this wise: Self-consciously recalling the original and spontaneous operations of the Intellect, the Reason, reflectively, and by that Intuitional analysis we have previously explained, resolves these concrete acts and processes into their constituent elements, and, gazing upon them in abstraction, it gains a direct perception of Ultimates and Simples, the very seeds of knowledge, the Primary Atoms—so to speak—of intelligent thought, essential being, and necessary relationships. These Simple and Pure Ideas are the concepts of the Reason. And, looking directly upon these in reflective Intuition, it is empowered to make its absolute and unconditional utterances, its positive enunciations of axiomatic and universal truths. While self-consciously looking upon, and through, these Simple and Pure Ideas, it intuites things precisely as they are, and clearly perceives their inherent and abiding relations, those immutable and eternal relations, existing between them.

But, what is the nature of the concepts of the Understanding? And what use does the Understanding make of its concepts, in its "scientific" explorations and reasonings? It is plain, that these concepts are not Simples; nor are they gained by analysis; nor do they have an abiding existence in the realm of actual and rational fitness —independently of the mind conceiving them. On the contrary, they are complex, are built up by a constructive process of thought, and are wholly the creation of the Intellect—having no reality, save in the mechanical Imagination. In distinction from Pure Ideas, they are artificially constructed and compounded General Notions. The Understanding, having worked these up, and elaborated them in its "forms," in accordance with its own subjective and regulative laws, from sensations and sense-perceptions, adopts them as the sole foundation, and employs them as the only material, of its Inductive processes and reasonings. Up to the point of the creation of these concepts, the work of the Understanding has been merely preparative. Its illative action, its effort at drawing conclusions, begins entirely with them, and is wholly carried on by their assistance. In fact, the great aim of the Understanding, in all its so-called "scientific" labors, is, to distribute, and reduce, the supposed objects of sense, under one or another of these General Notions. To classify sensuous phenomena, is the great work

of those sciences, which are the outgrowth of the Understanding. The reasonings, performed by this faculty of the mind, almost exclusively relate to the assignment of physical objects and natures, as known by the senses, to their appropriate places under the various heads of classes, genera, and species—those General Concepts and Notions created by the Understanding, and having only a mental and imaginative reality.

Thus are these two faculties of the Intellect shown to be radically and essentially distinct. And the diversity of the two Methods of scientific investigation, which respectively employ and bring into requisition these faculties, is herein clearly revealed.

SEC. 5. *They are in Contrast as to the Nature of the Knowledge to which they conduct the Intellect.*

There is another feature or ground of diversity, which separates and distinguishes the Consciential and Inductive Methods, that yet remains to be mentioned and emphasized, although it is implied in, and directly flows from, the positions and statements contained in the foregoing section, namely, the difference in the character of the knowledge to which these Methods respectively give rise. The former Method gives rise to the knowledge of absolute certainty; the latter, to the knowledge of only hypothetical and probable certainty.

It is evident enough, that, in Psychology, there is demanded the use and application of a Method

that ends in absolute certainty, in that it (Psychology) is the *Prima Philosophia*, "the Mother of the Sciences." Its facts, principles, and laws enter into, and give mold and form to, all other branches of Philosophy. Its facts, principles, and laws, therefore, must be criticised in accordance with the Rules of a Method which admits of no doubt, but gives us to know infallibly. Especially must this be the case, with respect to the scientific criticism of that department of the mind where, it is claimed, resides the intellectual power which is capable of Intuitional Sight and Insight—which gazes upon Pure Ideas, and cognizes and enunciates Absolute and Universal Truths. If the acts and affirmations of this mental power can be critically examined only by a logical process, which gives no more than probable knowledge; nay, unless the phenomena of this rational power shall be authenticated by a Method of inquisition whose decisions are, and are seen to be, absolutely infallible—then all knowledge is invalidated; truth is but a sham and a pretense, and Philosophy of every kind is no more than a castle in the clouds.

The Psychologic Method, which I have unfolded in these pages, and whose various steps I have endeavored to explain, furnishes the means for a complete and precisely accurate exploration of every department of the mind—every form and species of mental action, including the Intellect,

its processes and beholdings. For, as I have before remarked, in Consciousness, Self-consciousness, and Sub-consciousness, it is the Reason, with its clear and piercing and unerring glance, that does all the seeing and knowing: and the Reason sees and knows, by means of Intuitions alone. The entire work of Psychologic Observation, therefore, is performed Intuitionally. And the Discrimination of the facts of Consciousness, reproduced in Self-consciousness, is also wholly Intuitive, since these facts are here brought immediately before the seeing eye of the soul. The same is true, and for the same reason, as to the Analyzation of these conscious facts. This, also, is effected by the Intuitive action of the mind. So, again, is the Abstraction of their elements, and the scanning of these elements in Abstraction, an Intuitional process. And so, also, and lastly, the apprehension and affirmation of eternal and immutable relations existing between the Simple and Pure Ideas found in such Abstraction of the concrete phenomena of Consciousness, is, pre-eminently, an Intuitive act of the Rational Intellect. The various steps of the Consciential Method, the only Method applicable in the explication of mental acts and operations, being thus wholly Intuitive, it is plain that the knowledge, gained by the use of this Method, is perfectly certain and reliable. It is to be ranked in the same category, as the knowledge gained by mathematical conception and demonstration.

What a perfect contrast to all this does the Inductive Method present! Its original data, instead of being given us in Consciousness, are furnished by Sense-perception. And the perceptions of sense, we have seen, do not give us to know the objects of them with any great thoroughness or certainty. For, they do not bring these objects immediately to the knowing faculty of the mind. Nay, while leaving these objects outside of, and distant from, the knowing mind, in the outer Not-Self, they do but supply faint and feeble, and by no means correct, intimations of the things to which they relate. These perceptions contain not much more, than the impressions made upon the senses by the beings and objects of the outer world. The mind is thus led, by its own inherent action, to an apprehension of certain powers, residing in these objects and beings, capable of producing such impressions. But, what these powers are, in themselves, or upon what peculiar combination of material atoms they depend, cannot, by any possible effort of observation or experiment, be discerned by sense-perception: and, so, can never be really known. Whatever notions we may form of these hidden powers, they are wholly the creation of fancy and speculation. Induction must here content itself with the sheerest guess-work.

But, suppose that the attention is entirely confined to the apparent and superficial intimations of

sense-perception; and the attempt be, by aid of these intimations, to classify, Inductively, the objects perceived—even here, although there may be the exercise of the greatest carefulness and patience, the conclusions arrived at must be regarded as exceedingly doubtful. For, the apparent and superficial intimations of sense give no genuine revelation of the qualities and natures they are taken by us to indicate or stand for. Though similar sensuous appearances may, therefore, seem to unite in certain objects we are said to perceive, we have herein no positive proof, that these objects do hence really possess the same inherent qualities, and are identical in their inner structure and constitution. We simply take this for granted; we jump to this conclusion, and assume, in our work of Inductive comparison and classification, that only precisely identical qualities, natures, and powers can make identical or similar impressions upon the organs of sense. And, thus, in that prime and most important business of Induction, namely, the arranging of the existences and forces of the outer world into classes, genera, and species, according to their apparent resemblance (the only possible mode of procedure here), there is liability of confounding the most opposite natures in the same category, and of referring to the same origin creatures whose derivation is from sources the most antagonistic. The most painstaking Induction cannot hinder mistakes and incongruities

of this sort. How repeatedly soever our senses may report to us examples of the combination of certain appearances, this affords us no sure guarantee of any essential and structural connection between them, or between the natures which are supposed to give forth these appearances. However often we may perceive two or more phenomenal natures to stand side by side, as though joined in one; and however much one may seem to depend upon another; and though our senses may never report them to us apart; nor the most torturing experiment be able to break the link of their sensuous marriage, and procure their divorce; yet, for all that, it may be there is no necessary bond of union between them; and, in heart and soul—so to say—they may be strange and antipodal to each other. Our senses can never penetrate beyond the seeming and outward qualities, natures, and causes of things. Induction cannot lead us into the real secrets of the physical world, which lie back of the palpable. It has none of the implements or instruments for detecting and testing Ultimates and Essences. Though it may discover uniformity of action, and regularity of operation, and consistency of organization, in material nature, sufficient for the ends of practical life in this terrestrial state, it is, nevertheless, a vain pretense, that it can go beyond and give us genuine certainty. Its conclusions, relating, as they do, to an alien and unknown sub-

stance, and because of the known limitations of our faculties of sense-perception, must ever be and remain hypothetical and suppositive. They can never rise above the probable; and, hence, are entitled, only conditionally and by license, to be called Scientific.

Thus numerous and unique are the "marks," by which these two Methods are to be distinguished. And, in tracing out the lines of contrast between them, we have seen, that the Method which I have called the Consciential, is as clear-cut and well-defined in its character, as is the Inductive. The Idea of the former is as apprehensible and consistent, as that of the latter. The former can be supported and defended, by quite as cogent arguments, drawn from the laws of thought, and from the nature and qualities of the subject to which it relates, as can the latter. And, if only it shall be as diligently and faithfully applied, by Psychologic plodders and workers, to the facts and powers revealed in Consciousness, as Induction has been, by Physicists, to the phenomena of sense-perception, I know not why the Consciential Method may not serve as greatly to enlarge and multiply the fruits of Mental Philosophy, as has the Inductive Method to enlarge and multiply the products of Material Science.

BOOK IV.

INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS.

FROM the foregoing exposition of our Theory of Psychologic investigation, and of the principles herein involved, several COROLLARIES AND INFERENCES are easily deducible, which seem to me worthy of special mention and consideration.

CHAPTER I.

OUR PSYCHOLOGIC METHOD RIGIDLY SCIENTIFIC.

SEC. 1. *It is Grounded in Observation.*

First, it is worthy of special and emphatic mention, that the theory of Method we have been endeavoring to unfold and substantiate, has its beginning and ground in Observation.

Nowhere does this our theory admit of assumption, or the introduction of hypothesis, or indulgence in flights of fancy, whether at the beginning, or middle, or end, of its processes. From first to last, it neither employs, nor permits of, any thing but the most direct, exact, and rigid observation and perception. It accepts of no fact, which is not an object of immediate sight; of no principle, law,

or cause, which is not apprehended by the way of positive Intuitive insight. Than this Method, therefore, nothing could be more thoroughly and perfectly scientific.

SEC. 2. *It far transcends Induction, in the Reliability of its Conclusions.*

In scientific rigidity and exactitude, it far transcends Induction. For, the latter, because of the unknown nature of that with which it has to do, namely, the Not-Self, Matter, is obliged to make use of hypothesis; guessing its way along from facts, to seeming and probable laws and causes; and then testing its guesses by trial and experiment. While, on the other hand, the Conscientia Method takes not a single step in the dark. It utterly repudiates all guess-work; and will venture only so far as it can see its way along, by the light of Rational Intuition.

We have already taken occasion to explode the mistaken notion of the oneness of Observation and Induction. And again, I say, that, to confound them, is the grossest confusion of ideas; notwithstanding the fact, that many philosophers of high repute and great penetration, have been guilty of it. Induction is a particular mode of observation; or rather, and more precisely, it is a species of illation, which follows a particular kind of observation, namely, the observation of sense-perception. But, we have shown, that there is, also, a kind of

observation which proceeds by the way of Intuition; that, namely, which must be employed in the realm of Consciousness: a realm of fact, of cause, order, and law, where Induction has no place, and is forever inapplicable; since here the facts, causes, laws, and orders of sequence, being all revealed in the light of the self-knowing Reason, are, therefore, observed and observable by direct Sight and Insight. In connection with the facts which here occur in spontaneity, there are dimly disclosed the powers which produce them; the laws governing their genesis; and the essential and constitutive order regulating their occurrence. For, the mind must, in a measure, disclose to itself in Consciousness, simultaneously with its spontaneous acts and states, its own constitution, and powers, and principles. The reproduction and analytic observation, therefore, of these spontaneous acts and states of Consciousness in Self-consciousness, must enable the Reflective Reason clearly to intuite those constitutive principles, powers, and laws—that Self, giving birth, form and regularity to these conscious acts and states. And thus, this Psychologic Method, which I have denominated the Consciential, is most thoroughly and completely one of Observation.

CHAPTER II.

The Consciential Method Approved by Self-Consciousness.

Sec. 1. *This Method the one employed by the Reason in its Spontaneous Action.*

The consideration, relating to the character of this new Psychologic Method, and the evidence by which it is supported, which I wish here especially to insist upon, and present to the attention of the reader, is, that it (this Method) is not a theoretic invention. It is not a plausible hypothesis, having only the merit of meeting and harmonizing the demands and difficulties of the case somewhat better than that Method, for which we have suggested it as a substitute: But, I propose it as an actual matter-of-fact Method, the real Method pursued by the Intellect, when engaged in introspective action and the inquisition of mental laws and causes. In the attempt to substantiate it, my appeal is, primarily, to Consciousness and Self-consciousness. I affirm, that the various steps I have prescribed, in the delineation of the mode by which the mind takes cognizance of its own operations, and gains a knowledge of its own powers and laws, which I have named the Consciential Method, are those

actually and self-consciously taken by the Reflective Reason.

SEC. 2. *Every System of Method to be tested by an appeal to Self-consciousness.*

The course which the Reason pursues in any department of thought or research, in the acquisition of ideas, and in knowing the truth, being a conscious process, can be detected by Reflection. It can be repeated in Self-consciousness, and there examined and studied, until it shall be perfectly understood.

The truth and genuineness of every logical Method are to be determined, finally and decisively, by an appeal to Self-consciousness. In dealing with any class of facts, with the purpose of scientifically knowing them, the Intellect spontaneously pursues a Method of examination, such as comports with the nature and quality of those facts. The knowing faculty of the mind spontaneously knows how to proceed, in questioning any species of facts presented to its attention. Any arbitrary set of rules governing its procedure herein, would be unnatural and impertinent. In every department of knowledge, the correct Method of logical procedure is originally suggested and prescribed in spontaneity. This must be so: and it is so, as a matter of fact. The Reason could not lay down rules for the governance of its own action, in advance of actual trial and experiment: in other

words, prior to all experience. And, it is the Reason alone that is competent to the imposition of rules upon itself, for the regulation of its own activity. In its first essays, therefore, and when engaged in spontaneous effort, it must determine upon its Method simultaneously with the putting forth of such effort. And this act of determination becomes, or rather is, a fact of Consciousness, as clearly marked, and as capable of reproduction in Self-consciousness, as any other spontaneous fact of Consciousness. And, it is by the reproduction hereof in Self-consciousness, and its analytic criticism therein, that we come to know what is the correct Method of rational search in any given department of thought or fact, and which, in the exposition thereof, enables us to state what are the true scientific rules of logical procedure. And this is precisely the course I have pursued, or, at least, have honestly attempted to pursue, in unfolding what I have named the Consciential Method of investigation.

I claim to have traced out this Method, by a careful study in Self-consciousness of the actual and conscious operations of the Intellect, when engaged in the examination of mental facts. The Reason, when engaged upon mental phenomena, and proposing to itself the quest of mental powers, laws, and causes, must be allowed to impose upon itself its own rules of investigation. And, we may

be sure, that it will give unmistakable utterance hereto in Consciousness, so that we may as clearly scan, and fully know, these utterances in self-reflection, as we may any other acts or emanations of any other faculty of the mind. And, going upon this assumption, I have continually asked myself, in the elaboration of the foregoing treatise, What is the actual course pursued by the Reason, in its attempt reflectively to explore and scan the realm of Consciousness? How does the Reason proceed, in its quest after mental causes, powers, and laws? In the answer I have returned to this question, in the preceding pages, I have endeavored to be true to Consciousness, and to set forth the various steps in consecutive order, which the Reason, in Introversion, actually takes. And, I find that the Reason, employed about mental facts and problems, repudiates Induction, wholly and entirely, as being irrelevant, and devoid of all adaptation to the demands and requirements of the situation. The Method, which it does actually adopt, I find to be one of direct Sight and Insight, as being alone adapted to the nature of the case.

SEC. 3. *The Reason shut up to this Method in Introspective Action.*

Not only do I find the Consciential Method to be the one employed as a matter of fact, but, when I come to apprehend the relation of the Reason to mental phenomena, laws, and causes, I

see that in the department of Psychology, this Method is a necessity—that none other can be made use of.

1. For, I discover that the Reason is the substratum of personal being; that all mental faculties and powers find their center and unity, as personal faculties and powers, in it; that it overlies, and underlies, and penetrates all through the various elements and departments of the human mind. I discover this, in that the Reason includes all these within the grasp of its immediate and intuitive knowing in Consciousness; for, the light of Consciousness, which illuminates all the acts, states, operations, and processes of every faculty and element of the mind, is the efflux of the Reason. Since, therefore, the Reason is thus shown to be the very substratum of our personal being, and penetrates all through it; and, since Intellection, knowing, is the very essence of the Reason, it is plain enough, that the Method of immediate Sight and Insight is the only one that can have any possible application in the realm of mind.

2. Nothing can be plainer, than that all the facts, the phenomena, of Consciousness, are under the immediate inspection of the Reflective Reason. Not even the most skeptical of Philosophers have denied, that we proceed by the way of Intuition to this extent. It is universally conceded, that, in apprehending and observing the acts, movements,

impressions, and states of mind which stand forth in Consciousness, we employ the Method of direct Sight, the Method, that is, which I have denominated the Consciential. While this concession covers a great deal in itself, and grants us, at the outset, the right of possessing and cultivating with our Method a large share of the territory belonging to Psychology, it also inclines us to believe—on the start—that we can possess and cultivate the entire field of Psychologic inquiry, by the use of the same Method.

And, this rational anticipation we find, upon actual trial, to be real and true. By an application of the triple process of observation we have described as Discrimination, Analysis, and Abstraction, which every body knows and confesses to be the work of Intuitive perception of the Reflective Intellect, there are fully supplied the conditions upon which the Reason discovers, by direct vision, every thing else, that is properly included within the domain of Psychology. Thus, though with partial truth, it may be said that, in a given conscious fact, the mental power producing it is not itself contained, yet it is true, that in that fact, analytically observed, a sufficient occasion is furnished to the Reflective Reason for intuiting, or directly beholding, the producing power below the fact in Sub-consciousness. The same is true, also, of the genetic and logical order of conscious phenomena; and of the

laws regulating the suggestion and sequence of facts in the Consciousness. In all instances, the discovery of these is an immediate Intuition of the Reason, consequent upon a reflective analytic observation of the reproduced facts of Consciousness.

3. Take, as an illustration of what I here assert, our apprehension of the Ego. Now, it may be affirmed of the Ego, or Self, with the same truth that we affirm of a mental power, psychical law, or genetic orderly occurrence of conscious states and ideas, that it is not a fact of Consciousness, and is not contained in any or all such facts. Yet, is the Self, the Ego, revealed, more or less fully, in connection with *every* conscious fact. And the idea or sense of the Ego is as perfectly realized by Intuition, in every instance of analytic reflection upon a conscious fact, as though the Ego were palpably envisaged in such fact, and constituted a part of it. If the idea of Self is not, precisely, *contained in* any fact of Consciousness, it, at least, lies immediately below every such fact, and at once discloses itself to the clear insight of Reason, in Sub-consciousness, in all reflective acts. In truth, when conscious facts are reproduced in Self-consciousness, it is found that a sense of Self accompanied even the spontaneous production of every one of them: though, perhaps, not very powerfully and evidently; since the attention was then objectively

directed, not subjectively. But, the reproduction in thought of any one of these facts, for the purpose of analytic reflection, evolves the Egoistic idea from Sub-consciousness, with such fullness and entirety, that it becomes as clearly an object of Intuitive beholding, as any conscious fact can be.

4. In the same way, it is, that we come to know the genetic and necessary order of mental facts; the powers that give rise to them, and the laws governing their appearance and passage in the Consciousness. Though the order, powers, and laws, may be affirmed not to be a part of the facts, or concatenations of facts, occurring in the inner world of Consciousness, yet does an intimation of them always accompany the spontaneous occurrence of the facts; and, by the introspective action of Reason, they are made fully to disclose themselves in Sub-consciousness, to the perspicuous and absolute beholding of Intuitional Insight.

Thus, by an actual survey of the intellectual processes, that are involved in the work of self-conscious reflection, do we find an entire absence of the Inductive Method of procedure; and, that every step is taken, every act of knowing performed, by means of Intuitive Sight and Insight.

CHAPTER III.

THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD ENABLES US TO DEFINE THE PRECISE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY.

THE principles of this new Method which in this treatise I have endeavored to unfold, do, also, enable us to apprehend the precise sphere of Psychology. They clearly define its boundaries, and distinctly mark out the field of its legitimate researches. And this is a great advantage.

SEC. 1. *Importance of this Definiteness of Outline, in any and every Department of Science.*

Haziness of outline, and indefiniteness of aim, characterizing any branch of scientific inquiry, will hinder its growth, fill it with vagaries, and impart an air of doubtfulness and incertitude to all its conclusions. The landmarks of a science must be well defined, in order that the mind may be able to gather up its energies, and concentrate them upon the special questions which, in that science, demand solution.

And, what distinctness of outline and definiteness of aim, do those principles of Method we have set forth impart to Psychologic Science! By them, we learn, that Psychology has only to do with

what the Reflective Reason intuitively perceives, as it looks in upon the facts of Consciousness. Whatever is beyond the possible Intuition of the Reason, as it is engaged in scanning and questioning the phenomena of the inner world, is outside of the jurisdiction of this Science, and ought not to be regarded as a matter of Psychologic quest, or thought.

The sole faculty of the Intellect which Psychology employs, is, Reason—in the attitude of introspection. The only data, with which it is concerned, are conscious facts and their environments, Self-consciously reproduced. The only intellectual process which it brings into requisition, is, Intuitive Sight and Insight. Thus, no Science could possibly be more clearly defined, or bounded by plainer lines of demarkation, than the Science of Psychology. And, than this Science, no department of Philosophy ought to be more completely purged of all extraneous matter—of irrelevant speculations and impertinent questions.

SEC. 2. *Hitherto, no branch of Science more fully loaded down with Irrelevant Matter, than Psychology.*

But, scarce any branch of Science or Philosophy has been so greatly cursed by the introduction of alien and irrelevant matter, as Psychology. Certain of its professed cultivators have persisted, much to its detriment every way, in ignoring the facts of Consciousness, and the powers, processes,

and laws discovered by the Reason while looking upon these facts in reflectivity, and in raising and discussing questions relating to the objective mode of producing these facts, and what has caused the mental powers, processes, and laws to be what they are. Inquiries of this nature constitute a species of Metaphysics, which, however curious and fascinating, are as profitless and unsatisfactory as can well be imagined. Such inquiries have nothing to do with Psychology; nor Psychology with them. In this Science, the facts of Consciousness are ultimate. By what possible objective forces these facts may be produced—forces lying outside of the Consciousness, and so, beyond the possible ken of the Reflective Reason, this Science cares not to inquire; has no business to inquire. What those movements or activities of being may be, which do not come under the inspection of reflective Intuition, this Science must wholly refuse to consider, and cannot take the least interest in. What makes mind to be what it is, to possess the qualities it does, and to act in such and such ways, are questions which the genuine Psychologist never seriously attempts to answer. He is satisfied with gaining an insight into the mind as it actually is,—with cognizing its powers, modes, and laws of acting, as they are really revealed in Sub-consciousness.

Extraneous questions, of the nature above al-

luded to, it is, more than all things else, that, having been dragged into Psychologic discussions, and mistakenly regarded as proper subjects of Psychologic research, have served to vitiate and corrupt this highest and noblest department of Philosophy, and bring it into unmerited contempt. The frivolous and inane speculations upon such topics as these, having been covered with the name of Psychology, have induced multitudes to regard and treat this entire branch of Philosophy, as a study unworthy of the cultivation of earnest truth-seekers, the lovers of solid and practical learning. But, our New Organ of investigation, being made use of, and adhered to, will correct this folly, and advance Psychology to its deserved position of rank and power, in the realm of Science.

CHAPTER IV.

ADOPTION OF THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD MUST RESULT IN THE ERADICATION OF SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM.

ANOTHER advantage, which must result from this new Method of investigating mental phenomena, is, the ultimate elimination of Sensationalism and Materialism from the field of Psychologic thought.

SEC. 1. *A consummation devoutly to be wished.*

Than such elimination, it seems to me, nothing could confer a greater benefit upon Mental Philosophy. For, than these dirt-eating forms of speculation, nothing has served to degrade and corrupt this species of Science, to so great an extent. Indeed, the pernicious influence of these systems has extended beyond the field of philosophic inquiry and speculation, and been felt in the arena of practical life, in the depravation of social manners and morals. And whatever, therefore, might lead to the general disbelief and rejection of Sensualistic and Materialistic theories by the learned world, would prove a great moral blessing to mankind.—Such disbelief and rejection must follow the adoption and use of this New Organ of psychologic research we have propounded.

SEC. 2. *The Principles of Induction applied in the Investigation of Mental Facts, have resulted, and must ever result, in Sensualism and Materialism.*

In the beginning of this treatise, it was shown how the various systems of Sensationalism and Materialism had, as a matter of fact, sprung from the teachings of the Inductive Philosophy, as applied to the study of mental laws and causes.

Such a result was, indeed, natural and inevitable. The employment of Induction in the inquisition of mental laws and causes, implies, in fact, the assumption, that mind and matter are one in essence; and that the respective phenomena of each are the product of similar forces. It is plain, that Sensualism and Materialism are postulated, in the adoption of the Inductive Method as a process of search suited to the discovery of psychical laws and causes. Unless physical and psychical facts are the same in nature and source, it seems evident enough, that they cannot be scientifically known by the same process of examination. To assume that they are to be known by the same process of examination, is to assert, by implication, that they are identical in kind, and as to the substance from whence they proceed. The attempt to employ Induction in the investigation of mental facts, has always tended to draw the attention away from Consciousness and its affirmations, and given rise to the endeavor to account for all psychical manifestations by means of

objective forces and laws. For, Induction is only adapted to the examination of objective facts—such facts as cannot be intuited in Consciousness and Self-consciousness. And, through the bias of the Inductive Method, queries have been raised, and solutions of problems started, concerning mental facts, which wholly disregard the limits of Mental Science, and ignore the aim of Psychology; which aim is, the elucidation of such facts only as are given in Consciousness.

1. Sensationalism rests upon the assumption, that all the phenomena of mind originate from impressions made from without, upon the organs of Sense-perception. And the aim of this theory is, to show how the various species of mental phenomena are made up by, or produced from, such impressions.

Now, it is plain that both this assumption, and this aim, necessitate an abandonment of Consciousness, and what is given us therein. For, Consciousness asserts the existence of many facts, within its domain, which have not a sensuous origin. It declares, indeed, that the most of its contents have an entirely different origin. And it renders not the least assistance in discovering to us the combinations and transformations which, the Sensualist tells us, the primary intimations of sense are subjected to, in being worked up from their raw state into the various degrees of complexity and sub-

limation, which they, at length, attain in the laboratory of the brain. If the Consciousness has any thing to affirm, with regard to these alleged combinations and transformations of Sensational Philosophy, it is, simply to declare their utter non-existence and falsity.

2. From the Sensual theory, to Materialism, is but a step. In truth, the latter is wrapped up in the former, and is its inevitable outgrowth. The assumed postulate of Materialism is, that Matter is every thing; and that, what are called mental facts are but physical movements going on in the brain. And the aim of this so-called Philosophy is, to determine what these physical movements, creating mental phenomena, are, and what are the laws by which these movements are regulated. Thus, this system, equally with the Sensational theory, ignores Consciousness, and requires of all who accept its teachings to abandon the field of conscious observation.

Both these species of speculation, indeed, discard all observation, whether of Sense, or of Consciousness; and, furnished only with a few loose and far-fetched analogies as an outfit, depend upon liveliness of fancy and fertility of imagination, for the manufactory of the filling, and doing up the business of systemization. They each undertake to tell us how mental forms and processes are created by a peculiar commingling and action of material

molecules, which none of our faculties of perception, whether external or internal, can give us any information about; but whose very existence is wholly a matter of hypothesis.

SEC. 3. *These Speculations banished from the Field of Mental Philosophy by our Theory of Method.*

It is easily seen, that both these forms of Speculation are effectually shut out and banished from the domain of Mental Philosophy, by the principles of our New Method of psychologic investigation. For, first, as I have already said and shown, this Method confines itself, strictly, to conscious facts, and utterly forbids any departure from the inner world of Consciousness.

In the second place, as we have also already observed, it evermore insists upon Observation as the prime means for attaining its discoveries, and never permits the least resort to guess-work—any stepping out into the region of the unknown; any going forward which is not justified by direct vision.

And then, again, see what this Method gives us, in its most primitive application, or rather, in its application to that most primitive fact of Consciousness, namely, the affirmation of Self. The use of this Method gives us to discover, in the analysis of every concrete act of Sense-perception, the idea of Self, as distinctly defined as any idea can be; and,

in connection herewith, and no more distinctly, the idea of the Not-Self.

Moreover, this Method discloses to us the fact, that the idea of Self, in the primary concrete act of Sense-perception, as unfolded in the Consciousness, logically and chronologically precedes that of the Not-Self. For, how could an existence be affirmed as Not-Self, until Self was first apprehended?

Furthermore, of these two ideas, it is seen, in the Consciential analyzation and abstraction of the primitive acts of Sense-perception, that Self has a more distinct and positive content than the Not-Self. And this is, also, implied in the name Not-Self, which, of itself, is suggestive of the negative quality of the perception, by which the substance bearing the name is apprehended.

But, not to insist upon this very significant fact, that which I wish especially to enforce upon the reader's attention, at this point, is the clearness with which it is made known in Intuitive Reason, confirmed and ratified by self-conscious criticism, that Self and Not-Self are essentially and eternally distinct in essence. The idea of Self, reflectively examined and considered, furnishes the Reason the occasion for its cognition of Personality, Rationality, Spirit, Mind; facts which it as truly perceives in contemplating Self, as it perceives Cause when contemplating Beginning. So, when pondering the

idea of Not-Self, the reason is infallibly led to the perception of Outness, Space, Matter.

As, therefore, Self and Not-Self are seen in Self-consciousness to be eternally antithetical and separate, so Mind and Matter, which the Reason perceives through and by them respectively, are as truly seen to be eternally antithetical and separate. Both the content and the genesis of the ideas, Mind and Matter, render it forever impossible to identify them, or the substances which, through them, are cognized. The attempt to confound or identify them, is the perpetration of intellectual suicide. Reason evermore compels us to view these two forms of being, as distinct in essence.—And this we discover, even when reading those speculative theories, which have been constructed for the purpose of proving their essential oneness. The ridiculous absurdities and contradictions which these theories involve, demonstrate the utter irreconcilability of the ideas they are seeking to harmonize. Above all, is it the commission of intellectual harikari to attempt to subsume the idea of Mind under that of Matter, and to assert the former to be the same with the latter. For, the former is cognized through, or by means of, that most primitive and radical of rational Intuitions, namely, the intuition of Self. And so, if Mind is not known to have a distinct existence, it is certain the existence of Matter cannot be affirmed; since,

for us, all being and knowing depend upon, and are antedated by, the apprehension of Self.

Thus, in the light of this New Method of Psychologic investigation, is plainly disclosed the profound absurdity hidden in the postulate with which Sensationalism and Materialism set out, and the absolute impossibility of all their speculations and reasonings. In the light hereof, these base and groveling forms of Philosophic thought are discovered to be self-evidently false — as to their initial propositions; and more directly at war with all the original dicta of the reason, than any other system of Philosophic belief; having far less of rational support, indeed, than the precisely opposite and antagonistic system of Pure Idealism.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD WILL SERVE TO CORRECT THE EMPLOYMENT OF PHYSICAL COMPARISONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS IN MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

ANOTHER fruitful source of error and corruption to Psychologic learning, which this New Method of research I have ventured to propound will serve to dry up and remove, is, the use of physical comparisons and illustrations, by those who would elucidate the facts, processes, laws, and causes of the Mind.

SEC. 1. *The Employment of the Principles of Induction in Psychology has fostered this pernicious Practice.*

The pernicious custom of introducing such comparisons and illustrations into Psychologic discussions has chiefly arisen from, and been fostered by, the prevalent notion, that Induction has as legitimate an application in the realm of Mind, as in that of Matter.

Now, the truth is, that Induction is purely a physical Method. It is adapted only to an examination of facts and existences belonging to the outer world,—those which we gain a knowledge of solely by means of Sense-perception. A dim con-

sciousness of this truth seems to have been felt by all Inductionists, that have labored in the field of Psychologic inquiry. The principles, and the habits of thought, induced by that Method, have had a tendency to create the belief in their minds, that material substance is the substratum of all being; that mental phenomena have, somehow, a physical origin; and that conscious processes are, at bottom, derived from, and governed by, the same forces and laws, as those which produce and regulate the operations of physical nature. It is true, many philosophers who heartily indorse Induction as the proper Method of search into the arcana of the Mind, do not, Self-consciously, entertain any such materialistic belief; but, on the other hand, do avowedly repudiate and condemn it. But, for all this, the bias of their principles and theory of Method usually proves too much for them, and unconsciously compels them to hold and treat the mind as a material organism.

The principles of Method which we may embrace, are imperious and controlling; and, despite all our protestations and professions, will mold our most fundamental opinions, our most radical beliefs. We have seen how it was with McCosh; how, as a sincere and zealous Inductionist, he was betrayed in opposition to his principles as a pronounced Ideal-Realist, into the expression of decidedly Sensualistic opinions, and an inclination to

view the human mind as a sort of mechanical contrivance. And we can readly detect indices of the same tendency of thought, in the works of almost every Inductional Psychologist. What one of this class is there, whose writings are not marked and marred by physical allusions and material illustrations, used to make plain certain mental processes, or to render intelligible the language by which such processes are sought to be explained? This constant reference to material facts, in exposition of those of a psychical nature, on the part of those who think Induction is the proper Method to be employed in investigating the facts of Consciousness, is natural, and what we might anticipate. For, this Method was originated for the purpose of elucidating facts belonging to the physical world. With these facts, it is most familiar. In the physical realm, it is entirely at home. And, when it is introduced into the inner world of Consciousness for the exposition of its phenomena, it will, inevitably, suggest and demand the employment of, by way of analogic illustration, those physical processes, forces, and laws, with which it is already and especially familiar. And, hereby, is genuine Psychologic Science greatly hindered.

SEC. 2. *There is no real Analogy between Physical and Psychical Phenomena.*

No real Analogy can be traced between material movements and changes, and conscious ongoings

and processes. The objects of Sense-perception are of a totally different order, from those which come under the gaze of internal perception. The former, therefore, can bear no just comparison with the latter: nor can the latter receive any the least elucidation from such comparison. On the contrary, when the attempt is made to explain mental phenomena by physical allusions, confusion of thought always ensues: the mind is cheated into the belief of a real analogy, where none whatever exists; and the attention is called away from the facts to be investigated lying in Consciousness, to those lying in outward sight and sense, whose intrusion into any reflective or Psychologic procedure always impedes the process, and constitutes a disturbing element.

SEC. 3. *How our Method would correct and remove the Instituting of such Analogies.*

This pernicious habit of using material comparisons for the explanation of mental phenomena, contracted by Philosophers under the influence and bias of the Inductive theory, receives reproof, and must ultimately receive correction, from the teachings of that Method which it is the aim of this book to unfold. For, this Method both begins with the assumption, and ends with the conclusion, that Mind is an entity distinct from Matter. It shows that this distinction is essential and eternal, inasmuch as it exists, and is revealed in,

that primal and most radical cognition of the Mind, tne cognition of Self; since this cognition is inseparably accompanied with the affirmation of the Not-Self, that is, Matter, as an exterior and antipodal element of being. And herein it is seen that a perception or knowledge of the operations and powers of the one nature, cannot render the least assistance in the apprehension of the facts and causes pertaining to the other. This Method is the outgrowth and creation of the felt rational necessity, that Mind shall be studied by a process of search that is peculiar, and specially adapted to the nature of Mind. And, when it is conceded that the study of Mind demands the use of a peculiar mode of search, it must appear evident, also, that the introduction herein of physical analogies and comparisons, not only cannot afford any assistance, whether for proof or elucidation, but is positively pernicious and obstructive.

But, above all, does the Consciential Method rebuke the vitiating injection of physical ideas and allusions into those intellectual efforts which are concerned with the scientific scrutiny of the inner conscious world, in that prime prescription which it lays down as an absolute condition to all genuine Psychologic knowledge, namely, the direct ingazing upon mental phenomena in Self-consciousness. Every body must see, and acknowledge, that this prescription is true. And, in view hereof, it must

be plain to everybody, that material allusions and physical metaphors and comparisons, entering into any introspective process or solution, are an obstruction and an impertinence. When such allusions, metaphors, and comparisons intrude, they at once obscure the gaze of the Reflective Reason, break the spell of Self-conscious thinking, and call away the attention from the forms of thought, feeling, and action that had been Self-consciously reproduced, to a consideration of certain suggested notions of the Understanding, that relate to the perceptions of sense and things of the outer world.

Thus, does this Method I am seeking to recommend, promise to banish from the field of Psychologic inquiry the use of sensuous images, material allusions, and physical illustrations. And, if it shall fulfill this promise, it will confer a most signal blessing upon Mental Science. For, that science has received most serious detriment, every way, from the frequent and customary introduction of such illustrations, allusions, and images into the writings of its cultivators.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD IMPARTS TO PSYCHOLOGY THE CHARACTER OF A DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE.

I HAVE already, to a sufficient extent, dwelt upon the certainty of the knowledge to which we are conducted by the Consciential Method,—having shown, that this knowledge is complete and absolute, inasmuch as it is attained by direct Intuition of the Reason. And, what I now wish to bring to the reader's consideration is, the truly demonstrative and absolutely reliable character which may be imparted to the Science of Psychology, its principles, doctrines, and teachings, by a severe and constant and careful application of this Method, in each of the departments of this Science, and to all the facts and questions which it includes. By such an application hereof, Psychology is, at once, elevated to a place among the Demonstrative Sciences; and in the reliability of its decisions, and accuracy of its conclusions, is made to take rank with Mathematics.

SEC. 1. *Psychology hitherto regarded as being merely Speculative and Fanciful.*

The impartation of such reliability and certainty to Psychologic Science is the great intellectual de-

sideratum of mankind, in the present state of human learning and philosophy. The merely hypothetical and suppositive character of the great body of the speculations, that have borne the name of Mental Science, or Psychology, has always been the opprobrium of this branch of learning. Hitherto, nothing has been esteemed more mystical and dreamy and unsubstantial, than Psychologic lucubrations. The products of Psychologic thinking have usually been stigmatized, by those of a practical and realistic turn of mind, as almost wholly fanciful, the creation of the speculative imagination. And, quite generally, it has been held, that pretty much the only advantage that could reasonably be expected to be derived from this species of human learning is, a sort of pleasurable recreation to minds especially in love with mist and fog.

SEC. 2. *Effect of this Supposed Unreliability of Psychologic Thinking.*

And, what has been the effect of this general contempt with which the results of Psychologic thinking have been regarded,—of this supposed unreliable nature of that extended mass of literature, which has borne the name of Mental Philosophy? I answer, the effect has been, to bring discredit upon all the highest branches of scientific pursuit; to create a general distrust as to the reliability of all kinds of human learning;

and to awaken, and give countenance to, that worst, most desperate, and incurable of all species of Skepticism, namely, lack of faith in the truthfulness and credibility of our intellectual powers. What more natural, than for us to question our ability to know any thing, when once we are taught to think, that we cannot know, with any certainty, the acts, processes, and laws of our own minds?

The very leading part which this species of Skepticism has played in the history of the Science of Mind, cannot fail to awaken a degree of astonishment in every thoughtful student of Philosophy. Those mental theories which involve a denial of the validity of the intellectual faculties, have, indeed, occupied the largest place in this branch of Science, and have enjoyed the most extended popularity. All this has come, from the lack of a solid and accurate Method for conducting an examination of the contents of Consciousness. Because of this lack, those who have professedly devoted themselves to the criticism of Consciousness, and the explanation of mental facts, have only to a limited extent, made use of the Reflective Reason in intuitive observation; but have, instead, sought a solution of the problems here presented by a resort to ingenious and fanciful speculations, or by the use, especially in these latter times, of those principles of Induction which confessedly can never

issue in the realization of knowledge divested of all doubt.

As the supply of this lack, I confidently commend that Method of Rational investigation which I have unfolded in the preceding pages. To me, this Method appears as a bright and radiant torch, which every mental explorer can carry with him, in his researches into the recesses of the world within; and by its light, he may clearly behold every object and fact there existing, and discover, with absolute certainty, every power and law there at play.

SEC. 3. *An absolutely truthful Method will not of itself purge Psychology of all Error.*

Yet, I am not so sanguine as to suppose, that the general acknowledgment of the Consciential Method as applicable to the investigation of mental facts, much less, the mere enunciation of this Method, will either at once clear the field of Psychology of all frivolous and false theories, or raise this branch of Philosophic inquiry to instant, or even speedy, perfection. The announcement of a mode of Scientific inquisition, which is absolutely correct and infallible, is one thing; inducing the professed votaries of Science to make an honest and faithful use thereof, is quite another.

Since Bacon's rules for the inquest of physical nature have been accepted by the scientific world as truthful and adequate, what gross neglect and disre-

gard of these rules have been exhibited by the mass of physicists, even those who have been esteemed the leading Scientists of their day. Induction has not banished foolish hypotheses, and ridiculous dreams and fancies, from the domain of Natural Science. And, we might anticipate, that the general acceptance of the Consciential Method, as furnishing rules of mental search capable of leading to absolute knowledge, would not soon eliminate all falsehood from the Philosophy of Mind, nor hinder Psychologic pretenders from drawing upon their imaginations, when claiming to give exposition to the curious and wonderful operations of Consciousness.

Besides, there are limits to the actual achievements of human intelligence and wisdom, as to all subjects of inquiry, which even the honest employment of an infallible Method of search cannot be expected to supersede. Though the rules, giving direction as to the working of the intellectual faculties, with reference to any given subject, might be perfect, they would not, therefore, be empowered to overcome the inherent weakness of these faculties themselves, nor could they furnish guarantee, that they themselves would not be applied in a bungling and mistaken manner. And, if the rules I have laid down for the guidance of the Intellect in the exploration of the realm of Consciousness, are all that I claim they are, they do but guarantee

the *possibility* of the attainment of purity and perfection in Psychologic Science.

Equipped, though we may be, with a Method which, in itself, is capable of insuring absolute certainty, yet, when we actually undertake a complete and exhaustive exploration of the inner, conscious world, there are many difficulties in the way, and much hard and fatiguing labor to be performed. To the vision of most persons, the Consciousness is a realm of darkness and shadows. The objects and forms existing therein present but little distinctness of outline: to a great degree, all here is chaos and confusion. The power of Self-conscious reflection is possessed by but few, to any great extent. The many are but slightly endowed with the gift of introspection. To most, the effort of thought involved herein is irksome and disagreeable; and they are incapable of such a reproduction of conscious facts as is required, in order to a prolonged and accurate examination of them. And, hence, there is much in the way of the rapid growth and speedy completion of the Science of Psycholgy, in view of the inherent difficulties involved.

SEC. 4. *A Truthful and Adequate Method will authorize the Student of Psychology to anticipate Final Success.*

In mentioning these difficulties, however, I neither take back, nor qualify, any thing I have

previously asserted, concerning the excellence of our New Method of mental inquisition, and the demonstrative character it imparts to Psychologic Science. I only declare a fact, borne out by common observation, when I say, that not very many are largely endowed with the gift of Reflective Sight and Insight; and, hence, that not many are capable of making large acquisitions of knowledge relating to subjective facts, causes, and laws. But, what of that? Are we hindered on this account, from regarding Psychology as a demonstrative Science? Have many the gift of mathematical conception and combination to any great extent? Are there many, who have the ability to test the accuracy of the processes of reasoning, by which certain propositions in Geometry or Trigonometry are proved with absolute certainty? The perfect reliability of the modes of mathematical reasoning, can only be appreciated by those who have the ability of discerning the relations existing between mathematical ideas. It does not, however, at all detract from the force of this kind of reasoning, because there are multitudes that are not able to perceive the relations existing between such ideas.

And, so, in the department of Mental Philosophy: that the knowledge properly included herein is the product of Intuitive Sight and Insight, and is, therefore, on a par with mathematical

knowledge for certainty, is a fact to be passed upon and decided, only by those who are gifted with the power of Introspective vision: and, it is none the less a fact, because there are multitudes who have not sufficient strength of reflective Self-consciousness to apprehend it.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD PERFECTLY VINDICATES THE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE RATIONAL FACULTIES.

THE Psychologic Method, which I have named the Consciential, points out the way for effecting a thorough survey, and achieving a perfect vindication, of the Rational Faculties.

SEC. 1. *Such Vindication the Primary Demand of Science.*

Such a criticism and vindication is the first and most fundamental requirement of genuine Science. As soon as the Intellect is moved with the desire to know scientifically, it appreciates the necessity of scanning its own knowing faculties, finding out their proper functions, the limits of their capabilities, and the nature and reality of their contents—their cognitions, affirmations, and reasonings.

The thoughts, decisions, and actings of the intellectual powers, as given in Spontaneity, are not knowledge, in the true scientific sense. They must be passed under subjective review, and be reflectively examined; the circumstances of their genesis, their modes of combination, and the nature of the intellectual faculties from whence they emanate, must

first be Self-consciously known, and receive rational indorsement, in order that we may attain to the certainty of Scientific apprehension, and be satisfied that we do, indeed, possess real knowledge. Before a criticism of the Reason shall have been by us effected, we do not truly know; we only think, or imagine, we know. If we are not made certain of the entire adequacy and truthfulness of the faculties by which we perceive facts and existences, and cognize their relations, we have no well-grounded assurance that we know any thing. Intelligence that is not Self-conscious, has no capacity for Science. And, it is only in Self-conscious reflectivity upon the powers of our Intellect, that we become elevated to that sublime height of rationality, which gives us guarantee of the genuineness of our spontaneous perceptions and cognitions, and empowers us exultantly to affirm, "We know that we know."

SEC. 2. *A Method of Criticism of the Reason the Supreme Question of Philosophy.*

Since, then, the critical examination of the Rational faculties is a work of such prime importance in the construction of Science and Scientific forms of knowledge, it is plain that it becomes the supreme question of Philosophy, to determine the Method by which such critical examination shall be conducted. The mode of conducting this criticism must no more be left to the spontaneous actings

and motions of the Reason, than the mode of searching into any other department of existence, or of phenomenal manifestation. The Reason, in criticising itself and its own powers, must be governed by such rules of procedure, as shall meet the exigencies of this high enterprise. It must pursue such a course of search, as shall accord with the demands of its own nature. If it shall be left here to its own spontaneous actings, the results of its searchings and criticisms will not be characterized by reflective certainty; and so the Reason will fail of gaining perfect assurance as to the reliability of its own perceptions and affirmations. For, how can the Reason be assured that it has accurately scrutinized its own powers, and that the various outcomes of these powers are authentic and credible, unless it shall be provided with a correct and truthful Method of Criticism? For one to undertake a criticism of the Reason, without first sitting down to consider in what way so important an undertaking shall be prosecuted, is really far more unscientific, than is the effort to study and learn the modes and laws of working of Nature's forces, without the guidance of a Method.

SEC. 3. *No such Method of Rational Criticism hitherto Expounded.*

Now, the systematic construction of a Method, such as this I have described, has not, that I am aware, been heretofore attempted. It has, thus

far, remained a desideratum in Philosophic literature. It is true, that, in almost every extended Psychological treatise, from the time of Locke to the present, more or less attention has been given to the elucidation of the acts and processes of the Intellectual powers, and the nature of the knowledge thereby acquired. We have had plenty of Essays upon the Human Understanding, and Critiques of the Reason; but no extended elaboration of a Scientific Method for conducting the process of self-conscious examination of the Reason and Understanding. What philosopher, in the whole history of Mental Science, has proposed to himself the task of reflectively searching out, and minutely unfolding, the various steps the Reason must take in accurately scanning and fully authenticating the Rational powers?

SEC. 4. *Kant's Critique not the Exposition of such a Method.*

Probably some will think to meet and silence the above challenge, by referring me, with a triumphant wave of the hand, to Kant and his masterly Critique. And, in this instance of marvelous Psychologic and Metaphysical thinking, we do, perhaps, find as near an approach to the practical employment of a correct Method of Rational Criticism, as is to be found in the whole compass of Philosophic literature. But, his Critique contains no scientific elucidation of such a Method. In it, he under-

takes to criticise the Reason; but does not propose to himself the task of pointing out the course the Reason must take, in order properly to consummate such a criticism. He assumes that the Reason may correctly scan its own operations, and those of the other faculties of the Intellect. He does not begin by questioning, as to whether this is the fact or not, and by showing how it is to be done. His Critique, therefore, not being preluded by a Method, intentionally and rationally adopted, lacks support and confirmation, and presents no certain tests, by which to ascertain and establish the validity of the perceptions and cognitions of the Reason. In other, and briefer, terms, Kant's Critique is scientifically invalid, because it was not directed by the rules of a Psychologic Method, whose correctness had previously been considered and settled.

This same fault is to be found with the various works on Rational Psychology, since his day. Not a single philosopher, I repeat, who has busied himself with the exploration of the Intellectual realm, has deemed it necessary to preface his labors herein, by sitting down carefully to consider how such an exploration should be conducted. It seems to have been imagined, on all sides, that, in the field of Psychology, especially Rational Psychology, the Reflective Reason could be trusted to prosecute its researches, without the guidance of any rules of

Method,—that its own instinctive tendencies could here be followed, with entire safety.

And, it is true, that even by this unregulated and desultory sort of reflection, much truth has been discovered, and many works, greatly extending the boundaries of Mental Philosophy, have been wrought out—by minds highly gifted with self-conscious power and introspective Insight. But, in the general, it must be confessed, that there has resulted herefrom much vagueness and crudity, and much waste of time and thought upon frivolous and irrelevant questions, with not a little extravagance and folly. And, as a consequence, Psychology has been made to assume a character of dreaminess and uncertainty; and devotion to it has come to be considered the fitting employment of minds having a penchant for vain and fruitless reveries.

SEC. 5. *No Method at all, better than the adoption of the Baconian.*

But, a positively vicious Method is even worse, than no Method at all. And, I think the history of Modern Philosophy will show, that Rational Psychology has received greater detriment and vitiation from the stupid and unquestioning acceptance, by many of our Mental Scientists, of the Rules of the Baconian theory of Induction, as a fitting guide to the Reason when engaged in a critical examination of its own powers and proc-

esses, than from the ignoring, by so many others, of the necessity that the Reason should be supplied with Rules for conducting the survey of its own activities. The adoption of the principles of the Baconian Logic, by Psychologists, has given birth to all those gross and groveling views of human nature and the soul of man, that have been the opprobrium of Modern Philosophy; and, worse than all, to Skepticism, the most inveterate and malign. Induction, used as a Psychologic Method, renders a Critique of the Reason an absolute impossibility. For, it compels a denial of the Reason, and of all the Prime Truths and Intuitive Affirmations which the Reason gives us to know.

Induction, applied in the department of Mental Science, permits only of the recognition of mere facts, as they appear and follow each other in Consciousness. It requires the exclusion of all things else from the sphere of conscious reflection, as having no reality, and no title, therefore, to consideration. The bare facts of Consciousness are the only data which it can here acknowledge; those facts only which are envisaged to the mental eye, and have their being in the Representative faculty of the mind. The principles, which bind these facts together,—which underlie and give validity to them, the pure ideas which these facts involve or suggest, and the visions of eternal and immutable truth they are the occasion of the soul's enjoying,—*these*

as they are not found in the facts, and receive not a representative embodiment to the eye of reflection, the Inductive Psychologists are, in consistency, prohibited from investigating, or even of acknowledging their existence. For, does not the father of the Inductive Philosophy declare, that his system deals exclusively with facts, and never permits the least departure from them? The Principles of things, the Pure Ideas, the Universal and Necessary Truths, which the Reason, using the facts as occasions, intuitively perceives, Induction does, and must, condemn as impertinent suggestions, unwarrantable anticipations, and extravagant hypotheses, which must be dismissed from the calculation in which the Understanding is engaged, as it turns over, combines, compares, and inducts the facts submitted to its inspection.

And hence it is, that of all the products or specimens of Psychologic Inductive reasoning, Hume's "Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding" is the perfection of consistency, as well as of logical acuteness. It is wholly occupied with a bare enumeration of the facts of Consciousness; and it excludes and discards every thing else as being outside of the province of Psychologic inquiry. Mental principles, laws, and powers it denies to be proper subjects of investigation; and it utterly repudiates that whole class of truths, cognitions, and judgments, which we call, "prime," "axiomatic,"

"fundamental," both as to their reality, and their subjective apperception.

And I say, that necessity requires a like exclusion, from every system of Mental Science constructed upon the principles of the Inductive Method, of this whole class of truths, cognitions, and judgments, and denial of the possibility of knowing them, or any of the powers, laws, and causes of the mind.

Even if a Psychologist, who adopts Induction as the true Method of Mental search, shall start out with the affirmation of Prime Truths intuitively apprehended, and, consequently, with the assumption of the Pure Reason as a faculty of the human Intellect, he must, at length, wind up his system with the positive repudiation of both. We have seen how it was with McCosh. No Philosopher could more emphatically declare his belief, that the human intellect is endowed with the power of intuitively apprehending Universal and Immutable Truths; that is, with the power of Reason, in contradistinction from the Understanding. But, the demands of his vicious Method forced him, as an Inductionist, to a virtual abandonment of this advanced and truthful position, and plunged him into the darkest and most hopeless abyss of Skepticism. For, no form of Skepticism is so incurable and desperate, as that which will not allow us the possession of certain knowledge, or of faculties of In-

tellect that empower us to know with certainty. And this is the kind of Skepticism into which Induction, when employed as a Psychologic Method, inevitably conducts us. For, suppose we do begin our reflective researches into the arcana of the intellect, by conceding the existence in the consciousness of certain Intuitive convictions and judgments relating to individual objects; if, when we come scientifically to scrutinize and authenticate these convictions and judgments, it is enjoined upon us to go through certain Inductive processes of reasoning, which, at the best, can insure no more than probable certainty, then, after all, we must confess that we gain, from these so-called Intuitive convictions and judgments, only knowledge of a contingent and probable nature. For, no species of knowledge, by whatever name it may be called, can be more certain or reliable, than are the principles of the Method by which it is tested and proved. The stream cannot rise higher than its fountain head. It is the height of absurdity, to talk of our possessing sources of knowledge of a positive and absolute quality, which can be shown to be such only by a course of probable reasoning. Induction, therefore, utterly breaks down, and exposes its incompetence, when used as a Method of Rational Criticism, or as a means of ascertaining and substantiating the possession, by the Intellect, of certain First Truths and Intuitive Judgments, as

the basis and substratum of genuine and scientific knowledge.

It is only a Method, whose processes are themselves Intuitional, whose every step is one of direct Sight and Insight, and which thus of itself gives us absolute certainty, that can properly be employed to authenticate the perceptions and affirmations of the Reason, and scientifically assure us that we have the ability of knowing with Intuitive and Absolute Certainty.

And such is the nature of that Method we have propounded, and sought to unfold, in these pages. And, therefore, we confidently commend it, as affording competent and perfect rules of Rational Criticism, and adequate confirmation of the Intuitive and Absolute character of the Prime Truths of the Reason.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD INVOLVES A NEW THEORY OF THE REASON.

AND now, as a most important and interesting corollary, growing out of the statement and discussion of our New Theory of Method, I have to announce, what may be justly termed a New Theory of the Reason,—though some of our modern psychologists may have vaguely hinted at it.

SEC. 1. *How the Principles of our Method suggest, and render necessary, such a Theory.*

In that survey of the Rational faculties, which I have been led to take, in unfolding this New Theory of Psychologic Method, I have several times stated and insisted upon the fact, that it is the Reason whose seeing eye is turned within, and achieves the marvelous work of self-inspection, when the mind puts itself in the attitude of Self-consciousness. And this must be so; for, self-inspection can but be recognized as the very highest function of intelligence, the supremest species of intellection; and it is, therefore, performed by the Reason, the highest faculty of the Intellect. Self-inspection is a function essentially Intuitional; for, nothing is more evident, than that the Intellect looks in upon,

and scans its own operations, by direct Intuitive Sight and Insight, alone.

Having apprehended the fact, that the Reason performs its self-conscious knowing by direct Sight and Insight, we are readily brought to the cognition of the fact, that the Reason performs all its acts of knowing in precisely the same way; that it is the special function of this Supreme Faculty of the Intellect, to see Intuitively, to behold by immediate vision, whatever it cognizes as appearing, or as being. Thus, in the light of the principles of the Consciential Theory of Method, it is revealed to us, that the prime affirmations and judgments of the Reason are really Intuitive Perceptions—direct, immediate Rational beholdings. They are the Seeings of the Intellect, in distinction from its believings; its infallible visions of absolute truth and reality, in distinction from its convictions necessitated by its own constitutive laws.

SEC. 2. *Can this be properly characterized as a New Theory of the Reason?*

But, can the above view of the Reason be justly characterized as a New Theory of that exalted faculty? Is not this, after all, the same view we have been taught to take hereof, by every Philosopher who has attributed to the human mind the possession of the faculty of Reason, from Kant to McCosh? I confidently reply, No, to this last question; and, Yes, to the first. I go even further,

and declare, that no Rationalistic Philosopher—at least no one of sufficient distinction to have secured special mention in the history of Mental Science—has, up to this time, clearly announced it as his theory of the Reason, that it is the essence and sole function of that supreme intellectual power to intuite, perceive, behold, whatever comes within the range of its knowing, by direct vision. The seeming and partial announcement of this truth is, I grant, to be found, here and there, in the discourses of certain Philosophers. But, only in a fragmentary style, a desultory way, as though not fully grasped; and never maintained with any show of consistency, never laid down as a distinct proposition, to be considered by itself, and supported by proof.

SEC. 3. *The View of the Reason hitherto taken by Philosophers of the Idealistic School.*

That view of the Reason which has hitherto been entertained and advocated by Philosophers of the Rational School, teaches, that it is a power of the Intellect by which it spontaneously announces certain truths, called Primary or Fundamental, in accordance with its own nature, laws, and forms; that it is a faculty of knowledge having its own inherent and peculiar constitution, by which original ideas are necessarily suggested, and by whose inward suggestive principles its primary judgments, convictions, and cognitions are compulsorily created

and molded. The writings of all these Philosophers abound in phrases and forms of expression, through which this view of the Reason crops out; such as, the "Reason's Instinctive Affirmations;" its "Primary Laws of Belief;" its "Inherent Regulative Rules;" its "Impossibility of Conceiving Otherwise;" and other like forms of speech, conveying the same meaning. Let me give a few specimens, from the most eminent writers of this class.

1. Thus, Reid,* in discoursing upon "First Principles," says: "In propositions that are submitted to our judgment, there is this great difference: some are of such a nature, that a man of ripe understanding may apprehend them distinctly, and perfectly understand their meaning, without finding himself under any necessity of believing them to be true or false, probable or improbable. The judgment remains in suspense, until it is inclined to one side or another by reasons or arguments. But there are other propositions which are no sooner understood, than they are believed. The judgment follows the apprehension of them necessarily; and both are equally the work of Nature, and the result of our original powers." And, again, in commenting upon certain remarks which Hume made upon the affirmation: "Similar causes will continue to produce like effects, under the same circumstances," he says:† "It is not my

* Reid's Works, vol. iii, p. 135. † Ibid., p. 185.

business at present to examine the account he [Hume] has given of this universal belief of mankind; because, whether his account of it be just or not, yet, as this belief is universal among mankind, and is not grounded upon any antecedent reasoning, but upon the constitution of the mind itself, it must be acknowledged to be a first principle, in the sense in which I use that word."

In the foregoing extracts, it is made evident, that Reid's notion of Axioms, First Truths, Intuitive Judgments, etc., was, that they are no more than those original convictions, which the mind is constrained to form and pronounce by the action of its own subjective laws.

2. That Dugald Stewart entertained the same notion, concerning the nature of our original and most positive knowledge, is evident from the following quotation: * "The belief which accompanies consciousness, as to the present existence of its appropriate phenomena, has been generally considered as much less obnoxious to cavil, than any of the other principles which Philosophers are accustomed to assume as self-evident, in the formation of their metaphysical systems. No doubts on this head have yet been suggested by any Philosopher, how skeptical soever; even by those who have called in question the existence of both Mind and Matter: and yet the fact is, that it rests on no foundation more

* "Philosophical Essays," pp. 74, 75.

solid than our belief of the existence of external objects; or our belief, that other men possess intellectual powers and faculties similar to those of which we are conscious in our ourselves. In all these cases, the only account that can be given of our belief is, that it forms a necessary part of our constitution; against which metaphysicians may easily argue so as to perplex the judgment, but of which it is impossible to divest ourselves for a moment, when called on to employ our Reason, either in the business of life, or in the pursuits of science. While we are under the influence of our appetites, passions, or affections, or even of a strong speculative curiosity, all those difficulties which bewildered us in the solitude of the closet, vanish before the essential principles of the human frame." According to this, our most reliable source of knowledge is but an original tendency of belief, rendered invincible by the constitutional structure of the mind.

3. As to "The Ideas of the Pure Reason" of Kant, every student of Philosophy knows, that this metaphysician described them as no more than "Regulative Principles," and that he did not regard them in the least as cognitions of realities. Nevertheless, I deem it best here to introduce a passage from his Critique, bearing upon this point: * "Reason has only strictly for object the Understand-

* "Trans. Dialectic," App. to Book ii, div. 3, sec. 7.

ing, and its suitable disposition; and, as this Understanding unites the diversity in the object by means of conceptions, so such Reason, on its part, unites the diversity of conceptions by means of Ideas, in setting up a collective unity as the aim of the actions of Reason, which else are only occupied with distributive unity. I maintain, therefore, that trancendental Ideas are never of a constitutive use, so that thereby conceptions of certain objects would be given; and, in the case where they are thus understood, they are merely sophistical conceptions. But, on the contrary, they have an excellent and indispensable necessary regulative use, namely, to direct the Understanding to a certain end, in respect of which the lines of direction of all its rules terminate in a point, which, although it indeed is only an idea (*focus imaginarius*), that is, a point from which the conceptions of the Understanding do not really proceed, because it lies entirely out of the limits of possible experience, yet it still serves for the purpose of procuring to them the greatest unity, together with the greatest extension."

4. Leibnitz, also, held to a similar view of the Reason, and its Ideas. Thus, in a letter to Bierling, in 1710, as translated by Sir Wm. Hamilton, he says, in refutation of Locke: "Had he [Locke] sufficiently considered the difference between necessary truths or those apprehended by demonstra-

tion, and those which become known to us by Induction alone, he would have seen that those which are necessary, could only be approved to us by principles native to the mind (*menti insitis*), seeing that the senses indeed inform us what may take place, but not what necessarily takes place. Locke has not observed, that the notions of being, of substance, of one and the same, of the true, of the good, and many others, are made innate to our mind, because our mind is innate to itself, and finds all these in its own furniture."

5. Hamilton accepts and indorses this definition of Leibnitz. He even denominates the Reason, "the Regulative Faculty," and declares, "the Primitive Cognitions seem to leap ready armed from the womb of Reason, like Pallas from the head of Jupiter."—As though, in his estimation, they were but the birth-creation of that faculty of the Intellect, and not the acts by which it beholds rational and substantive realities.

6. The language of Cousin, in referring to Reason and its Ideas, is, I am glad to note, less objectionable and unguarded, and would seem to indicate a nearer approach to that theory of Rationality, which I have above suggested. And yet, he did not positively break away from, and disown, the false and pernicious notions respecting the supreme faculty of the Intellect, which have been so long and universally inculcated by even the best and

most advanced school of Philosophic thinkers. Thus, in speaking of the relation of Cause and Effect,* he employs terms which imply, that the affirmation of this relation is a necessity imposed upon the Reason, by a principle or law of thought inhering in the constitution of that faculty; as follows, "Does it [the Reason] strive to put in question the truth of this relation: it cannot do it. Intelligence in vain makes the attempt; it cannot be done. Whence it follows, that the truth is a necessary and universal truth. Reason is, then, under the empire of this truth; it is impossible for it not to suppose a cause, whenever the senses, or the consciousness, present any phenomena whatever." As though the proper affirmation of the universality and necessity of truth relating to causality, were contained in the declaration of the inability of the mind to think otherwise.

7. Dr. McCosh, certainly, has not succeeded in emancipating his mind from this customary view of the Rational Faculty, which represents it as being constrained to make enunciation of truths called Prime or Intuitive, by the action of its own subjective constitutional laws. And this, notwithstanding he has, time and again, reiterated the statement, apparently so precisely contradictory hereto, that in Intuition, nothing is given us which the Reason does not find in the objects at which it

* "History of Modern Philosophy," vol. ii, p. 265.

looks. Take the following, as an illustration: "By observation, we may rise to the discovery of mental principles which do not in themselves depend on observation, but which have a place in our constitution anterior to our observation of them, and are there, as observation discovers, native, necessary, and universal."* And again, "They are truths of our original constitution, having the sanction of Him who hath given us our constitution, and graven them there with His own finger."† And again, "They [the Prime Truths of the Reason] may be contemplated as Laws, Rules, or Principles guiding the mind. . . . Under this aspect, first, they are native. Hence, they have been called natural, innate, connate, connatural, implanted, constitutional. All these phrases point to the circumstance that they are not acquired by practice, nor the result of experience, but are in the mind naturally, as constituents of its very being, and involved in its higher exercises. In this respect they are analogous to universal gravitation and chemical affinity, which are not produced in bodies as they operate, but are in the very nature of bodies, and the springs of their action. It is thus, that is, by an original property of his being, that man is led to look on body as occupying space, or any given effect as having a cause, and on certain actions as being morally good or evil."‡

* "Intuitions," p. 4. † Ibid., p. 30. ‡ Ibid., p. 35.

SEC. 4. *Such a View of the Reason involves the most downright Skepticism.*

Now I assert, without hesitation, that, in such an exposition of the Reason, and its Primary Truths, is contained the rankest, falsest, and most desperate species of Skepticism. And I feel to discard and condemn it with energy. The above quotations by no means suggest the true exposition of the highest faculty of Intellection we possess. In fact, we have herein no account of any species of intellection. Neither genuine knowledge, nor the power of knowing, is herein given us. If I have no better assurance of the truth of those affirmations of my mind called Prime, Axiomatic, Fundamental, than the fact of their compulsory imposition upon my belief, by an immanent, constitutional law of my mental being, I cannot trust them as conveying to me any real knowledge, any knowledge of the actual truth of things. Nor, can any just confidence in these affirmations be inspired by the reminder, kindly vouchsafed by McCosh and others, to support our wavering faith, that the God of truth and goodness would not create us with subjective tendencies of belief that were not correspondent with genuine realities. We have no guarantee of the Divine existence, or of his goodness and truth, unless we first know the absolute truth of the Prime Cognitions of the Reason. It does not convince us that we know and possess the truth, by

being told that we are constrained, by the constituent principles of our being, to believe thus and so, and that it is impossible for us to believe otherwise. A thought, imposed upon me by a law of my mind, cannot truly be said to be an intellection. A conviction, irresistibly created in my mind, is by no means the same as an act of knowing; and it is only genuine, positive acts of knowing that can assure me that I am in possession of absolute truth. Unless the mind is endowed with the ability of directly seeing things as they are, of seeing, in this manner, the eternal realities of being, and their immutable relations, then, whatever it may think, or imagine, or believe, it must forever be destitute of genuine knowledge. The intellect must be endowed with the faculty of immediate Sight and Insight, of unerring, absolute Intuition, or it is without any capability for apprehending the truth. The sole function of the Reason, the highest faculty of the Intellect, must be that of pure intellection,—clean, pure, absolute knowing, and nothing else; or all our talk about Truth, Science, Knowledge, must be the sheerest nonsense and delusion.

SEC. 5. *The Highest Function of the Intellect, that of Pure, Absolute Knowing.*

That this is the prime Function of our Rational Faculty, the Method of Psychologic investigation we have unfolded in these pages affords us the

surest guarantee,—the guarantee, namely, of immediate, absolute self-conscious apperception. Looking in upon the operations of our minds, we self-consciously behold, by an act of intuitive reflection, that certain affirmations concerning fact and being and the nature of things, are acts of knowing, in which the mind looks directly upon, and sees intuitively, what it affirms. And, thus, the form of these affirmations, both as they are envisaged in Consciousness, and as they are expressed in language, is wholly unconditional and absolute. In them, when they are analyzed, and their elements are contemplated in Abstraction, we find no trace, not the slightest indication, of subjective or constitutional compulsion; that is, that they were the product of certain immanent principles and laws of the mind. They are not the expression of an inward inability of thinking differently; they declare nothing concerning the constitution or structure of the Intellect. But, it is concerning something which the Intellect looks upon and intuites, with absolute clearness of vision, that they make unconditional asseveration. Such is the nature of all those intellectual acts, which are denominated Primitive Cognitions and First Truths of the Reason.

Some of them, it is true, may, when first subjected to Self-conscious inspection, appear to be the outgrowth of certain emotional and sentimental tend-

encies of the soul, in which faith-feeling, and a constitutional bias of belief, are specially apparent; but, a nearer and closer inspection will, in every instance, reveal as the central and radical fact of the concrete operation, an act of clear, positive, direct Sight or Insight.

CHAPTER IX.

THE RELATION OF THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD TO PURE IDEALISM, AND TO POSITIVISM.

SEC. 1. *This Method does not end in Pure Idealism.*

It may, possibly, be suspected, and brought as an objection against this New Psychologic Method I have sought to explain in this work, that, teaching as it does the Intuitional character, and, so, the certainty of the knowledge we have, or may have, of mental facts, causes, and laws—since it is universally conceded that we can know physical facts, causes, and laws only by Induction, and so with only moral or probable certainty—it (this Method) must necessarily, when its principles shall be fully drawn out and carried forward to their ultimate consequences, land those embracing it in an Idealism as complete and pure as that taught by Bishop Berkeley, and deny Ontological Science any rational passage out of Consciousness into the realm of Material existence. Or, rather, it may be imagined, that the doctrines implied in this New Method really assert only the existence of the Ego in Consciousness; and, by denying the cognizable reality of the other terms of Ontology, namely,

God and Matter, proceed to the annihilation of all objective forms of truth, and affirm Psychology to be the only branch of genuine Science.

Any objections of this sort that might be urged against this Theory of Method, would proceed from misunderstanding, and would be wholly without foundation in truth. For, let this Method be applied to the determination of the question concerning our original cognition of Self, and Body or Matter; and we see at once, that it affirms the cognition of the one, and of the other, as given in the self-same act of Intuition. That is, it recognizes the Intuition of Self and the Intuition of Body as being coinstantaneous, and, therefore, of precisely equal authority. In the first act, and in all acts, of Sense-perception, as this Method informs us, the subjective sensation, which is the basal element in every perception, involves the intuitive cognition of the Ego, and also an intuitive cognition of Body or Matter. In other words, our Method declares, that, by means of sensation, both Self and Body are simultaneously introduced into Consciousness; and thus subjected to the searching insight of the Reason in Intuitive action. Through sensation, the Reason intuites Body as a real substance, as readily as it does Self. And, thus, is found a passage, by which the Rational Intellect may go forth from Consciousness into the universe of Material existence, with a firm and confident

step. And thus, of the three forms of being with which Ontology has to do, and whose reality Philosophy has ever sought to found upon absolute certainty, the two above-mentioned, namely, Self and Body, this New Organ of Psychologic investigation enables us to assert we know, by direct, Intuitional Insight,—since both are given us simultaneously in Sensation, which is entirely subjective in its nature, and wholly contained in Consciousness.

SEC. 2. *Our Method, however, teaches that we may not know the Inner Nature of Matter.*

True it is, that though our Method thus affirms intuitive, and therefore certain, rational apperception of Body, and of Self, in the subjective Sensation, as actual existences, it does not assert that we know, or can know, the essential nature and qualities of the former, with the same immediacy, thoroughness, and certainty, as we may the nature and qualities of the latter. We should anticipate, that the Reason would penetrate further in the apperception of Self, than in the perception of Matter or Body—the Not-Self. And so we find, that, whereas Rational Intuition gives a profound insight into the elements, qualities, powers and laws of the Ego as unfolded in Consciousness, it gives us to enjoy but a superficial view of the real nature, powers, laws, and qualities of Body as represented in Sense-perception. In fact, the Intuition of Body, which

we consciously gain in sensation, is only that of a substance which is space-occupying—a something which has obtruded itself, by its effects, into the realm of Consciousness from without, through the senses. But, what that space-occupying something is, in itself, the sensation does not declare; nor does the Intuition, consequent upon the sensation, give us to cognize. If, advancing beyond the sensation, and the Intuition of the space-occupying something, we attempt to go forth, in Sense-perception, into the outer world of Matter, and study the changes, forces, and laws there in operation, we at once go forth from the sphere of Consciousness, and over the boundaries of Conscious knowledge, within which Intuition enables us to see, with immediate certainty, the movements there going on, together with the powers from whence these movements spring and the laws regulating their occurrence, into a dark, foreign sphere, where strange and alien forces are at play; where causes operate which lie concealed and hidden from the immediate ken of the Reason, and which must be discovered, if discovered at all, by a long and patient course of mole-eyed plodding, and mechanical separating and combining of unknown natures; a process never crowned with the satisfactory fruits of absolute knowing,—as is that process of search which Reason may employ in its explorations of the inner world of conscious being.

SEC. 3. *The Principles of our Method in their Relation to Positivism.*

In the light of the foregoing views, which grow directly out of the principles and teachings of our Method, we see how unreasonable, how stupid and ridiculous even, are the course and the theory of our modern "Positive" Philosophers and Physical Scientists. They start out with the denial of that most primal, and radical, and necessary of all the distinctions of human intelligence, the distinction, namely, of Self and Not-Self, or Matter. They begin, by merging Self in the material Not-Self, and declaring that the former has no independent and separate existence; although the affirmation of such existence of Self is necessarily involved in every assertion or proposition we lay down. These "scientists" and "philosophers" cannot themselves enunciate a single principle or conclusion of their "system," without, in so doing, virtually repudiating the very fundamental postulate of that system. They commence the construction of their "philosophy," by laying down the proposition, that Matter is the sole substantial element of being. Whereas, the very conception of Matter implies, logically and psychologically, the precedent realization of the conception of Mind. For, the primal conception of Matter is that of Not-Self, that is, something different from, and exterior to, Self, having the root, the essential condition, of its being in spatial

relations; that is, in a sphere outside of, and apart from, the Me. The Me, then, must be cognized before the Idea of Matter is possible. But, these "philosophers" assert the knowing of Matter, while asserting the non-existence of the knowing Me.

It seems, to my thought, that a philosophical theory, which has its beginning in so stupid an act of Intellectual suicide as this, is worthy only of the scorn and contempt of all thinkers.

1. This shallow school of physical Scientists, calling themselves Positivists, inasmuch as they profess to believe in nothing but Matter, are compelled in consistency to assert that we know nothing which does not pertain to Matter; which was not learned and discovered by an observation of material facts, movements, and forces —In other words, that Physical Science is the only science possible; that there is no knowledge, and can be none, which is not derived from an Induction of physical phenomena.

It seems incredible, that any class of men, in these days, will dare arrogate to themselves the title of Philosophers, who are yet uninformed of the truth, so familiar to the thoughts of all possessing any degree of philosophic culture, that all the various branches of Physical Science rest upon certain Axioms of a universal and necessary character, and, which, therefore, must be known independently of experience, by an Intuitive effort of

the Reason. Those Scientists, who are so poorly instructed in the very rudiments of rational thinking, as really to imagine that a system of Science can be built up upon data exclusively furnished by experience and observation, are undeserving of any consideration in the philosophic world; and their sputter and gabble ought not, surely, to disturb, in the least, the composure of the Christian community. Why should any body care what sort of conclusions that class of men may draw from their "system," concerning God and the soul, who openly and avowedly discard the very first and plainest principles of human knowledge? For my part, I can but regard as simply despicable the Religious and Philosophic Skepticism of those who can seriously harbor the idea of constructing a Cosmological System, solely and alone, out of what they may discover in physical facts. It is hardly worth while, to pause for the purpose of reasoning in earnest with those who do not know, or will not acknowledge, that, in order to build up a Science, in any department of Physics, they must be supplied with a set of principles which that Science itself did not, and could not, furnish; principles which are wholly independent of observation, or experiment, and which must be rationally apprehended in Intuition. Who does not know, that, in the absence of such rudimentary principles, scientific observation is an utter impossibility?

Who would think of observing physical facts, for any purpose of Science, were he not already cognizant of the truth, that "Every Beginning must have a Cause?" Or, that "Similar Effects must result from the same Causes, acting under like circumstances?" The Physicist cannot take the first step, without adopting these principles; principles that are wholly independent of experience or observation, and cannot be derived from any physical source, but are spontaneously cognized by the mind, in the exercise of its own original and proper powers. Thus, in direct contravention of his own cardinal postulate, is our Modern Positivist obliged to begin with the affirmation of Mind, and its original Intuitions.

2. But, the ridiculous absurdity of the Physical Scientism of our day, appears, quite as conspicuously as in any thing else, in that additional assumption, with which it sets out, namely, that absolute certainty is given us in Sense-perception, and nowhere else. That it does set out with this assumption, is found in its declaration, that all Science is derived from the observation and study of physical facts. For, surely, the observation and study of physical facts can only be achieved by the aid of Sense-perception. Sense-perception, then, is the sole source of positive and absolute knowledge; and, it is only such knowledge, that can issue in valid Science. Now, I call this assumption

a ridiculous absurdity. For, in the first place, there is no principle, in Reason or in Fact, to substantiate it. How did our physical Scientists learn, that they could learn nothing, save through the medium of their physical senses? They cannot appeal to Reason, for "backing" here; for, they would then be submitting to the authority of a tribunal purely mental; and would, moreover, by so doing, repudiate the authority of these senses as sole and supreme. Nor can they, any the better, make appeal herefrom to Consciousness; since, in that case, they would also be abandoning their own chosen standard of absolute knowledge—the affirmations of sense—for the affirmations of a mental tribunal.

But, this attribution of positive and absolute knowledge to the physical senses, and denial of it to any other faculty or set of faculties, is not only a pure assumption, being utterly devoid of evidential support of every kind, but it is maintained in the face of the most powerful contradictions, coming from all sources of Perceptive, of Intuitive, and Rational knowledge. The Reason contradicts this assumption. For, it instinctively erects its own dicta as the arbiter of all truth. It instinctively assumes the prerogative of questioning, analyzing, and passing judgment upon, in the light of its own intuitive cognitions, the assertions of sense; and of deciding upon their quality, and the degree of

credence that is their deserving. If, at any time, the decisions of the senses conflict with the dicta of the Reason, they (the senses) are required to revise their work, and go over it again and again, until it is seen to conform to the decisions of that magisterial faculty of the Intellect.

3. And, think of the monstrous intellectual treason, which is involved in the attempt to abandon the evidence of Consciousness and Self-consciousness, in favor of that of Sense and Sense-perception! So monstrous, indeed, that nature will not permit of its actual commission. For, however much certain Materialists may try to exalt and magnify the material world at the expense of the inner world of conscious thought and spiritual apperception, it still remains a fact forever, that the former cannot be known at all, only as it shall be reflected and imaged in the latter. And, be it understood, this imaging and reflection is never direct, and precisely accurate. It is indirect, and through media that mingle their own nature and coloring with the imaging process, greatly to the distortion of the resultant panoramic representation. And, were it not for the corrective action of the Reason in Consciousness and Self-consciousness, brought to bear upon the intimations of Sense-perception, the physical world would be to us wholly chaotic and void of significance.

The most inveterate and malignant Skepticism

of other days never refused to make its *devoir* to Consciousness, and always professed respect to the apperceptions of Self-consciousness. It has been left to our Modern Positivist to consummate the prodigious feat of absolute mental disembowelment, such as is implied in annihilating Consciousness, and turning the mind inside out, by placing its highest faculties of knowledge in the senses. Can any thing be more ridiculous, than to assert, that the mind can know, through the senses, the objects and changes of the outer world, better than it knows about itself, and what is taking place within itself—in the domain of Consciousness, and under its own immediate inspection? If the mind does not know itself and its own operations, Self-consciously, with absolute certainty, how, I ask, can it know a nature foreign to itself, and lying outside of Consciousness, with absolute certainty? And, if our Physical Scientists are forced, after all, to grant that the Intuitions of Consciousness and Self-consciousness concerning the mind, its operations and powers, are really reliable, by what tricks of logical or metaphysical jugglery, are they going to get rid of Mind, with its contents, altogether? or find any thing like a plausible support to their thesis, that Matter is the sole substratum of being?

Nay, the Rational Intellect itself, the very knowing principle of the mind—that faculty by virtue of whose possession alone we know any thing—

cognizes, in one and the self-same act of Intuition, the personal Self, and the impersonal, material Not-Self, as distinct elements of being: So that, as to their substantial reality, they may be said to be known with equal certainty. But, of the phenomena, laws, and powers of the former, it must be asserted, as we have seen, that they are also apprehended Intuitively, and, therefore, with far greater certainty, than the phenomena, laws, and forces of the latter,—which being perceived solely through the medium of the senses, can only be known Inductively, and, hence, with no more than probable certainty.

CHAPTER X.

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD IN THEIR RELATION TO THE SCIENCE OF GOD.

SEC. 1. *The Knowing of Every Order of Being is by the way of Intuition.*

It seems to be — and indeed it is — implied in the Principles we have laid down in the development of that Theory of Method we have denominated the Consciential, that we can know an object or nature, as having substantive existence, only by an Intuitive act of the mind. In other words, the principles of our Method assert, that no order of real and substantive being can be cognized by us as such, which is not given us immediately in Consciousness. Direct, Intuitive Perception is necessary, in order to an apprehension by us of a nature having actual being. *

This is the way, we have seen, by which we attain to the knowledge of self-existence, and also of the existence of the outer world. And it seems clearly impossible, that we could gain a knowledge of substantive existence, of a distinct order, in any other way. We can only know a fact as really occurring, by having it come immediately under

* See McCosh, on Intuitions, pp. 287, 295.

the gaze of Sense-perception, or of Consciousness. And so, a distinct order of existence, that does not thrust itself immediately before the seeing eye of the Reason, by its appearing, or in its effects, cannot be apprehended as a substantive reality. We could not know, and affirm the actual existence of, the material Not-Self, did it not find entrance into Consciousness in sensation; and thus furnish an occasion to the Reason for directly cognizing it. Upon this principle of rational and conscious Intuition, it is, that the Consciential Theory of Method is based. And, conversely, this Theory also asserts and teaches, that Ontology is possible only on condition of direct Rational Perception, through the means of data furnished either by Sense, or by Consciousness. And, that this principle is true, appears to me self-evident.

SEC. 2. *The bearing of the statements contained in this last Section, upon the fundamental Idea of Theology.*

If the above declarations be true, they have a most important bearing upon that transcendently interesting department of Ontology having to do with the Divine Existence—Theosophy; especially in the present phase and condition of that Science. For, Theosophy, as a branch of Ontology, does not now, and, so far as I know, scarce ever has, sought to base our knowledge of the being of God upon any thing like Perceptive Intuitions of Him. Instead,

it has almost always sought to prove the being of God, by a somewhat intricate and extended process of reasoning; and its present method of proof is indirect and inferential.—A kind of proof, as I think, in view of the nature of the subject, very inadequate, unsatisfactory, and unscientific.

SEC. 3. *Cognition of the Divine Being cannot be Reached by Logical Processes of Thought.*

If the being of God must be ascertained by us as the concluding result of a chain of reasoning, carried on by the employment of abstract ideas,—as is almost universally consented to by all Theologians, whether of the Cambridge Platonic School, of which Cudworth and Clark are the representatives, or of the more realistic school represented by Paley, then, to me, it appears plain, that no scientific foundation can be found for Theology: And we are forced to accept Kant's skeptical position with reference to the Divine Existence. As to the impossibility of attaining an apprehension of the existence of God, or of any other substantive being, by a course of reasoning upon abstract ideas, the truth of the following passage, from this great thinker, cannot, in my opinion, be successfully controverted: * "Our conception of an object may therefore contain whatever, and how much soever, we will; yet must we go out of it, in order to confer existence upon it. In objects of

* "Critique of Transcendental Dialectick," div. 3, book ii, sec. 4.

the senses, this occurs by means of the connection of any of my perceptions according to empirical laws. But, in objects of pure thinking, there is no means at all for cognizing their existence, since this must be cognized *a priori*. But our Consciousness of all existence (whether through perception immediately, or through conclusions which connect something with the perception), belongs wholly to the unity of experience; and an existence out of this field can certainly not be absolutely declared to be impossible; but is a presupposition which we cannot justify by any thing.

"The conception of the Supreme Being is, in many respects, a very useful idea; but on this account exactly, because it is a mere idea, it is quite incompetent for increasing, by means of itself alone, our cognition in regard of that which exists. It is not even competent enough for this, that it could instruct us in respect of the possibility of a many. The analytical sign of possibility, which consists in this, that mere positions (realities) generate no contradiction, cannot certainly be denied to it. But, as the connection of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis, as to whose possibility we cannot *a priori* judge, because the realities are not specifically given to us, and even if this occur, no judgment at all takes place there, because the sign of the synthetical cognitions must always only be sought in experience, but to which the object of an

idea cannot belong; the celebrated Leibnitz was thus far from effecting that as to which he flattered himself, that is, wishing to discover *a priori* the possibility of so elevated an ideal Being.

"There is, therefore, in the so celebrated Ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from conceptions, all the toil and labor lost; and a man would just as little become richer in knowledge from mere ideas, as a merchant in fortune, if, in order to better his situation, he were to add ciphers to the credit of his cash account."

SEC. 4. *Intuitive Perception the only way of Cognizing actual Existence.*

By meditating upon the rationally perceived relations of abstract conceptions, we may come to know what must be in the eternal fitness of things, but never what is, in the world of actual existences. No way of cognizing an entity, or a nature, as an actuality, is adequate and satisfactory, but that of Perception, in one or the other of its forms. I cannot be said to know *being* as such, unless I intuite it. Perceptions are the sole data, through which the mind can cognize a nature as existing. In abstract conceptions, substantive being is not found; and no species of argumentation, therefore, in which such conceptions are employed as the chief data, can certify to us the reality of any kind of existences. The conclusion of a syllogism cannot contain more than was involved in its premises; and

Inductive reasoning from facts cannot wind up with more than was immanent in the facts themselves.

SEC. 5. *We can, then, only know God by Intuitions of Him.*

The propositions contained in the last Section, I am obliged to admit, whatever may be the result; for they approve themselves to my Reason; and I seem clearly to discern their truth. What follows? Why, that our cognitions of the Divine Being as being, in order to be valid, and to afford a solid basis to Theology as a department of Ontological Science, must be gained through Intuitions, and not as the result of syllogistic forms of thinking. I must confess myself unsatisfied with, and unconvinced by, those arguments concerning the being of God, the living, personal God of Christianity, that are drawn from the ideas of the Necessary and the Contingent, the Absolute and the Conditioned, the Infinite and the Finite, evolved in the mind by abtruse metaphysical reflection; or, from the notions of intelligent Design, derived from viewing the wise correlations and combinations of objects and forces in the Natural World. These do not give me the direct apperception of the Divine Existence, which my Reason demands, in order that I may credit it as a reality.

SEC. 6. *God must be revealed in Consciousness, to be known by us.*

My Reason, no less than my Soul, "cries out"

for direct manifestations of the living God. But the living God does not directly appear to my cognition in Nature, or in the Pure Ideas of Metaphysical speculation. To know God as a living entity, I must have Intuitions of Him; I must gaze, in immediate vision, upon certain facts which Reason shall recognize as His appearing. In order for me to apprehend Matter as a substantial existence, it must be directly represented in my Consciousness, in the way of sensations. I cannot know it, as being, in any other way. And, in order that I may apprehend God as an actual existence, he must immediately impress Himself upon my Consciousness. He must reveal Himself to my inner being, by the production therein of such phenomena as will afford my Reason an opportunity or occasion for Intuitively beholding the Divine Nature. Unless I am permitted such Intuitions of God, then Sir Wm. Hamilton and Mansel and Herbert Spencer are right; and He must ever remain to my intelligence as the Unknown and the Unknowable; I can never actually cognize Him. At best, I can have of Him no more than a barren idea, a conception without content; and He will never be to me more than a cold and distant abstraction.

SEC. 7. *Are we permitted an Intuition of God?*

Is God indeed that Actual Existence, that Living Reality, who pervades all space, the Source and Support of all being, wrapping us around like

an atmosphere, and touching us on every side? And, still, are we never permitted a glimpse of Him, never granted a vision of His actual being and presence? How comes it, that we are endowed with the ability of intuiting material existences, of perceiving physical phenomena; but lack the power of cognizing the Divine Nature, of beholding direct manifestations of the Godhead? It cannot be so. If it be a fact that God lives, and is my Creator and the Support of my life, then it must be, that, having endowed me with intelligence, and the desire to know Him, since He is to me the most intimate of all existences, and sustains to me the closest and most indissoluble of all possible relations, He has provided some means of communicating, directly, with my Consciousness, and affording me positive Intuitions of Himself. Why should He conceal Himself from my sight, and refuse to come within the range of my perception, or to hold immediate intercourse with my mind, after endowing me with an intelligent spirit, capable of knowing Him, and, above all, longing to know Him and commune with Him? I cannot believe this. Sustaining to me, as He does, the nearest and most vital relations, and my well-being depending—as it does—more fully upon the apprehension of His actual being, than any other possible knowledge, there is the strongest *a priori* improbability that He would only empower me to gain a barren notion of Himself, and give me

no nearer intellectual approach unto Himself than an inferential belief will give one. No; having created me a rational personality, it must be that He will, in some way, reveal Himself to my Intuition.

SEC. 8. *The Intuition of God a Question of fact, to be settled by an Appeal to Consciousness.*

In substantiation of the position taken in the preceding Section, we make our primary appeal, in accordance with the requirements of our New Psychologic Method, to Consciousness and Self-consciousness. Before this tribunal must all theories, involving mental facts, powers and susceptibilities, first of all, be brought. No psychical fact is, for a moment, to be accepted, which finds no support in Consciousness and Self-consciousness. What, then, we inquire, has this supreme arbiter to say of the theory of Divine cognition, I have just propounded? In my view, it indorses it. Looking within the arcana of my own mind, I think I see there evidences of the Divine inworking. I seem to myself to find there certain modes of Supernal Energy operating within me. — Facts, that are Supernatural, the result of a Divine Force acting upon my mind; a sense of God moving in and upon my mental being, and producing therein unique conscious phenomena; which, my Reason beholding, it at once attributes to a Supernatural Source, and, by them, gains at once, not merely

or especially, an *idea* of God, but a *vision* of God.

I am aware, that declarations relating to the nature and processes of these spiritual facts of Consciousness, should be cautiously uttered. For, none of the facts of the inner world demand, in their analytic study, such subtlety, keenness, and power of introspective sight, as do these. The spiritual is the deepest and most central element of our being; and the phenomena therein produced seem to lie at the profoundest depths in Consciousness. And, on this account, probably, it is, that during all the ages of philosophic activity and development, religious and spiritual phenomena have rarely been the subject of careful psychologic examination. Their analysis seems to have been shunned by the cultivators of Mental Science, though such analysis involves the consideration of some of the most vital questions and most interesting problems pertaining to our being,—for the reason, that the prosecution of such kind of analytic effort demands so much more delicacy and penetration of reflective vision, than is required in scrutinizing the ordinary phenomena of the mind. Scarce any other reason than this can be assigned for the deficiency, so noticeable in Mental Science, when our attention is directed to the little it has to say concerning the facts, faculties, and laws of our Religious or Spiritual being. Let this department of

Consciousness be as carefully searched and reflected upon, in the true spirit of Scientific inquiry, as has that which includes the Intellective processes; and, I think, that then Psychology would be compelled as decisively to declare, that we have as immediate and unmistakable Intuitions of the being of God, as we have of Mind, or of Body, as substantive existences. For, it seems plain to my reflective thinking, that God as positively enters the domain of human Consciousness, through the Religious or Spiritual faculties of man's nature, as that Matter or Body does, by means of the powers of Sense-perception. And, we may have as emphatic a subjective sense of the Divine Nature, as we have of Self, if we will but listen attent to the voices that speak to the ear of Spiritual Self-consciousness.

SEC. 9. *Men have always enjoyed Intuitions of the Divine Existence.*

Though, in our depraved materiality, we are so much more inclined to give heed to the intimations of sense than to the utterances of our spiritual being, still the sons of men have never been without Intuitions of the Divine Being. There are scarcely any, who have become so physicised, as to be wholly unable to recognize, within the depths of their inner being, the direct inworking of Supernal Forces—a Divine Energy. Who is there, so debruted, as not, at times, to enjoy visions of realities

which he knows have not their root in Self, or in Physical Nature, but pertain to a sphere of existence distinct from, and above, both? With all our animality, we are not destitute of spiritual perception, through which we gain an immediate vision of a Nature, an order of Existence, wholly independent of ourselves and of the physical world —a Nature which the Reason instantaneously apprehends as Supreme and Ultimate. And, as Sense-perception has its starting-point in sensation, so this spiritual perception, of which I am speaking, finds its prerequisite condition in the subjective inworking of God upon the Religious Sensibilities.

SEC. 10. *The Intuition of God a Fact corroborated by the Religious History of Mankind.*

The Religious History of mankind corroborates these declarations of self-conscious reflection. The universal apprehension of God by the Race, as a reality, and not simply as an abstract conception, has been Intuitional, and not inferential—by inner spiritual vision, and not by a rational examination of the world of Nature. We see, in this universal apprehension of Him, all the marks that could possibly be presented, to indicate that it is the result of God's direct revelation of Himself to the inmost heart of man, and not the result of man's reasoning and "searching." A sense of the Divine has been as constant and all-pervading in the life of the Race, as

has the sense of human personality. By all the generations of men, the Divine Existence has been held and treated as being as truly real, as is the existence of Physical Nature. And this, not as a result of education, or of mental development and civilization; but as a fact compulsorily present to the perception of human intelligence, in all stages of its growth. To men of all climes and races, a realm of Supernatural Existence and Power has been as much a matter of reality, as has the realm of physical existence. It has influenced their conduct, and entered into their thoughts, their aspirations, their hopes and fears, joys and sorrows, as truly and deeply, as has that system of things which our eyes can see and our hands handle. Skepticism with regard hereto has always been of a speculative nature, and no more operative upon human conduct, than that form of Skepticism which questions the substantive reality of our own existence.

SEC. 11. *Practical forms of Worship imply the Intuition of Divine Existence.*

All systems of practical religion premise the known actuality of the Divine Nature. They all prescribe acts of devotion, kinds of offering, rites and ceremonies of worship,— which assume the actual personal existence of the Being to whom they relate, as a perceived and self-evident fact. Every system of practical religion is supposed, by its votaries, to be a means of intercourse with the

Divine Nature,—a method of real communication between the Divine and the Human. And, therefore, are such systems an instinctive and indubitable affirmation of the fact, that man recognizes God as absolutely real: that is, that he recognizes Him Intuitively.

Every-where, and in all generations, have men been religious worshipers. But, go among whatever class of religious worshipers, and what is the sentiment, the feeling by which they are characterized as such? Is it not, that they are actually holding communion with the Being they worship? that they are thus the subjects of Divine influence? and that the spell of God is upon them? There is no order of religious devotees — and all men belong more or less to this order—who do not attribute certain emotions or states of mind, of which they are conscious, to the immediate action of the Divine Nature upon them. In seasons of religious exhilaration, men have always displayed their ability for gaining direct Intuitions of God, by their belief in oracular utterances, prophetic visions, inspired disclosures, and rapt, mysterious frenzies, as being the living manifestations of Divine Power, acting immediately through and upon their minds.

Through all time, have men accepted the fact of Supernatural and Divine Existence, with an assurance so strong and practical and abiding, as to

demonstrate that this assurance has its beginning in, and derives its support from, positive Intuitions of the mind. A rational conviction, having reference to the reality of a Nature, or an Order of being, so powerful and constant in its action as always to influence human conduct, and to find expression in institutions which men every-where regard as their dearest and most indispensable inheritance, cannot have its birth in mere inference, derived from a process of syllogistic reasoning upon abstract conceptions. No: such a conviction must be the outgrowth of direct perceptions, of Intuitive acts of the knowing faculty. And such is the nature of the conviction which mankind has always entertained concerning the existence of God. The existence of the material world has not been to the human race more of a present and abiding actuality, than has the being of that Divine Nature, whom men call God. A sense of Him, as a Substantial Entity, has evermore pervaded the human consciousness. And this sense of the Divine could only be induced and nourished, by an Intuitive mode of cognizing.

From the first, and through all time, men have ever been ready to credit the fact of the Divine appearing in creation, and of God's sensibly revealing Himself, in miraculous and extraordinary ways, to human cognition. Whence this remarkable peculiarity of human thought and belief? It

can only be accounted for, on the supposition of a precedent Intuition of the Divine Being, as a positive, substantive fact. Were not the mind of man first supplied with an Intuition of God, as an actual existence, it could not accept even the most astounding operations and displays, in the world without, as His appearing. The Divine Spirit must disclose Himself in the inner world of Consciousness, by direct action, and in the production there of such phenomena as the Reason shall at once recognize as of Divine origin, and through which it shall intuite the fact of God's being, before any, however wonderful, disclosure in the realm of matter, can be regarded as a miraculous or Divine revelation. God must enter, and reveal Himself in, the consciousness of men, in order that they may be able to behold manifestations of Him anywhere else.

SEC. 12. *The Doctrine of the Intuition of God is not Mysticism, and does not lead Thereto.*

It may, perhaps, be objected to the view I here take of the Intuition of God, as the ground of our recognition of Him as a Substantive Existence, that it is an extravagance of Mysticism, and must lead those accepting it into the wildest vagaries of fanaticism.

To such an objection, I would reply, firstly, that I am induced to take this position as a result of Self-conscious reflection, that is, because of certain

facts which I think I discover within my own being by introspective observation. To my mind, the Intuition of God, which I here announce and affirm, is a real and normal fact of inward experience; and no position, which can find such corroboration and support, can lead to extravagance and folly.

Nor, again, ought any statement, purporting to be a statement of fact, to be esteemed unworthy of credence, or of favorable attention, by being stigmatized as Mysticism. In every age of Philosophic activity, certain doctrines, or systems of doctrine, called Mysticism, have been evolved and maintained. And, hence, we may conclude, that such doctrines, or systems of doctrine, have some reliable basis of support in the elementary facts and truths in which all human knowledge has its beginning and foundation. At any rate, Mysticism has as legitimate and honorable a place in Philosophy, as any other form of reflective and speculative opinion; and its conclusions are not to be set aside or answered with a sneer.

I am, however, no Mystic, whether in Religion or in Philosophy. Though I honor Mysticism as an honest attempt to trace our belief in God, and in the realities of the Spiritual World, to our most radical and primitive sources of knowledge, still I cannot accept, but am constrained to reject, its most fundamental postulate.

That postulate is, that Faith is the source of all the Prime Truths and Intuitive Judgments, with which we commence our career of intelligent activity. And it teaches, that God is immediately known by faith; that is, by those tendencies and laws of belief, which pertain to, and inhere in, our Religious and Moral nature. On the contrary, I hold, that, strictly speaking, we can know nothing by the action of the Faith Faculty. Faith is not a mode or act or power of *knowing;* it is the power of believing; in strictness, of believing in, or upon, a personal being. Knowing is an act of intellection; and it is performed only by the aid of that highest faculty of the Intellect which has the gift of cognizing by direct Sight and Insight. Subjectively considered, belief, or a tendency to believe, is, primarily, an impulse of feeling. In it, there is no intellection whatever, and, consequently, no knowing. That theory, therefore, which asserts that truth can only find entrance into the mind through the Faith faculty, is, in my judgment, as impossible and absurd, as would be the assertion, that the perception of colors is a function of the sense of hearing. Faith empowers us to accept and act upon the knowledge of other personal beings, who may communicate their knowledge to us; but not originally to acquire it. And, when thus accepted by us upon the faith we repose in others, it is not to us real knowledge, although we may

use and apply it, in the affairs of life, with the utmost confidence and advantage.

As we said above, faith is a state of mind we cherish with regard to other personal beings. By its exercise, we never grasp the existence of personal beings. Cognition of that fact must be antecedently gained by us, and as a prerequisite to the exercise of faith. We must first know that our fellow beings, in whom we confide, are in existence, in order to our confiding in them. And, so it is, with regard to the Divine Personality. Our religious faith does not help us to a knowledge of His existence. We must, indeed, know that He exists, before we can have faith in Him. And, in the very nature of things, we can only know this, by perception, or Intuition. Reality of being can be cognized in no other way. And such Perception or Intuition of the Divine Existence is secured to us, as I think, by means of the impressions which God makes of Himself upon our minds, through the Religious or Spiritual Element of our being. By directly touching our spiritual sensibilities, does He enter the domain of human Consciousness. The unique and extraordinary phenomena thus produced and envisaged there, are immediately discerned by the Reason to have a Supernatural or Divine Source. And thus is God beheld by spiritual Intuition.

The Divine Being could not, any more than

Body or Matter, be taken hold of by the human mind as a reality, by any other process of intellectual action.

SEC. 13. *The Doctrine of the Intuition of God does not imply a Perfect Knowledge of Him.*

Nor, by asserting that we apprehend God by Intuition, am I obliged to take the position, that we must therefore know Him perfectly—that we must have of Him an absolutely correct and adequate apprehension. All that the primitive Intuition of God, which is found in the souls of all men, contains, is simply this, that He is; that the Divine Being exists, as a matter of fact. It goes not beyond this. It by no means discloses to us His qualities of character, or the relations He sustains to us, and the Universe around us. We come to the discovery of His attributes, and the attitude He stands in toward the Cosmical realm, by other means, and as a result of long-continued observation and reflection. And, even then, not perfectly. Our theory of the Intuition of God no more includes the absurdity of asserting a perfect knowledge of Him, than does the universal acknowledgment that we apprehend the existence of Matter by the Intuitions of Sense, contain the implication that, therefore, we have a complete understanding of Physical Nature. The proper development of the prime Intuition of God is secured by research and study.

SEC. 14. *The Doctrine of the Intuition of God in Harmony with the Teachings of the Christian Scripture.*

I cannot dismiss this subject, without an allusion to the entire correspondence between the views I have advanced upon this subject, and the statements of Sacred Scripture bearing hereupon. Every-where in the Revealed Word is the assertion of the immediate intercourse of the Divine with the Human expressly made or implied. The Scripture doctrine concerning our human conception of God, is, that God reveals or discloses Himself directly to the mind of man. The genetic narrative of Humanity, contained in the First Book of the Sacred Canon, unmistakably informs us, that God's holding immediate and positive communion with man, is but a natural and normal procedure; and that man was originally endowed with the power of seeing God by spiritual vision, as directly, as of seeing the external world by Sense-perception. And, though the Word teaches that the keenness of this spiritual vision has become obscured by sin, and the paralyzing influence of depravity, it by no means intimates the loss of the power itself of spiritual vision.

The very opposite of this, in fact, is herein declared. For, after man fell, we are told God appeared to him, and conversed with him face to face. And, with what positiveness does Job assev-

erate the possession by man of the ability of direct spiritual apperception of the Deity, in that wondrous passage, so pregnant with the deepest Philosophy: "There is a spirit in man; and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." This fact is, also, implied in all those passages which speak of the outpouring of the Spirit of God upon the human race. And, especially, is it contained in that gracious declaration, "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal."

But, indeed, it is not necessary that I should adduce specific passages, in proof hereof. The Great Plan of Redemption, whose unfolding is the prime object of the Sacred Writings, goes upon the assumption that God deals directly with the mind of man. This Plan, indeed, is grounded upon the fact of the Divine entering into, and communing with, the Human. Does the Scripture teach the necessity of man's enlightenment, realization of guilt, turning to God for help, regeneration, and restoration to the Divine favor? It affirms, that all these gracious bestowments are to be obtained, solely on condition of the actual incoming of God into the Consciousness. The Christian system is true, only as it is a fact that God is constantly operating upon the hearts of men. And, if such a fact exists, then its disclosure in conscious manifestations, which are just as cognizable to reflective

perception as are any other conscious manifestations, need not be a matter of conjecture, or of mere theoretic belief, but should be a matter of immediate, positive Intuitive knowledge. And, so it is. God in human Consciousness—God acting upon and touching the soul of man, so as to produce there conscious impressions, through which the Reason obtains an actual perception, by spiritual vision, of the Divine Being as a living Reality, is, as it seems to me, a fact as strongly attested by introspective observation, as any fact of being can be.

Theology must, and does, find its support, as to its fundamental postulate, in the same class of Intuitions that attest our own personal existence, and that of Physical Nature. And the three forms of Substantial Being with which Ontology has to do, namely, Mind, Body, God, are each known to human intelligence in precisely the same way, and with corresponding certainty.

CHAPTER XI.

THE RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSCIENTIAL METHOD TO THE QUESTION OF THE FREEDOM OF MAN.

I WISH, now, to offer a few remarks, showing the bearing of this theory of Method upon one of the most important and vital questions of Morals and Religion, namely, the Freedom of Man. For, this Theory has a most intimate bearing upon this question, as can be very readily explained and shown.

SEC. 1. *The Doctrine of Human Freedom vital in Morals and Religion.*

In Morals and Religion, the Doctrine of the Freedom of man is absolutely fundamental and determinative. If man be not, truly and essentially, a free being, he is not, and cannot be regarded as, a proper subject of moral law. Were he not free, he would not be, nor could he esteem himself as being, responsible for his conduct, or deserving of either praise or blame, reward or punishment. His acts would be wholly destitute of any moral element, and could not justly be characterized as either good or bad.

Why do sentiments of moral obligation arise in

our minds? Because we recognize in ourselves the power of free, alternative choice. Simply and wholly, for this reason. We view ourselves as the absolute spring and source of free activity. We regard ourselves as the sole producers of certain acts we call voluntary. We look upon these acts as being the exclusive emanation of our own personality. And so, we hold ourselves as responsible for their commission, and as deserving of praise or censure, according as they are good or bad. The power of pure self-originating action is the basis and essence of moral accountability. If a being destitute of that power could have any conception of a system of moral government, he could not possibly be made to think or feel that he stood practically related to such a system. That which constrains an intelligent being to impute blame to himself, in any case, is, the knowledge he has that the blameworthy act was solely his own, and that he was endowed with the ability to have done otherwise. No rational intelligence could see or feel that he is amenable to God, and deserving of the Divine condemnation or approval, unless he should first discover in himself the ability of free, untrammeled, self-originating action.

These propositions are self-evident; and nobody has the hardihood to positively and squarely deny them. And, therefore, I made no mistake, when I

declared, the affirmation of man's Freedom is the fundamental postulate in Morals.

Now, there is no fact of the human mind more plainly discernible, than the fact of man's moral accountability. That we impute blame to ourselves for what we call wrong action, and regard ourselves as deserving commendation for what we consider right action, is a matter of the plainest hourly experience. We discern a moral quality in all those acts of ours which we call voluntary; and cannot help feeling that, for the performance of such acts, we are justly deserving of reward or punishment. This recognition of our moral responsibility is universal; there are none who are destitute of it: though there may be those who are led to deny it, on theoretic grounds. No fact of human nature is more generally admitted, or finds more constant expression in the life of man, than that of our personal Freedom as the foundation of our moral accountability.

SEC. 2. *The Principles of Induction, accepted as the Guide in Psychologic study, destructive of Man's Freedom.*

It is impossible to admit—rather, it is impossible not to deny—this prime postulate of Morals and Religion, this universally recognized fact of human nature, if we accept Induction as the legitimate Method for conducting mental investigations. And, for the reason, that Induction goes upon the

assumption that all classes of facts, laws, and causes, which are the subject of its examination, are characterized by necessity. Free facts—that is, those not produced by the force of an internal or external necessity, but which might, upon the mere choice of a free agent, have been otherwise—the Inductive Method, from its very nature, is compelled to ignore. In all its researches, it goes upon the assumption of the indissoluble and unvarying connection of natural cause and effect. It not only takes for granted the principle, that every beginning must have a cause, but that every beginning must be the necessary result of its own cause. It not only begins with postulating the great principle of Cause and Effect, but also assumes, with reference to all facts lying within its proper range, that their causes must, under like circumstances, invariably produce the same effects. Now, these postulates of Induction are true, when predicated of Physical phenomena and causes, to the investigation of which that Method is precisely adequate. But, when predicated of some of the facts and causes that appear in Consciousness, they squarely contradict the great fact of man's Freedom, and are as false as any propositions can be.

Since, therefore, Induction asserts these postulates concerning all the facts and causes with which it has to deal, and cannot advance a single step without presuming upon their implied truth, it is

plain, that, if that Method of investigation be taken as the one which is appropriate and applicable in dealing with mental facts and causes, it must be denied that there are to be found in Consciousness any phenomena which are the emanation of a Free Power residing in the mind.

SEC. 3. *Free Facts Inadmissible and Incomprehensible, on the principles of the Baconian Philosophy.*

According to the assumed Principles of the Baconian System of Logic, a Free Cause—that is, a cause capable of alternative action, that is, again, a cause capable of producing any one out of many supposable effects, at its own option—is not only inadmissible, but wholly inconceivable. By that Method we are not even permitted to cherish the idea of a Free Cause. Surely, then, we could never, by its aid, attain to the actual knowledge of a Free Cause. Though ten thousand facts, proceeding from a Free Cause, might be submitted to its inspection, this Method would forever remain blind to their true nature; nor could it ever attain to a correct apprehension of the nature of their cause. For, the principles upon which it proceeds admit only of the inquisition of such causes as are unvarying and constant in their action; that is, such as are under the control of the law of necessity, and must produce the effects which they always do produce, and none others.

Here, then, do we find a whole class of mental phenomena, namely, the facts of Free Volition—facts whose existence is universally conceded, and the reality of whose producing cause, as a genuine power of the mind, is acknowledged, and acted upon in all the relations of life—for knowing and examining which the Inductive Method is confessedly incompetent. Nay, we have seen, that, by the underlying principles of this Method, the very existence of such phenomena must be forever ignored or denied. The attempt to investigate the free, volitionary facts of Consciousness, by the Inductive process, is absurd. For, the fundamental postulates of that Method exclude, positively and forever, such facts from the field of its exploration. That Method eternally refuses to consider other effects than those occurring according to fixed and necessary laws—laws constant and unvarying in their action—laws, that is, having only to do with the governance and regulation of natures that are not free.

SEC. 4. *Philosophers of the Inductive School have generally denied the Freedom of Man.*

Those Philosophers, who have learned to view the human mind from the Inductive stand-point, and have undertaken the exploration of Consciousness guided by the Rules of the Inductive theory, have, almost invariably, arrived at conclusions irreconcilable with the doctrine of man's Free

Agency. They have, customarily, entered upon and prosecuted the study of the mind as though regarding it as a machine, all whose parts and powers and operations were subject to laws imposed from without, and working compulsorily, according to the dictum of physical necessity, like the laws of the material world. Guided by the ideas of the Baconian Logic, when these philosophers have turned their attention to the study of the human soul, they have viewed and treated it as a nature similar to the physical, its activities originating in like causes, and being guided by the same laws. Those of them who have drunk most deeply into the spirit and ideas of that System, have declared, in emphatic terms, that Matter is the substratum of all existence, and is the source of all phenomena of which we have, or can have, any knowledge; and, have constructed various theories, showing us how the facts and operations of Consciousness are brought about by means of physical force and motion. And so, the most of them have explicitly denied the Freedom of the Will, and asserted all human acts, equally with the movements of the material world, to be under the control of the law of necessity.

And this is the only logical conclusion, with reference hereto, at which any honest, straightforward Inductionist can arrive, who shall courageously apply the principles of his Method in the

philosophic exposition of conscious facts. No thorough-going Inductionist can enter upon an inspection of the phenomena of his mental being, without having already formulated a theory of mind so false, as to vitiate all his psychological reasonings, and hinder him from forming any thing like a just conception of the soul of man. Philosophers of this school are constrained to view the human soul as a mechanical contrivance, only acting as it is acted upon, and bringing forth such results only as those fatal laws which have been impressed exoterically upon its various faculties, compel it to produce. Without an abandonment of the vital principles of their theory, they cannot contemplate the mind as it truly is, a living personality, a self-acting, self-knowing entity, endowed with the power of free, self-regulated, and, hence, responsible action. Such a conception of our human mentality is absolutely impossible to any philosopher who heartily embraces, and adheres to, the ideas and doctrines of the Baconian System, while engaged in exploring the realm of Consciousness.

SEC. 5. *The Conscientiial Method admits and explains the Free Facts of Consciousness.*

As, however, the student of Mind who shall begin and prosecute his researches under the guidance of those Rules of Method set forth in this treatise, shall enter the arcana of his own being, moved with the desire to know himself, he will not

be required to look through any discoloring or distorting medium; nor will he be hindered, by the philosophical spectacles he may wear, from seeing any class of facts having existence there. On the contrary, the principles of his Method will require him not to overlook any thing, and to look at every thing precisely as it is, while turning the eye of Rational Reflection within, and gazing upon the objects and realities of that wondrous realm of being, illuminated, as it is, by the white light of Consciousness; and, at the same time, he is assured that he can see every thing there just as it is, since the seeing is, in this case, performed by the Reason in Intuitive action; the eye of Rational Personality being turned in upon movements, laws, and forces that are immediately disclosed to it, as they stand forth Self-consciously disclosed. Is there, then, presented here to his inspection certain facts that do not bear the stamp of necessity? free facts, which he traces, at once and wholly, to personal agency, and which bear the marks of alternative choice? He acknowledges them, as readily as any other sort of conscious facts; and, through them, does he discern, by as direct an Intuitive eye-glance as that with which he beholds any other psychical power through the phenomena it produces, the Freedom, the Self-determination, which essentially pertains to our Personality. In truth, sustained and guided by the Consciential

Method, one may catch and apprehend, with clearness, the most subtle motions of thought, the most delicate shades of emotion, the most lightning-like decisions of the Free Spirit of man; and, through these, dive down to the profoundest depths of Subconsciousness, and penetrate to the very roots of that marvelous living personality, in which our proper life and being consist. For, no form of thought, sensibility, or volition, can escape the Intuitive glance of the Reflective Reason, nor avoid revealing thereto the law, order, and cause of its production.

CHAPTER XII.

Relation of the Consciential Method to the Moral and Rational Sciences.

The acceptance and adoption of this New Theory of Method must have an important bearing upon those branches of Science and Learning which directly rest upon, and spring from, the Primary Truths of the Reason, the Subjective Laws of Thinking, the Instinctive Principles of man's nature, the Native Tendencies of Human Feeling and Action,—the Humanities and Rational Sciences, whose elements are Abstract Ideas and General Notions growing out of the Mind itself, and whose systematic development is secured, chiefly, by Deductive processes of Reasoning.

Sec. 1. *Importance of these Sciences.*

The Humanities and Rational Sciences are numerous, and quite as useful and practical as those which depend, for their origin and growth, upon physical observation: as must at once appear upon a mention of a few of them; such as Logic, Natural Theology, Moral Philosophy, Rhetoric, Political Economy, Jurisprudence, and the Laws of Nations. The "materiel" of this entire class of Sciences consists, in the last analysis, for the most

part of ideas, concepts, notions, which spring up within the mind itself, by the action of subjective laws and processes of thinking, feeling, and acting. The validity and truth of this class of sciences will, therefore, depend almost wholly, upon the care and accuracy with which these elementary ideas and concepts and notions are fashioned, and the correctness with which the deductive processes of reasoning upon them, or from them, shall be carried on. If this work of fashioning the elementary ideas and concepts, and of reasoning thereupon, shall be performed with entire correctness, the resultant systems of thought will be free from all admixture of error; and, thus, be intellectually nutritive, and practically reliable, and wholly deserving of the name of Science.

SEC. 2. *How our Method aids in the above-mentioned Processes.*

The correctness with which the above-named work is wrought, is, and must be, chiefly conditioned upon the clearness with which the Ideas and Concepts of the mind are envisaged, as they shall be inspected in Self-consciousness, and the fullness and accuracy with which the relations involved in them shall be perceived and stated in the reasoning processes.

And, it is here, in the securement of this clearness of envisagement, and this fullness and accuracy of apprehension of abstract relations, that our

Method is capable of furnishing the most valuable assistance. For, it perpetually insists upon turning the eye of the soul within, and scanning the ideas and ongoings of the mind by the power of Reflective Sight and Insight, in utter disregard of the names that may have been appropriated to these ideas and ongoings, or of the customary explanations advanced respecting them; while asseverating, at the same time, that, if this introspective labor be well and thoroughly done, all mistakes will be avoided, the reasoning will bear the stamp of demonstration, and the conclusions arrived at will be absolutely trustworthy. A rigid application of the Rules of this Method, in the construction of those Sciences which rest upon abstract ideas, and their respectively perceived relations, could not fail of imparting to such Sciences, and to their concluding statements, an almost mathematical positiveness and certitude; a degree of positiveness and certitude at least surpassing any contained in that knowledge wrought out by purely Inductive modes of search—that knowledge which so nourishes the pride and arrogance of our Modern Physical Scientists. For, no species of either Inductive or Deductive knowledge can be made to carry such certainty with it, as that which depends upon purely abstract and subjective ideas, and their reflectively perceived relations. In this field of inquiry, indeed, absolute truth may be attained

since here every thing hinges upon the accuracy of the mind's action; which, as our Method teaches, may be perfectly determined by the Intuitive Sight and Insight of the Reason: not upon the adequate fullness of our Induction of facts, nor upon the conformity of our Sense-perceptions to the actual truth of things in Nature; neither of which have we any means of ascertaining with certainty.

SEC. 3. *The Moral and Rational Sciences, when aided by a proper Method, contain reliable Knowledge.*

Those Sciences, the "materiel" of which lies mostly within the domain of Consciousness, and may be subjected, in good part, to the direct examination of Self-conscious Reflection, have the advantage, as to reliability and certainty, over those which are concerned with the objects, movements, and laws of the outer world. The former, when supplied with a proper Method for conducting such inspection, may be built up with an ever-during strength and solidity, so as to afford full satisfaction to the demands of the Intellect; while the latter, will ever be subject to change and revolution as the result of more extended observation and experiment, and the multiplication and more perfect construction of instruments for penetrating into the secret workings of Nature. And those branches of learning which satisfy the Intellect with the relia-

bility and certainty of the knowledge they contain and supply, present, of course, the greatest attractions to the mind of the Student and Scholar, and will, therefore, invite, and be most likely to gain, the most assiduous cultivation.

We may suppose, it is because of the demonstrative and absolute character of the Science of Mathematics, that it has so many devotees, who delight to revel in its mystic and curious combinations, and has been carried to such a height of perfection. For, the practical use that can be made of Mathematical knowledge, in the business and commerce of every-day life, is very limited indeed; at least, the extent of the practical application of this kind of knowledge will bear no comparison whatever with that of the Moral and Mental Sciences. And the supposition of reliability and certainty of Physical Learning, awakened, partly, by the obtrusive nature of the subject with which it deals, but more especially by the arrogant pretensions and boastings of its modern cultivators, is the chief cause of the special zest and enthusiam with which it is prosecuted in these days.

Now, let the impression once be made upon the minds of those in search of truth, that the Rational and Moral Sciences—those which are allied to, and spring from, Psychology, and are the outgrowth of subjective forms of thought—are capable of attaining to the highest degree of certainty, and of feeding

the Intellect with the most absolute species of truth, and we may confidently anticipate a speedy increase in the number of their devotees, and greater amplitude and perfection in the knowledge which they will include. Such an impression, followed by this result, it is to be hoped, and is my expectation, will be effected by the exposition herein made, of a Method specially designed for, and adapted to, the investigation of the facts, laws, and causes of the interior world of Consciousness.

SEC. 4. *Growth and Perfection of the Moral and Rational Sciences would confer the largest Blessings upon Mankind.*

Should the anticipation suggested in the foregoing section be realized, I am sure that thereby the greatest possible blessings would be conferred upon mankind. For, it must be confessed, that hitherto, those parts of learning which include Psychologic forms of thought, and are allied to Psychologic Science, denominated Rational and Moral, have, in popular estimation, suffered in comparison with those treating upon Physical Nature, as possessing less fullness of sound and useful knowledge; and are being still further pushed into the background, and minified as to importance, through the influence now being exerted in the learned world—by the principles of the Positive Philosophy. It is quite customary, in these days, to refer to them as being less honorable, and less

worthy of careful and studious attention, than those which have to do with Matter, its movements and forces. Whereas, in truth, they are the most worthy and beneficent of the Sciences. Their principles are involved, and find practical application, in all the relations of human life, and in all the ways through which human thought and feeling and volition gain expression. Psychology, and the studies allied thereto, have an immediate bearing upon all the manifestations, whether in Consciousness or in conduct, of all the living energies of our being. These Sciences, therefore, relate more intimately to the welfare and happiness of men, than any other forms of scientific knowledge; and, hence, they are entitled to the first place in our estimation, and their study ought to be pursued with the greatest ardor and devotion.

The esteem in which these studies shall generally be held, is the sure index of the intellectual and moral elevation of the times—the criterion of the degree of culture of the People in that which is noblest and best. While, conversely, their assiduous prosecution serves to develop, to the greatest extent, the most exalted of man's mental attributes, and to lead on the Race to the achievement of its highest destiny.

And, my earnest and expectant prayer is, that the Theory of Method, expounded in this work,

may largely contribute, both to enhance the esteem with which the Psychologic, Rational, and Moral Sciences shall be regarded, and to stimulate the zeal, and promote the success, of their cultivation: all to the benefit of mankind, and the glory of God.

THE END.

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